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ANGLIA RUSKIN UNIVERSITY 
ABSTRACT 
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THE ECLECTIC ECONOMIST: A GUIDE FOR BECOMING A 
RADICAL PLURALIST 
IMKO MEYENBURG 
MAY 2016 
The aim of this thesis is to explore eclecticism, its relationship with pluralism and to 
achieve a suitable definition and justification for its adoption with regard to economic 
research. In this dissertation eclecticism shall be understood as a philosophical leitmotif 
for the individual researcher to be unprejudiced, to have no commitment to a particular 
school of thought but to treat them all as a priori valuable for the pursuit of one's 
research aspiration by deliberately choosing from the available range of historical and 
modern economic concepts, ideas, theories and practices.  
To achieve this particular aim, this thesis i) investigates the history of eclecticism as a 
philosophical concept as well as its modern applications, ii) develops a differentiation 
between eclecticism and pluralism based on an inquiry into the pluralist literature, iii) 
formulates a suitable definition of eclecticism and iv) develops a justification for 
eclectic research in economics. The justification formulated in this thesis specifically 
focuses on the question of how eclectic choice of theory, methods and concepts from 
different schools of thought can be made without commitment to any reference 
framework that would define the criteria from which to choose from.  
The result of the philosophical enquiry suggests that eclectic choice is justified, when 
choice is understood as migration between different cognitive aims and methodological 
norms (Laudan, 1978, 1987, 1996) on different levels of abstraction, and can become 
necessary when this migration is used to trigger epistemological crises (MacIntyre, 
1977), which are events for a school of thought, or entire disciplines, to make any 
intellectual progress. The research further argues that migration on the level of schools 
of thought, and their respected cognitive aims and methodological norms, remains easy 
for the eclectic. On the other hand, migration between higher levels becomes 
increasingly difficult the further one moves to those higher levels. The thesis concludes 
that eclecticism is a recommendable research philosophy for the individual economists, 
who wishes to internalise pluralism. 
Keywords: Eclecticism, Pluralism, Economics, Schools of Thought, Philosophy of 
Social Sciences, Philosophy of Economics, Rational Choice Theory, Ontology, 
Epistemology, Methodology  
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CHAPTER 0: THE ECLECTIC ECONOMIST INTRODUCED  
The success of your presentation will be judged not by the 
knowledge you send but by what the listener receives. – 
Lilly Walters 
 
0.1. THE MOTIVATION OF THE ECLECTIC ECONOMISTS 
This dissertation is a study of eclecticism and, to some extent, pluralism, for now 
understood as the need of acceptance and use of the existing multiplicity of schools of 
thought, and their relationship in the context of economics. The choice of this topic is 
initially founded on a dichotomy in economics, where an ever present orthodoxy, often 
called mainstream or neoclassical economics, dominates over a heterodoxy, lesser 
known schools of thought of scholars who rebel against the mainstream and its 
conceptual and methodological choices. My exposure to the heterodox literature during 
my Masters lead to my self-commitment to the heterodoxy and reinforced the adoption 
of research interests beyond what is usually found in the mainstream. Yet, an additional 
dissatisfaction with contemporary economics teaching and practice, i.e. a feeling of 
inability of theory to connect with my experiences with the real world, started even 
earlier during my undergraduate years in Germany. The heterodox literature then helped 
me to formulate this feeling of discontent into a more rigorous criticism of theory and 
practice, mainly focusing on the inability of economics to deal with the real world (see, 
for instance, Lawson, 2001). This problem became particularly obvious in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis of 2007/2008, a crisis that showed that underlying contemporary 
economic equilibrium models could neither predict nor deal with the consequences of 
the crash of the financial system (Bezemer, 2009; Desai, 2015). The absence of 
predictive, or even explanatory, models in economics and the institutional reluctance to 
listen to warning voices from scholars, such as Keen (2006), who uses Minsky's (1994) 
models to partly predict the financial crisis, Baker (2006) or Roubini (2008), made the 
demand for a change and an increase of inclusiveness in economics more prominent 
among a wider audience of academics, students and members of the public; a wave I 
rode on as well. This event almost 10 years ago was, however, by no means the 
beginning of criticism of economics itself, as I found out during my studies. 
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The history of criticism of economics is almost as old as the discipline itself. It ranges, 
for instance, from Alfred Marshall's (1920) critical comments on the idea of 
equilibrium, over Keynes' (2008) distrust of an overuse of mathematical modelling, to 
Nobel Prize winner Douglas North's (North, 1993, section I, para. 2) assessment that 
“neo-classical theory is simply an inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe policies 
that will induce development”. Neither as an undergraduate nor postgraduate student 
was I ever exposed to such ideas and in almost 6 years of being a university student I 
have learned nothing about the history of economic thought. Today, the criticism found 
in the literature addresses ontological, epistemological and methodological issues found 
in contemporary economic research and teaching. The “insistence on mathematical-
deductive modelling” (Lawson, 2006, p.492) as the best methodology to conduct 
research in economics, in conjunction with the failure to formulate models which are 
appropriate representations of the nature they supposed to represent, created a strong 
resistance among some scholars to this particular procedure; a resistance that is shared 
by me and is used for a general motivation behind the research conducted here. 
Additionally, the limited appreciation of different schools of thought in economics and 
the lack of history of the discipline in university curricula emphases this critical position 
even further.  
While the dissatisfaction with the current methodology in economics is a starting point 
for the motivation of this research, it is by no means the only reason this study on 
eclecticism has been conducted. The choice to study eclecticism is more substantially 
motivated, within the pluralist framework, by the absence of discussion about this topic 
as well as the generally perceived negative attitude towards it, which makes eclecticism 
a somewhat controversial choice of topic. Controversy is, of course, a less scholarly 
rigorous motivation, but it makes the pursuit of this research and the possible outcome 
more interesting. Additionally, the absence of discussion of eclecticism in the economic 
literature creates a rather substantive gap; a luxury or opportunity not many PhD 
research projects have these days. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the 
motivation of this research is closely related to the funding I received in the past three 
years. The awarded PhD scholarship, which allowed me to conduct this research and 
was provided by the Institute of International Management Practice and the Lord 
Ashcroft International Business School at Anglia Ruskin University, required the focus 
of the research to lie within the pluralist movement in economics. This scholarship 
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therefore provided not only a general, extrinsic financial, but more importantly a 
contextual motivation for the specific choice of eclecticism as topic.  
Hence, the aim of this study is to explore eclecticism and achieve a suitable definition 
and justification for it with regards to economic research, rather than providing another 
criticism of the mainstream. Moreover, with the absence of comparative data, a standard 
discussion of methods and methodological approaches for qualitative and quantitative 
research regarding data collection, data processing and data interpretation, as found in 
mainstream economics and other general research does not apply for this thesis. Instead, 
the thesis places emphasis on the philosophical discussion of relevant concepts, ideas 
and theories on which the academic narrative on eclecticism will rest. To achieve this 
discussion appropriate analytical tools will be applied to explore eclecticism, where 
Toulmin's (2003) strategy for argumentation serves as the underlying framework for the 
formulation of the correct movements from prepositions to the conclusions.  
Additionally, the arguments developed in this dissertation supports the pluralist 
movement in its attempt to change economics in practice and possibly teaching. In this 
dissertation eclecticism shall be understood as a philosophical leitmotif for the 
individual researcher to be unprejudiced, to have no commitment to a particular school 
of thought and to treat them as a priori valuable for the pursuit of one's research 
aspiration by deliberately choosing from the available range of historical and modern 
economic concepts, ideas, theories and practices, a definition arrived at from the 
substantive literature review conducted in chapter 2.  
 
0.2. RESEARCH AIM OF THIS DISSERTATION 
For the realisation of this goal, the following research objectives, with the third one 
considered most important, are formulated for the successful realisation of this goal: 
1. Investigate the history of eclecticism as a philosophical concept as well as 
its modern applications. 
2. Develop a differentiation between eclecticism and pluralism based on an 
inquiry into the pluralist literature. 
3. The formulation of a suitable definition of eclecticism and the 
development of a justification for eclectic research in economics. 
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While the research aim and these objectives provide the focus of the following chapters, 
the central research question for this dissertation emerged from the completion of the 
investigation of the history of eclecticism and its modern application as stated in 
objective number 1. With the definition of eclecticism coming from the identification of 
the most important commonalities and themes within the eclectic literature, i.e. the 
choice from elements of philosophical sects, schools of thought or paradigm-like 
groupings1 or conceptual schemes2 as well as a strong anti-dogmatic stance, the central 
research question of this dissertation, which arose from these elements, is formulated as 
follows: 
How can choices of theory, methods or concepts from different schools of 
thought, paradigm-like groupings and conceptual schemes be made if the 
eclectic does not commit to any reference framework that would define the 
criteria with which choice can be made? 
It is this particular problem of choice, as I wish to call it for the remainder of this 
dissertation, that becomes the motivation behind chapter three, and ultimately the main 
contribution of this research. While the definition of eclecticism and the identification 
of the main philosophical arguments from the eclectic and pluralist literature are 
important, their investigation is relatively straight-forward. In contrast, the problem of 
choice is a much more serious and challenging issue. How can we, in the absence of 
objective, i.e. framework independent, criteria for choice, make choices and be eclectic? 
Is it not true that, under these assumptions, commitment must be given and that a 
commitment-free attitude will result in indecisiveness, absence of structure and rigour? 
One of the central sentiments eclecticism faces is exactly this. Some commitment to 
scientific principles or moral codes, or whatever, are necessary to make a judgement, to 
be discriminatory, to decide what is right or wrong, what is true or false, desired or 
undesired. If not held we may otherwise invite a relativistic world where 'everything 
goes' (Feyerabend, 1993). If we, however, believe that a minimum of commitment is 
necessary, then we can argue that eclecticism is futile. Yet, the argument developed in 
this dissertation claims that eclecticism, with its inherent denial of commitment as one 
__________________________ 
1 The term paradigm-like groupings is introduced in this dissertation, and further explained in chapter 3, to represent 
discursive groups of researchers that share specific characteristics, which are not limited to individual schools of 
thought. It is, however, argued in agreement with Kuhn (2012) that his phrase paradigm itself makes no sense in 
social sciences and therefore, for the lack of a better term, paradigm-like groupings are used. 
2 Conceptual schemes shall be understood as essential, shared frameworks that allow us to make sense of raw sense 
data (Case, 1997; Rescher, 2008; Little, 2010). 
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of its central tenets, remains feasible. The conclusion presented here argues that eclectic 
choice is justified, when choice is understood as migration between different cognitive 
aims and methodological norms (Laudan, 1978, 1987, 1996) on different levels of 
abstraction, schools of thought, paradigm-like groupings and conceptual schemes, and 
can become necessary when this migration is used to trigger epistemological crises 
(MacIntyre, 1977), which are events for a school of thought, or disciplines, to make any 
intellectual progress.  
This conceptualisation of choice further argues that migration between schools of 
thought, and their respected cognitive aims and methodological norms, remains easy for 
the eclectic, while migration between higher level paradigm-like groupings and 
conceptual schemes becomes increasingly difficult the further one moves to those 
higher levels. Secondly, the use of cognitive aims and methodological norms allows for 
a coherent definition of schools of thought in economics which considers the existence 
of some shared aims and norms across these schools. This is due to the existence of 
higher level aims and norms as well as their historic development. Finally, the rationale 
developed here does not claim that epistemological crises are the objective guiding 
principle whose existence is denied in the first place by the literature discussed in 
chapter 3. It is itself embedded in a framework and can be formulated in a hypothetical 
imperative, which is only acceptable when shared across different schools or paradigm-
like groups. Eclecticism in this dissertation itself relies on specific aims and norms from 
a pluralist framework and it is argued that commitment to these is reasonable unless 
some better arguments are found or needed after one migrates. Lastly, it is important to 
clarify that sharing aims and norms does not make them neutral or objective, thus we 
avoid arguing that the underlying principles of the justification of eclecticism are 
themselves framework-independent. 
 
0.3. WHAT THE ECLECTIC ECONOMISTS CONTRIBUTES 
From this argument, there are certain areas where this dissertation specifically 
contributes to knowledge in philosophy of economic and social sciences. First of all, 
this dissertation critically outlines the historical, philosophical conceptualisation of 
eclecticism in conjunction with the comprehensive work by Donini (1988) and adds to it 
recent developments in the modern, social scientific literature, such as pedagogy, social 
science, law and economics, mixed method research and psychology, via in-depth 
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analyses. This inquiry provides us with a broad understanding of the concept of 
eclecticism and its meaning in the light of its historical development. Moreover, some 
aspects left out by Donini (1988) are explained, for instance the role of Immanuel Kant 
in the decline of eclecticism in the middle of the enlightenment, thus making a small 
contribution to the history of philosophy. Secondly, at the time of writing, this 
dissertation provides a comprehensive, original use of the literature about rational 
theory choice in chapter 3 to justify eclectic choice in economics. As such, it develops a 
new perspective on the rationality of theory, method and other framework choices, 
which is used to defend the defined eclectic choice. This contribution also complements 
the pluralist literature in economics, where the eclectic choice is partly a new argument 
in the literature specifically exploring the possibility of rational theory choice, while it 
further relies on existing arguments from the pluralist literature, thus making the link 
stronger. 
Additionally, minor contributions are made in the area of ontological and 
epistemological pluralism. With the lack of a satisfying definition of ontological 
pluralism in the pluralist literature, a definition from contemporary meta-ontology, 
specifically from Kris McDaniel (2009, 2010a; b, 2013a; b, 2014) and Jason Turner 
(2010, 2012), is applied in this research to comprehensively conceptualise eclectic 
choice, while a more detailed inquiry into this topic will be done in a separate 
publication (Meyenburg, forthcoming). Likewise, this dissertation suggests a 
perspective on epistemological pluralism that, at the time of writing and to my 
knowledge, was not discussed in this particular way in the pluralist literature. Here, 
knowledge is considered an epistemic fundamental (Williamson, 2000) where several 
criteria can be applied to define specific, framework-dependent kinds of knowledge 
(Schurz, 2011). Finally, in order to fully formulate the justification for eclectic choice, 
this dissertation uses Larry Laudan's (1978, 1987, 1996) concept of cognitive aims and 
methodological norms to redefine schools of thought in economics, as well as 
paradigm-like groupings, which is an extension to an idea about the definition of 
schools of thought presented by Negru (2007).  
 
0.4. OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
In order to achieve its contribution to knowledge, as well as to answer the research 
question, to fulfil the research objectives and arrive at the research aim, the remainder of 
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this dissertation is organised in the following four chapters. Chapter 1, the 
methodological preliminaries, outlines the pluralist literature in order to support the 
achievement of research objective number 2. Therefore, the chapter critically describes 
the major arguments for ontological, epistemological and methodological pluralism, 
whereat it is shown that the conceptualisations of ontological pluralism are intellectually 
unsatisfactory and I therefore supplement it with additional literature from 
contemporary philosophy. With regards to epistemological pluralism, the major point 
here is the uncertainty of knowledge, i.e. there is not one best answer to the question of 
what knowledge is (McCloskey, 1994; Dow, 1997). Thirdly, the literature on 
methodological pluralism is shown and the major argument of the non-existence of a 
single decisive method for research is presented. Here, methodological pluralism relies 
on the post-positivistic arguments supposedly first introduced into economics by 
Caldwell (1982), which is related, and therefore similar, to the argument for uncertain 
knowledge. From the lack of a single best method it is claimed that different 
methodologies and methods need to be respected and applied. Additionally, chapter 1 
discusses the literature on pluralism relying on the need of academic freedom of 
discussion and tolerance of different approaches, which is different from the 
ontological, epistemic and methodological arguments by virtue of its ethical dimension. 
Lastly, the concept of schools of thought discussed in the heterodox literature and the 
differentiation between heterodox and orthodox economics are presented for the 
purpose of a general understanding of these themes and because they are used in later 
chapters.  
The following chapter 2 is mainly concerned with achieving objective 1, the 
investigation into the history of eclecticism with the help of a key text from Donini 
(1988), and its modern application, as well as supporting objective 2. The chapter is 
organised thematically and historically, beginning with the identification of eclecticism 
as a philosophical concept in ancient Greece and Roman philosophy. Eclecticism of that 
time, however, is difficult to define, as it relies mostly on secondary interpretation in the 
absence of self-proclaimed eclectics of that time. The next time period covers the 
writings of philosophers in the early enlightenment, a time where eclecticism was most 
prominent. Additionally Moraux's (1984) concept of identifying eclecticism in historical 
writings is introduced. This specific conceptualisation is the most promising candidate 
for the identification of eclecticism among individuals who did not call themselves 
eclectic. Then, the modern eclectic literature found in educational research, psychology, 
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mixed method research and sociology and economics, is critically presented and the 
major arguments are outlined. It is shown how deliberate choice is a central aspect, as 
well as arguments about the inherent limitations of theories and methods to develop full 
narratives about research objects under investigation. The modern literature is followed 
by a discussion of so called idealistic eclecticism, i.e. philosophers who were not only 
describing, or trying to find, eclecticism among other historical figures but were 
outspoken eclectics themselves. According to them, eclecticism is a kind of ideal 
philosophy that one should strive for. At the end, the chapter looks at the critical 
literature which develops anti-eclectic arguments and provides a rationale for the 
possible reasons of the decline of eclecticism, which is associated with Immanuel Kant. 
The chapter closes with the definition of eclecticism, which is derived from the major 
common characteristics found in the literature and forms the basis for this dissertation.  
The investigation in the history of eclecticism is followed by the third chapter, which is 
concerned with objectives 2 and 3 and is mainly aiming at answering the primary 
research question. The chapter begins with a comparison of the central arguments of the 
pluralist and eclectic literature, confirming the claim that eclecticism is an individual 
form of pluralism. After this, the problem of choice, i.e. rational theory, method or 
concept choice, is discussed with a review of pro and contra rational choice literature 
from philosophy of sciences. The possibility of choice is then defined with the help of 
MacIntyre's (1977, 1984, 1988) concept of epistemological crises and Laudan's (1978, 
1987, 1996) cognitive aims and methodological norms, which are also used to redefine 
schools of thought and are applied to paradigm-like groupings and conceptual schemes. 
It is argued that in the absence of an objective rationality, i.e. no objective guiding 
principles, epistemological crises, which frustrate specific schools of thought's or 
paradigm like grouping's narratives, can assist to acknowledge the need for change or 
migration from within a relative framework, thus avoiding a possible accusation of 
objectivity, while migration remains limited by virtue of the framework from which one 
tries to migrate. This means that depending on the level where the framework is found, 
migration becomes more or less difficult, with migration between schools of thought 
arguably being the easiest while migration between cognitive schemes remains nearly 
impossible. This migration is then defined as eclectic choice. The chapter finishes with 
a short illustration of how eclectic choice on the levels of schools of thought, paradigm-
like groupings and conceptual schemes can be made with the help of a few relevant 
examples in the heterodox economic context.  
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Finally, chapter 4 constitutes a discussion chapter that arose from critical questions I 
received from supervisors, peers and colleagues as result of presentations, supervision 
meetings or more general discussion of this research project, its aim and question. I 
decided to take the five most challenging comments to develop this chapter and provide 
elaborate answers to them, without assuming completeness of the list of criticism 
against eclecticism. The chapter begins with Sheila Dow's (1997, 2007) criticism of 
eclecticism, which is already discussed in chapter 2, and argues against her idea that 
eclecticism constitutes unstructured pluralism. Secondly, the argument that eclectic 
research is not practically feasible is discussed and partly dismissed. It is granted that 
eclectic research is difficult to impossible for short-term research projects with tight 
deadlines, while long-term research can be done eclectically. Thirdly, it is discussed 
whether eclecticism is just another way of doing mixed-method research. Since there is 
eclectic literature from the mixed-method research community, it appears that these 
concepts are interchangeable. It is argued, however, that both concepts are merely 
identical on the level of method, and possibly theory choice, but not on the level of 
paradigm-like grouping or even conceptual scheme choice. Fourthly, and similar to 
three, the chapter looks at the question of whether eclecticism is simply another word 
for pragmatism. Here, it is argued that the perceived commonalities of eclecticism and 
pragmatism is due to the general influence the latter had on the 20th century’s 
philosophy of science and that pragmatic thought can be found almost everywhere in 
modern day philosophy of sciences literature, while it is also shown where both 
philosophies are different. Lastly, the concern about whether or not eclecticism 
ultimately leads to relativism is discussed. Just like in the previous discussion on 
pragmatism, it is shown that relativistic thoughts have entered and remained in the 
philosophy of sciences and are therefore present in the eclectic literature. For instance, it 
is shown that underdetermination of theories (Quine, 1951; Duhem, 1991) is an 
underlying, relativistic concept not only found in the eclectic literature, but observably 
discussed by many contemporary philosophers. Moreover, it is shown that relativism 
does not necessarily deserves its negative reputation and that it needs to be 
distinguished from subjectivism. This means that the question of this sub-chapter is 
answered positively, i.e. eclecticism leads to relativism, but that relativism is not 
inevitably an abominable philosophy.  
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What I hope to achieve with this dissertation is to support scholars in their research and 
maybe to become the “complete economist” George Shackle (1952, as cited in Steele, 
2004) described, where 
a man [sic!] need[s] only [to] be mathematician, a philosopher, a 
psychologists, an antropologhist, a historian, a geographer, and a student of 
politics; a master of prose exposition; a man of the world with the 
experience of practical business and finance, an understanding of the 
problem of administration and a good knowledge of four or five languages. 
All this in addition, of course, to familiarity with the economic literature 
itself.  
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CHAPTER 1: METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES 
I affirm that the forces who regard pluralism as a virtue, 
“moderate” though that may make them sound, are far more 
profoundly revolutionary – Christopher Hitchens (2011, 
p.xvii). 
 
Before the analysis of historical and contemporary eclecticism can be conducted and 
before the primary justification for it can be developed, it is necessary to investigate the 
constituents and themes of pluralism and other heterodox thoughts in economics. As the 
main argument will rely and refer to this area of the discipline quite often in the 
remainder of this dissertation, it seems necessary to begin by clarifying what is actually 
meant by the pluralist literature seems necessary. Hence, ideas of pluralism in the 
literature presented in this chapter as well as a conceptual clarification of the nature of 
economic schools of thought, although later adjusted for the purpose of this research, 
and the differences between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. The justification for 
eclecticism, formulated in chapter 3, will touch on all of these areas, specifically the 
new definition for schools of thought is in juxtaposition to previous ones, and therefore 
it is required to introduce them beforehand so that the reader will have no difficulty to 
understand the references made later. Furthermore, it is argued here that the 
comprehensibility of this research dissertation is supported by the clarifications of the 
central tenets of pluralism in the beginning, instead of explaining these tenets when 
mentioned in the later chapters. 
This chapter will begin with the discussion of pluralism, further subdividing it into 
ontological, epistemological and methodological pluralism. This is followed by an 
additional, but short, exploration of pleas for tolerance with regards to pluralism. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the literature on schools of thought in economics as 
well as the differences between heterodoxy and orthodoxy. The discussed literature is, 
for the purpose of clarification, not limited to contributions in economics, but involves 
other work in contemporary philosophy. 
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1.1 PLURALISM 
Bruce Caldwell (1982) is generally credited with for introducing pluralism into the 
economic literature with his book Beyond Positivism. Herein, he refutes positivism and 
falsificationism, and declares that the quest for one best single method in social sciences 
is over. Soon after, other academics entered into the debate about pluralism and it 
became a vivid subcategory in the heterodox community. Not all heterodox economists 
are pluralists, or have written about pluralism. Therefore it is important not to confuse 
heterodoxy and pluralism with each other.  
It appears that there are, broadly speaking, two positions on pluralism in the literature. 
The first one is of a rather practical nature informed by a specific ontological stance, 
whilst the other appears to be represented by a virtuous principle of tolerance (Eliassen, 
forthcoming). Other positions, related to the first one, deal with the questions of 
epistemological uncertainty and methodological pluralism. It will be shown, that these 
principles are also apparent in the eclectic literature and are important points for the 
justification of eclectic choice in chapter 3.  
For further clarification, and as guide for the remainder of this dissertation, Fleetwood's 
(2005, p.197) summary of ontology, epistemology and methodology, and their 
relationship with each other, shall be used. He says that 
[t]he way we think the world is (ontology), influences: what we think we 
can be known about it (epistemology); how we think it can be investigated 
(methodology and research techniques); the kinds of theories we think can 
be constructed about it; and the political and policy stances we are prepared 
to take. 
From this definition we can understand that pluralism ranges over all three areas, as 
shown in the following sections. In chapter 3, we will also take another look at 
ontological positions and although they are explained with a slightly different 
vocabulary, Fleetwood's (2005) definitions shall serve as clarifying idea in the 
background.   
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1.1.1. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE PLURALISM 
 
1.1.1.1. ONTOLOGY 
In philosophy of science, ontology concerns itself with the nature and structure of 
reality (Fleetwood, 2005). This philosophical concept finds its origin in ancient Greece, 
where Parmenides of Elea [5th century BC] is associated with being one of the first 
philosophers writing about the nature of existence. Negru (2007) summarises his 
philosophical thoughts as a logical dichotomy regarding the nature of existence and 
non-existence; in particular, anything existing cannot, by definition, not exist. And 
according to Russell (2013, p.56)  the essence of Parmendies argument is the following:  
When you think, you think of something; when you use a name, it must be 
the name of something. Therefore both thought and language require objects 
outside themselves. And since you can think of a thing or speak of it at one 
time as well as another, whatever can be thought of or spoken of must exist 
at all times. Consequently there can be no change, since change consists in 
things coming into being or ceasing to be3. 
Aristotle is another prominent Greek philosopher concerning himself with ontological 
questions. In his earlier work, Aristotle introduced several Categories of being, e.g. 
substance, quality, quantity, relation and others. Substance has a special role as it exists 
independently, while other categories exist only in relation to substances (Cohen, 2012). 
Russell (2013) simplifies substances by referring to linguistic examples. Here, 
substances are things with proper names such as the Sun, the Moon, John or Michael. 
Aristotle’s criterion of substance is that it is “neither in a subject nor said of a subject” 
(Cohen, 2012, p.no pagination). Contrary to substance are universals, categories or 
adjectives that encompass many substances, such as men or animals. Then, the sentence 
‘John is a man’ consists of the substance ‘John’ and the universal ‘man’ (Russell, 2013).  
Throughout the history of philosophy several different ontological positions have been 
developed. Classifying these ontological traditions in philosophy is, however, a difficult 
task. Negru (2007), for instance, identifies four major traditions investigating ontology. 
The materialist tradition holds that existing entities are composed of, or are the result of, 
the interaction of matter alone. Contrary to this position stands the idealist tradition, 
__________________________ 
3 At this point it shall not be discussed whether the specific claim at the end of this quote is justified or not. 
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arguing that reality is not independent but constructed by the minds of individuals. The 
dualist tradition arose from criticism of both materialist and idealist positions and 
argues for the existence of more than one ontological category, thing or principle, i.e. in 
materialism matter and in idealism mind. This position is most prominent in the 
philosophical debate about the relationship between the mind and the body. Concluding 
this list is the agnostic tradition, which argues that ontological categories are not 
rigorous enough to find exclusive definitions, e.g. does a magnetic field fall into 
materialistic category (Negru, 2007)? Within these four traditions exists a variety of 
sub-categories that present variations of the core principles of these traditions, for 
example realism, physicalism, post-modernism, positivism or interpretivism etc.  
In social sciences, and especially in economics, ontological positions are far more 
localised inside the academic disciplines (Negru, 2007). In mainstream economics, 
however, ontology has no important role and questions about the nature of, for instance, 
money or markets are rarely addressed. Tony Lawson (e.g. 1997, 2003b, 2004) is a 
prominent member of a group of heterodox economist engaging with these questions 
and is acknowledged to be a driving force behind the discussion of ontological 
questions in economics. He applies a critical realist approach based upon the work of 
Roy Bhaskar (1998, 2008), and others, focusing on the question regarding the 
possibility of a scientific study of society against the background “to what extent” 
society can “be studied in the same way as nature”, which he ultimately rejects to some 
extent by virtue of the nature of economic entities. He proposes a social ontology that 
rest upon “the study of what is, or what exists, on the social domain; the study of social 
entities or social things; and the study of what all the social entities or things that are, 
have in common” (Lawson, 2004, p.2).  
Although ontological questions are seldom discussed by mainstream economist, there is 
evidence that they subscribe to positions that would answer Bhaskar’s (1998) question 
with 'yes'. These ontological positions can be traced back to the early days of 
economics, with Francis Edgeworth (1881, p.v) as prominent example arguing that 
there is no difference “between the Principles of Greatest Happiness (…) and those 
Principles of Maximum Energy (…) [in] which mathematical reasoning is applicable to 
physical phenomena quite as complex as human life”. Nowadays such positions are, of 
course, more sophisticated, but empirical economists still relate to economic facts in a 
way that clear event regularities can be derived from econometric techniques, that 
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economic actors share the same view in economic reality and that this reality exists 
independent of these actors (Negru, 2007).  
On this, Friedman (1953) famously writes that economics, or in his words 'positive 
economics', can provide the same level of objectivity as natural sciences despite the 
existing social interrelations of human beings and the involvement of the subject in its 
research object. Although he does not refer to ontology per se, the ontological realist, 
and reductionist, position clearly stands out from his essay. Critical realists, on the other 
hand, put their emphasis on causal mechanism and not on such empirical event 
regularities, whereas they highlight the complexity and openness of the economy and 
the society, thus denying reductionism altogether. Furthermore, these causal 
mechanisms do not have to rely on existing entities as Fleetwood (2005) describes. 
According to him it is not important whether or not God exists. As long as the idea of 
God exists and has an impact on human behaviour it must be considered to be real.  
Likewise, any kind of economic or social stimuli must be taken seriously when they are 
able to motivate economic actions. In his 1984 book Simulacra and Simulation 
Baudrillard (1984) develops a similar argument and introduces the simulacra that, in 
different stages, loses their reference to reality to a point where a 'thing' has no reality at 
all. A famous example is Disneyland, which is said to be a combination of reality and 
imagination. Baudrillard (1984) now argues that this distinction cannot be made 
because the reality, i.e. an ideology of the American way of life displayed in 
Disneyland, is itself an imagination. Nonetheless, it can be said that these simulacra 
have obviously strong influence on human actions, as thousands of visitors come and 
interact in these parks every day. 
So, does ontology matter as Negru (2007) asks? According to Lawson (1997, 2003a; b, 
2004, 2006) and Dow (1997, 2004) it does. Both scholars subscribe to open-system 
ontology4 that marks the important distinction between heterodox and orthodox 
economics, which will be discussed below in more detail. Especially in regard to the 
discussion of pluralism, Dow (1997, p.89) says it “is the philosophical position that the 
ultimate reality of the universe consists of a plurality of entities; it is an ontological 
position”. Lawson (2003a, 2004), on the other hand, does not only propose ontology in 
__________________________ 
4 Chick and Dow (2005, p.366) clarify that the necessary conditions for open-systems are that “the system is not 
atomistic (…) agents and their interactions may change (…) structures and agency are interdependent (…) boundaries 
around and within the social or economic system are mutable (…) [and] identifiable social structures are embedded in 
larger structures”.  
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terms of pluralism, but sees it as a device to bring clarity in any scientific debate, in the 
sense of a first philosophy understood in the Aristotelian sense of the metaphysical 
study of being. Hence, ontology is also indispensable for economics, especially for 
heterodox economists.  
Contrary to this, Vromen (2004) and Guala (2008) are sceptical about the power of 
ontology in the debates on economics. Guala (2008, pp.631–632) remarks that ontology 
does matter but claims that some key issues, such as the “ontology of tendencies”, can 
be clarified “by empirical evidence, rather than a pre-scientific issue to be addressed by 
metaphysical speculations”. And Vromen (2004) provides arguments that ontological 
questions themselves are not as clear as, for instance, Lawson (1997, 2003a; b, 2004, 
2006) suggests. In regard to evolutionary economics, Vromen (2004) points out that 
ontological debates among academics in that field are far from the clarity that ontology 
would bring according to Lawson (2003a). Instead, “not only do they bring their own 
favourite ontological views to the debate, they also disagree about what ontology is all 
about in the first place” (Vromen, 2004, p.214). Furthermore, he questions the role of 
ontology in evaluating the quality of theories and models in economics as suggested by 
Lawson (2003a). Instead, he observes that the value of ontology is ultimately defined 
“by the quality of the economic theories and models they give rise to” (Vromen, 2004, 
p.214). Hence, ontology cannot be treated as a first philosophy.  
Nonetheless, it seems that ontology still matters in some way. Ontology might not 
always provide the helpful clarity in philosophical debates as Lawson (2003a) argues 
and it is thus not capable of unifying the discipline. However, this is not necessary. 
Instead, Vromen (2004) shows that there exist various ontological positions within the 
economic profession. Even positions such as Mäki’s (1997), who denies ontological 
pluralism based on the argument that a plurality of theories does not imply a plurality of 
worlds, can be counted to the existing variety of ontological positions. Hence, ontology 
matters in the way that its existing variety in economics needs to be recognised in order 
to understand the discipline. This recognition has direct implications for the eclectic 
economist, whose philosophical position of an acquisition of established positions, or 
parts of them, requires naturally a variety to choose from.   
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1.1.1.2. LAWSON AND THE OTHERS 
Ontological pluralism is rarely found in the heterodox economics literature, which 
otherwise discusses how economics should be done and why it is desirable to oppose 
the current mainstream. As shown below, the heterodoxy is, at least, united in its 
opposition to the mainstream. Lawson (2006, pp.492–493) specifies this in concluding 
that “the essence of the heterodox opposition [to the mainstream] is ontological in 
nature” simply because the nature of heterodox economics is a rejection of an emphasis 
of “mathematical-deductive method[s]” in the mainstream, which can only originate 
from a different ontological stance. This raises the question what ontological positions 
pluralists can take and what ontological pluralism, if existing, entails. Lawson (2009, 
p.118) identifies two ontological pluralist positions, without explicitly stating any 
commitment to either of them: 
Ontological pluralism, on one conception, designates the claim that multiple 
non-overlapping worlds exist (…). A second notion of ontological pluralism 
has it that our one reality contains an (at least synchronically) irreducible 
multiplicity of constituents. 
The first conception seems to be addressed when Negru (2009) explores the origin of 
ontological pluralism. She sees it as a form of opposition to an ontological monism in 
mainstream economics, which states that there exists only one economic reality. The 
opposing position would at least allow, if not claim, that multiple economic realities 
exist. Negru (2009) refers to Warren Samuels (1997a; b, 1998) as one of the few 
academics who holds such a position. And it seems that Caldwell (1997) comes to the 
same conclusion, that Samuels (Samuels, 1997a; b, 1998) tolerates ontological 
pluralism of the first category, alongside epistemological and methodological pluralism, 
as a result of his pluralistic position. 
However, Davis (2012) suggests that Samuels (1998, p.306) does not deny the existence 
of a single social reality and rather sees the world as heterogeneous, while 
acknowledging that “the possibility that the world is not heterogeneous, and that the 
multiplicity of facets may be illusory, is not denied”. With this analysis it seems that 
Samuels (1998) is ontologically rather agnostic, or falls into Lawson’s (2009) second 
conception of ontological pluralism. Later, however, it will be shown that his position 
also falls in the tolerance category of pluralism. Hence, a clear locating of his 
ontological commitment seems rather difficult. First though, I will continue to explore 
the second conception of ontological pluralism. 
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From this account it becomes obvious that ontological monism is not only present in 
mainstream economics but can also be found in the writings of heterodox economists 
like Dow (1997), Mäki (1997) and Lawson (2003a)5. Dow’s (1997, p.89) position 
becomes obvious with her definition of, interestingly, ontological pluralism as “the 
philosophical position that the ultimate reality of the universe consists of a plurality of 
entities”, while she opposes a multiplicity of worlds at the same time. Likewise, Mäki 
(1997, p.40) concludes that a “plurality of theories does not imply a plurality of 
worlds”. Instead, many theories can always refer to one world, introducing different 
aspects or perspectives on this one world. Both positions are clearly related to the 
second category of ontological pluralism and this also substantiate Caldwell’s (1997) 
assessment of Mäki’s (1997) ontological monism further.  
Moreover, we also need to introduce two different concepts of ontological monism as 
opposed to ontological pluralism to avoid confusion. Negru’s (2009) account of 
ontological pluralism and the opposing ontological monism are clearly related to 
Lawson’s (2009) first category. Hence, ontological pluralism, understood as a 
multiplicity of worlds, stands in contrast to an ontological monism of one world. What 
about the second category, where ontological pluralism describes an irreducible 
multiplicity of constituents of one world? From above, it becomes clear that this kind of 
ontological pluralism is, at first glance, equal to the ontological monism just described. 
This means that Dow (1997) and Mäki (1997) are both ontological monist and pluralist 
at the same time depending on what category we would apply, while it is unclear what 
category Lawson (2003a) would fall into. The opposite position of the second category 
of ontological pluralism would be an ontological monism or reductionism that says 
reality, and its perceived variety of constituents and entities, to be, ultimately, reduced 
to one substance. This kind of reductionism is very attractive in the natural sciences, 
where, for instance, biological systems can be reduced to chemical systems which can 
be further reduced to physical systems. And to some extent, this kind of reductionism 
can also be found in the mainstream, where everything needs to be explained in the light 
of individual behaviour6.  
__________________________ 
5 Eliassen (forthcoming) and Caldwell (1997) come to the same conclusion. 
6 This is the point where I think confusion can arise, because depending on the category we can be monist and 
pluralist at the same time. It might be necessary to redefine ontological pluralism. Two suggestions how to 
understand ontological pluralism will be discussed further below, where I will criticise Lawson’s (2009) categories in 
more detail. A more detailed exploration of ontological pluralism can be found in Meyenburg (forthcoming).  
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While opposing a plurality of worlds, Dow (1997) promotes methodological pluralism 
based upon an open-system ontology (Chick and Dow, 2005). As a result of the 
plurality of entities the one reality exists of, it is necessary to have a plurality of 
methodologies and methods able to deal with these entities. Lawson (1997, 2003a, 
2009) raises a similar point in his criticism of mainstream economics. According to him, 
the insistence of the mainstream to apply a mathematic-deductive methodology is based 
upon a closed-system ontology. He opposes this with his social ontology that, as open-
system ontology, requires a plurality of methods to conduct adequate research. Hence, 
pluralism held by heterodox economist such as Dow (1985, 1997, 2004; Chick and 
Dow, 2005; 2007) and Lawson (1997, 2001, 2003a, 2004, 2006, 2009) is informed by 
an open-system ontology and definitely falls into the second conception of ontological 
pluralism described by Lawson (2009). What about the other form he identifies and 
does not further explain?  
This other form of ontological pluralism could be brought into relation with the radical 
constructivist position of von Glasersfeld (1995) and others (see, for instance, 
Goodman, 1984). Although radical constructivism is epistemological in nature, the 
central claim that perception does not provide a picture of a mind-independent reality 
and its resulting rejection of objectivity constitutes the existence of multiple worlds 
created by individual experiences. Hence, it can be interpreted that this kind of 
constructivism is of the first category that Lawson (2009) introduces, and also, to some 
extent, what Mäki (1997) rejects. The issue with this interpretation, however, is that the 
worlds in radical constructivism are not necessarily non-overlapping. Hence, a different 
interpretation might work better. 
Another candidate for this conception of ontological pluralism could be the all possible 
world idiom in modal logic, especially in David Lewis’s (1986) modal realism. His 
interpretation of all possible worlds begins with the idea of an all-inclusive world that 
everything contains7. As a result, he concludes that  
__________________________ 
7 The idea of an all-inclusive world can be understood as follows:  
Anne is working at her desk. While she is directly aware only of her immediate situation (…) she is 
quite certain that this situation is only part of a series of increasingly more inclusive, albeit less 
immediate, situations: the situation in her house as a whole, the one in her neighborhood, the city she 
lives in, the state, the North American continent, the Earth, the solar system, the galaxy, and so on. 
On the face of it, anyway, it seems quite reasonable to believe that this series has a limit, that is, that 
there is a maximally inclusive situation encompassing all others: things, as a whole or, more 
succinctly, the actual world. (…) Intuitively, then, the actual world of which Anne's immediate 
situation is a part is only one among many possible worlds. (Menzel, 2013, p.no pagination) 
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[t]here are countless other worlds, other very inclusive things. Our world 
consists of us and all our surroundings, however remote in time and space; 
just as it is one big thing having lesser things as parts, so likewise do other 
worlds have lesser other-worldly things as part. (Lewis, 1986, p.2) 
In summary, modal realism proposes the existence of multiple non-overlapping worlds 
as a consequence of logical necessity. All worlds exist because of the possibility of 
different states of affairs, and the actual world does not enjoy any special attributes 
beside that it is our world we live in. However, at this point it is unclear whether modal 
realism ever found its way into the economic literature.  
Two final conceptions of ontological pluralism, that do not fully fit into Lawson’s 
(2009) two categories, are discussed by Matti Eklund (2009) and Kris McDaniel 
(2010b), and are explored in the following sections. For McDaniel (2010b, p.628) 
ontological pluralism, to which he subscribes, claims that “there is more to learn about 
an object’s existential status than merely whether it is or is not: there is still the question 
of how that entity exists”. Hence, ontological pluralism is the principle of different 
modes of being. This simply means that different entities can exist differently, for 
instance concrete physical objects exist differently than their shadows or holes they 
might have. The problematic opposite position, the ontological monist, “is committed to 
the unpleasant claim that holes [in cheese] are just as real as concretia, a claim that is 
apt to be met with incredulous stares by those not acquainted with contemporary 
metaphysics” (McDaniel, 2010b, p.628). There some major consequences from this 
position, which should not be underestimated.  
 
1.1.1.3. MCDANIEL’S MODES OF BEING 
McDaniel (2014, p.272) stresses that with his ontological pluralism “many metaphysical 
questions must be rethought”, and ultimately this also means that ontological questions 
in economics are affected. In combination with Lawson’s (2009) ontological pluralism, 
we not only ask whether or not the constituents of reality exist, and the reasons for their 
irreducibility, but also how they are different in their existence. This, however, does not 
mean that Lawson (2009) and McDaniel (2014) are coercively complementary, as for 
Lawson’s (2009) ontological pluralism is also compatible with McDaniel’s (2014) 
ontological monism. Why is that so? Imagine two constituents of social/economic 
reality, let us say individual agents and institutions. Following Lawson (2009), 
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institutions would be irreducible to individual behaviour, something that mainstream 
economics may assume on the other hand. With McDaniel’s (2014) definition at hand, 
the ontological monist must say that both institutions and individuals enjoy the same 
kind of being, while the ontological pluralist makes a differentiation here. It is not said, 
however, that the investigation of irreducibility must ask for kinds of being. Therefore, 
we have no necessary complimentary connection between both ontological positions.  
For the ontological pluralist there are two important questions; first of all what mode of 
being an entity enjoys and secondly in what sense the pluralist can differentiate between 
these modes (McDaniel, 2010b). The first questions seems intuitively justifiable in the 
sense that individuals, as entities of concrete matter, enjoy a different mode of being 
than non-material institutions. Let us illustrate this idea with the example of ‘holes’ 
given by McDaniel (2010b, p.628), as it makes this distinction even more striking: 
We quantify over holes, and even count them: we say, for example, that 
there are some holes in the cheese, seven to be precise. We ascribe features 
to them and talk as though they stand in relations: that hole is three feet 
wide, much wider than that tire over there. Holes apparently persist through 
time, as evidenced by the fact that my sweater has the same hole in it as the 
last time you saw me wear it. We even talk as though holes are causally 
efficacious: my ankle was badly sprained because I stepped in that hole in 
the sidewalk. It seems then that we believe in holes. If our beliefs are true, 
holes must enjoy some kind of reality. 
The example of holes in cheese and their mode of being is particularly striking, since 
holes are merely the absence of the cheese. They are, as McDaniel (2010b) calls them, 
‘almost nothing’. Going back to economics, it may make sense to ascribe different 
modes of being to different entities or concepts we deal with in our discipline.  
This brings us to the second question; how can we justify such an intuitive difference? 
McDaniel (2010b, p.630, 2014) suggests to employ two concepts here, “the concept of 
semantically primitive restricted quantifier and the concept of a natural expression”. In a 
natural language there are restricted and supposedly one unrestricted quantifier. This 
simply means that we find quantifier which quantify only over a limited amount of 
objects, therefore restricted, or over everything there is, therefore unrestricted8. 
__________________________ 
8 McDaniel (2010b) admits that ontological pluralism can be formulated without the need of unrestricted quantifiers. 
His full argument can be found in McDaniel (2009). 
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Restricted quantifiers are mostly context dependent and can easily be identified. For 
instance, if I say that ‘everything is on sale’ then the quantifier ‘everything’ only applies 
to the context of saleable objects. This naturally excludes celestial objects, such as our 
moon, since the moon cannot be on sale (Uzquiano, 2014)9. Now, semantically 
primitive restricted quantifiers are those which are restricted due to the general 
limitations of the language they are part of, i.e. the language does not allow to use them 
in every context or way. Secondly, natural expressions are those expressions which 
“carve nature at its joints” (McDaniel, 2010b, p.630), i.e. they allow us to formulate or 
create precise taxonomies. In combination with the restricted quantifiers, we can now 
say that some expressions are more natural than others. For instance, ‘X is human’ is 
more natural than ‘X is impressed by Y’, because it carves nature far better at its joints.  
It has been said that restricted quantifiers are context dependent, this means it is 
possible to make a distinction between the ranges restricted quantifiers cover. In 
McDaniel’s (2010b) illustrative example, ∃m, ranging over concrete, material objects, 
and ∃a, ranging over abstract objects, are two restricted quantifiers and ∃ is the 
unrestricted quantifier in ordinary English. If we assume that ∃m and ∃a are the only two 
modes of fundamental being, they are more natural than ∃, because ∃ can be seen as a 
disjunction of ∃m and ∃a. However, as an unrestricted quantifier ∃ ranges over 
everything there is and that does not necessarily mean it ranges only over ∃m and ∃a. If 
∃ ranges over more than just ∃m and ∃a, it must contain things that “enjoy no 
fundamental way of being”, instead they enjoy “a kind of mode of being that may be 
defined purely negatively, being-by-courtesy. Being-by-courtesy, represented by ‘∃b', 
can be defined as follows: ∃𝑏𝛷 = 𝑑𝑓. ∃𝛷 ∧ ¬(∃𝑚𝛷 ∨ ∃𝑎𝛷)” (McDaniel 2010, p.636).  
The next suggestion says that almost nothings, the holes in the cheese, are beings-by-
courtesy. This is intuitively easy to understand when referring back to the holes in the 
cheese mentioned above. Holes are intuitively existent, thus covered by ∃, but are also 
intuitively distinct in their existence the cheese, hence outside of ∃m that quantifies over 
entities like cheese only. Moreover, the existence of holes is dependent on the existence 
of the cheese. If the cheese ceases to exist, so do the holes, therefore they enjoy a being-
by-courtesy. If we allow being-by-courtesy as a realistic mode of being, we can say that 
McDaniel’s (2010b) almost nothings are beings-by-courtesy. 
__________________________ 
9 Given this context dependence, it seems rather difficult to identify unrestricted quantifier in any natural language. 
Indeed, the philosophical debate on this is rather long, as Uzquiano (2014) points out, and shall therefore not be 
pursued here. 
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For our purpose, the more interesting question is what being-by-courtesy ranges over. If 
it only ranges over almost nothings, it is not interesting for the existential questions of 
entities that are related to economics. Yet, if the class of beings-by-courtesy 
encompasses more than almost nothings, we can make a distinction modes of being 
enjoyed by different entities. In fact, some entities may enjoy fundamental modes of 
being and others are merely beings-by-courtesy and hence, some are more real than 
others. McDaniel (2010) refers to relations as another possibility of entities enjoying 
being-by-courtesy and not, as they were used to be considered, only mind-dependent 
entities. McDaniel (2010b, p.641) remarks that “necessarily, x is five feet from y if and 
only if x bears the being five feet from relation to y” is a being-by-courtesy kind of 
existence, as the relation is dependent of the existence of x and y and the distance 
between them, but not mind-dependent, because this relation could exist in a world 
without minds. This is a first indication that being-by-courtesy is not only enjoyed by 
almost nothings but other entities too. Moreover, if relations enjoy being-by-courtesy, 
“then perhaps objects that exist only when certain relations are exemplified are also 
beings by courtesy” (McDaniel, 2010b, p.641).  
As a result, we are not only having different modes of being due to restricted 
quantification but also being-by-courtesy that ranges over almost nothings and, at least 
relations. This has important implications for our ontology. As McDaniel (2010b, 
p.644) concludes: 
[I]f we accept a kind of ontological pluralism that recognizes being-by-
courtesy, then we should also accept a kind of pluralism about these 
relations as well. Just as there are modes of being, some of which are 
degenerate, there are different ways of being identical, kinds of parthood, 
modes of spatiotemporal relatedness, and so forth. 
For a further and more detailed discussion of McDaniel's (2009, 2010a; b, 2013a; b, 
2014) ontological pluralism, please refer to Meyenburg (forthcoming). The importance 
of existential quantification for the remainder of this dissertation lies in the fact they 
play an important role for the distinction of conceptual schemes, which themselves will 
be required for the justification of eclectic choice in chapter 3. It is argued that different 
conceptual schemes have, at least, different and some less natural existential quantifiers 
at their disposal.   
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1.1.1.4. EKLUND’S FEAR OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVISM 
When we talk about ontology, we tend to focus on the questions of what exists and how 
we construct our world view. Using Fleetwood's (2005, p.197) summary of ontology 
again: “[t]he way we think the world is”, which in its simplicity is not mistaken but 
leaves out an important part; the question of what we say when we say what the world 
is. A linguistic turn in ontology, addressing ontological issues from a linguistic point, 
allows new perspectives on the question of ontological pluralism McDaniel's (2009, 
2010a; b, 2013a; b, 2014). Such language sensitivity, however, does contain some 
dangers which are highlighted by Matti Eklund (2009, p.137). He critically summarises 
language sensitive conceptions of ontological pluralism as 
[a] number of different languages we could speak, such that (a) different 
existence sentences come out true in these languages, due to the fact that 
ontological expressions (counterparts of ‘there is’, ‘exists’, etc.) in these 
languages express different concepts of existence, and (b) these languages 
can somehow describe the world’s facts equally well and fully. 
Generally, ontologists can be divided into two groups; those who see ontological 
disputes as genuine and those who see them as shallow, with the latter group being 
ontological pluralists standing in the tradition of Rudolf Carnap (1950). Two 
contemporary philosophers in this tradition are Eli Hirsch (2002, 2005, 2007, 2008) and 
Hilary Putnam (1981a, 1987a; b, 1995b) who argue that ontological disagreements are 
merely linguistic in nature10.  
What does this mean? Hirsch (2002, 2005, 2007, 2008) develops the doctrine of 
quantifier variance (QV) to justify his position11. According to the QV doctrine, 
existential quantifiers such as ‘there is’ or ‘exists’ have different meanings in different 
languages and existential but contradicting sentences can be formulated such that they 
come out true in their relative languages12. Hence, we are facing ontological problems, 
or disputes, that are merely verbal in nature13. Hirsch (2007) refers to philosophers John 
__________________________ 
10 Eklund (2009, p.142) labels this group semanticists, defining semanticism as “the view that ontological disputes 
are merely verbal when the disputants talk past each other, using some of the expressions employed with different 
meanings”. 
11 Besides quantifier variance, Hirsch’s (2002, 2005, 2007, 2008) position also rests on the rejection of referential 
correspondence theory of truth. This means that the truth condition of a sentence does not depend “on the referential 
relation between its (non-logical) word and objects that exist in the world” (Hirsch, 2008, p.230). 
12 Putnam (1995b, p.305), on the other side, argues for quantifier relativism, saying that “there isn’t just one single 
privileged sense of the word ‘object’ (…) only and inherently extendible notion of ‘object’”.  
13 Elsewhere, Hirsch (2002, p.59) concludes that “the basic idea of quantifier variance can be nicely formulated by 
saying that the same (unstructured) facts can be expressed using different concepts of “the existence of a thing”, that 
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Locke and Joseph Butler to illustrate the meaning of his QV. In this example, John 
Locke argues that a tree, which loses a branch, is still the same tree because of the 
relationship between tree and its constituents, while Butler would oppose such a view 
and argue we would face a new tree. Although both sides agree that there is some 
relationship between the constituents of the object and its identity, “the conflicting 
ontological assertions are true or false depending on whether we speak Lockean or 
Butlerian English” (Hirsch, 2007, p.370)14.  
If QV is true, then it poses a real threat to heterodox economists because it may cause 
the heterodox critique of mainstream economics to become trivial. Any ontological 
disagreements, and if we believe Lawson (2006) the heterodox critique of the 
mainstream is in essence ontological, would be a simple case of economists talking past 
each other. Moreover, any dispute between heterodox economists will fall under the 
same fate. Take, for instance, two evolutionary economists A and B who are having a 
dispute about the existence of a Darwinian-like mechanism in social evolution. For A 
the sentence “a Darwinian selection mechanism exists” comes out true in her language 
while it is false for B. The reason for this conflict, according to QV, is that A’s claim 
has not been, or cannot be, translated properly in B’s language. On the other side, if it 
would be translated correctly the conflict would be resolved.  
This case, however, also illustrates one of several problems ontological pluralists, 
following Eklund’s (2009) definition, must face. For a sentence of the form given above 
to come out true in the language of economist A but false in the language of economist 
B, both languages must have different truth conditions and consequently different 
meanings. This poses a problem for the pluralist, as her focus is not on truth or meaning 
difference but on existence-concepts. Eklund (2009, p.147) remarks that 
[i]ntuitively, what she wants to say is that there are different languages, with 
different existence-like concepts, such that (say) numbers exist in one sense 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
statements involve different kinds of quantifiers can be equally true by virtue of the same (unstructured) facts in the 
world. (…) I am inclined to agree with Putnam that, once we’ve accepted quantifier variance, there is no point in 
trying to hold onto language-shaped facts that are in the world independent of language.” On the other side, Ted Sider 
(2003, 2009), among others, is aware of the QV argument but suggests that there are privileged quantifiers in 
different languages, which allow ontological disputes to be genuine.  
14 To further understand the conflict here, it might be necessary to distinguish between conceptual schemes and 
natural languages. Case (1997, p.11) clarifies that, if speaking of languages, [they] need not be equated with natural 
languages. An example drawn from Putnam’s discussion of conceptual relativity will help convey the significance of 
this remark. To speak the language of the Polish Logician is to employ the conceptual scheme of mereological sums, 
but it is not to speak Polish. A speaker of Polish may employ the Polish Logician’s conceptual scheme on one 
occasion and Carnap’s on another. 
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of ‘exists’ and not the other. But if ‘number’ automatically means different 
things in the two languages she does not get to say this. 
The pluralist is given a possible escape from this problem, but it seems to be an 
unattractive one according to Eklund (2009). One could argue that economists A and B 
express propositions with the same meaning, which is, however, relative to the truth 
conditions in their respective languages. This argument suggests that in “this reply 
propositions are not true or false absolutely but only relative to different concepts of 
truth” (Eklund, 2009, p.150), a valid but, due to its relativism, rather radical way out.  
The question in the end is whether such ontological pluralism can be formulated in a 
way that does not lead to relativism and allows ontological disputes to be genuine. 
Eklund’s (2009) definition lacks precision, something he also admits, to make a final 
defence. In particular, the question must be raised what is meant by languages being 
capable of describing the facts of the world equally well. Are these languages all 
inclusive? If so, then we arrive at relativism! Can the pluralist make a claim similar to 
Mäki’s (1997), where many theories only describe only parts of the world adequately, 
then relativism can be avoided. However, is relativism actually such a threat15? In any 
case, however, Eklund’s (2009) definition for ontological pluralism needs adjustment 
too.  
 
1.1.2. EPISTEMIC PLURALISM 
With the ontological positions providing a concept of reality established, we can now 
ask “what we think can be known about it” (Fleetwood, 2005, p.197). In economics we 
are naturally facing the questions of what can be known about economic phenomena, 
once their reality has been accepted and formulated. Lawson (1997, 2003a; b, 2004, 
2006) and Dow (1997, 2004) identify a dichotomy of closed-system and open-system 
ontologies in economics, with the latter, according to them, being necessary for the 
future, successful scientific endeavour of economics. This first distinction sets the stage 
for the epistemological inquiry of what counts as knowledge about these systems. Yet, 
there are more fundamental issues with the concept of knowledge itself, not only when 
it comes to the distinction between two different ontologies. In the following we will 
explore the meaning of these issues and how this leads to epistemological pluralism.  
__________________________ 
15 In chapter 4, it will be demonstrated that relativism is not necessarily a disadvantageous situation.  
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The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Steup, 2005, p.no pagination) defines 
epistemology as “the study of knowledge and justified belief”, concerned with “the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge”, its limits and so forth. Hence, 
knowledge is traditionally defined as justified true belief. This means that subject can 
only know a preposition if it is (i) true, (ii) the subject believes in it and (iii) the subject 
can justify its belief. This definition, however, naturally raises questions about the truth 
conditions and the possibilities to justify one’s own belief (Audi, 2011). Gettier (1963) 
is famous for presenting counterarguments against this definition, which show how the 
three conditions of justified true belief are met, while the reader intuitively questions 
whether the subject truly knows the preposition. In short, the Gettier problem, or 
problems alike, develop cases in which individuals hold certain information that turn 
out to be true despite being based upon false premises. The classic case states that Smith 
has strong evidence for the two propositions a) Jones will get a job in a company and b) 
Jones has ten coins in his pocket16. From this, he infers that the man with ten coins in 
his pocket will get the job, he has a justified belief. However, Smith himself gets the job 
and has, unknown to him, ten coins in his pocket. His inference is now a justified, true 
belief, however it can barely count, intuitively, as knowledge (Gettier, 1963).  
Philosophers have tried to implement additional conditions to circumvent the Gettier 
problems, especially solutions proposing safety, reliability, or independence from 
epistemic luck. These attempts were, however, very controversial which leads 
Zagzebski (1994), for instance, to argue that these problems can never be arrided 
completely. This had immense impact on the discussion of the concept of knowledge 
itself. Richard Rorty (1979, p.171) rejects the notion of knowledge being representative 
and argues, instead, for the need to “see knowledge as a matter of conversation and 
social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature”, while Williamson (2000) 
concludes that analysing knowledge is generally a futile effort. According to him, 
knowledge is epistemological so fundamental, that it is impossible to break it down to 
other fundamentals. This means now that justified true belief counts as knowledge and 
not the other way around.  
As a result of the latter, we can have different justified beliefs that are true dependent on 
the underlying truth conditions, eventually all counting as knowledge. Therefore, 
epistemic pluralism means the diversity of such conditions and as such, we might need 
__________________________ 
16 For a) he might have been told by the CEO of the company and for b) he might have seen how much money Jones 
put in his pocket. 
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to advocate Rorty's (1979) demand to analyse the discursive fields where these 
conditions are set. Yet, we must pay attention to the representational aspect as well. As 
Knight (1940, p.6) remarks, knowledge in economics, or social sciences, and natural 
sciences are fundamentally different, yet “it is still knowledge about reality”. While this 
first distinction seems reasonable, after all natural sciences and social sciences are 
concerned with different phenomena, we can make such distinctions of knowledge also 
within economics. Weintraub (1991, p.150) substantiate this point by writing “where 
Pigou saw an excess supply of labor, Keynes saw a particular level of employment 
associated with the point of effective demand. Where Solow sees a market failure, 
Lucas sees rational competitive activity”. It is certainly difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine which of these positions are true and which are false17. Thus, McCloskey 
(1994) argues that this problem cannot be solved at all. It cannot be decided whether 
Keynes position is true knowledge or Pigou’s. She concludes “that nothing can provide 
the “Knowledge” defined by epistemology. This “Knowledge” – as distinct from small-
k knowledge – is “whatever it is that is in the mind of God”” (McCloskey, 1994, p.191). 
Economics, as any other scientific endeavour or social system, is therefore both product 
and producer of knowledge as Searle (1995) says18.  
With the inability to find big K-knowledge and knowledge being an epistemic 
fundamental, as Williamson (2000) suggests, are we destined to fall into an 
epistemological anarchism (Feyerabend, 1993)? Is Caldwell (1982, 1991, 1997) correct 
when he realises “that the absence of a convincing set of criteria for choosing between 
scientific alternatives implies the impossibility of choosing among theories of truth” 
(Negru, 2009, p.14). Not necessarily, as it remains possible to apply a rather pragmatic 
approach and to ask what kind of knowledge suits us best in our scientific endeavour. 
Moscovici’s (1998) distinction between social, or every day, knowledge and scientific 
knowledge may give us a first hint what to do. An illustrative example from his writings 
concerns the disease AIDS and the knowledge that is associated with it. While the 
sciences provide, for instance, virological and general medical knowledge about AIDS, 
Moscovici (1998, p.210) says that the social knowledge about the disease surpasses its 
medical definition and adds, for instance, the “punishment of God”, the “retribution of 
nature”, “degenerate behaviours” and “irresponsible sexuality,” or arguments “that the 
__________________________ 
17 Here, the underdetermination of theories (Quine, 1951) may be able to explain why it is difficult to determine 
which one of these economists is right, a further explanation of this concept can be found in chapter 4.  
18 Berger and Luckmann (1966) share a similar constructive argument. 
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virus was manufactured by the CIA for the extermination of undesirable population”, 
depending on the overall social settings. It can be argued that such social knowledge is 
inadequate or false. However, to justify such argument one needs to develop general 
criteria for knowledge, which have been denied to exist (Rorty, 1979; Williamson, 
2000). The question then turns to what criteria are relevant and what are not, resulting in 
a situation where the issues regarding knowledge become a matter of legitimacy and 
discrimination. We face epistemic pluralism where we cannot have certainty what true 
knowledge is and is not. Nonetheless, the ability to choose epistemic criteria can be 
beneficial in any academic discourse, as it allows us to explore a wide range of research 
approaches that could not be explored with one fixed knowledge definition.  
As example for such criteria for epistemologically sound scientific knowledge we may 
refer to Schurz (2011). He proposes a set of criteria for scientific knowledge without 
claiming that this is the only reasonable set. These criteria are fallibilism, minimal 
realism, intersubjective objectivity and minimal empiricism. The first principle is 
derived from Popper’s (2002) work on scientific endeavour and says that scientific 
statements must be fallible. Statements about the world that cannot be refuted or proven 
to be wrong cannot be counted as scientific knowledge. Secondly, the ontological 
position of minimal realism states that there must be a reality, of any kind whatsoever, 
independent of the human subjective perception. Yet, this does not qualify for the 
ability to identify every aspect of this reality and allows the generation of different 
theories of truth19. In this regard, Haack (1987, p.227) states that “it does not require 
that truth be conceived specifically as a relation between some truth bearing item and 
the world or some aspect of the world”. The third criterion of intersubjective objectivity 
demands that the statements about reality must be reproducible, allowing, in principle, 
every competent person, i.e. researcher, to assure oneself about the validity of the 
statement by investigating it. Intersubjective objectivity is closely linked to the 
ontological position of minimal realism and leads directly to the final condition minimal 
empiricism. The final criterion states that the subject matter of science must be 
accessible for experiences and observation, because only perceptive observation can 
generate reliable information about reality (Schurz, 2011; Heichele, 2010). In this sense 
we still have to refer to some kind of representationism, something that Rorty (1979) 
rejects. To further illustrate the meaning of these four criteria, we may refer to Russell’s 
__________________________ 
19 Such as the correspondence theory of truth, the redundancy theory of truth or the coherence theory of truth. 
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(1997) famous teapot as counter example. In his analogy, he presents a teapot orbiting 
between Earth and Mars. This teapot, however, is not detectable by current and future 
technology. The question now relates to the epistemological value, which is of course 
none. The teapot violates at least two of the four criteria, i.e. intersubjective objectivity 
and minimal empiricism. Therefore, we can see why demarcation criteria are important 
for scientific endeavour. 
This is, of course, only one possible combination of criteria. The position of minimal 
realism, for instance, can be refined or changed, allowing strong realist positions on the 
one side or non-realist positions that can propose ‘realities’ that are mind-independent 
and ‘realities’ that are mind-dependent (Hoyningen-Huene, Oberheim and Andersen, 
1996). On the other side of the scale, one could also apply a naïve realist position that 
supposes humans are capable of perceiving the real, external world without interference. 
The point, however, is not to discuss the criteria available and the consequences of their 
composition but the fact that such plurality exists. This plurality of epistemological 
criteria allows the eclectic to critically acquire the principles she thinks are suitable for 
her research. 
 
1.1.3. METHODOLOGY PLURALISM 
 
1.1.3.1. PLURALISM VS MONISM IN ECONOMICS 
After the discussion of ontological and epistemological pluralism it is necessary to 
examine the last of the three Fleetwood (2005) describes; methodological pluralism as 
part of philosophy of science and economics. In general, methodology is understood as 
the philosophy or study of how research can be conducted scientifically and how 
research questions can be answered best (Panneerselvam, 2004). Generally, a 
methodology section in one’s work is required to justify/illuminate one’s research 
approach, while ontological and epistemological discussions seem to be less significant 
in everyday research. Nonetheless, it becomes self-evident that the methodology, our 
thoughts on how we answer our research questions, is very dependent on the way we 
conceptualise the world ontologically and what we allow to be knowledgeable about it 
(Dow, 2007). Hence, all three, methodology, ontology and epistemology, share a close 
and somewhat overlapping relationship. 
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Firstly, in economics we can roughly distinguish between heterodox and orthodox 
methodology. Orthodox methodology is usually characterised by its insistence of 
mathematic-deductive methods (Lawson, 2006), while the heterodoxy applies 
methodologies that are different and generally not accepted by the mainstream (Blaug, 
1992)20. Another remark on the methodology of the mainstream is that is based upon 
methodological individualism, i.e. “the claim that social phenomena must be explained 
by showing how they result from individual actions, which in turn must be explained 
through reference to the intentional states that motivate the individual actors” (Heath, 
2010, p.no pagination). Methodological individualism, as term, finds its origin in the 
work of Schumpeter (1909, 1998) and was later developed as central guideline for 
social sciences by Weber (1972). This doctrine then found its way into the economics 
through the writings of Hayek (1942, 1943, 1944), thereby strengthening the tradition of 
neoclassical marginalism and the model of rational actors within the discipline (Heath, 
2010). In contrast to the methodological individualism in the mainstream, heterodox 
economics methodologies can be much more holistic, i.e. highlighting the importance of 
reciprocal interdependencies between individual actions, or pluralistic. Institutional 
economics, for instance, applies such a methodology by looking at the level of social 
institutions and their implications for economic behaviour. 
 
1.1.3.2. THE MEANING OF METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM 
The quintessence of the dichotomy of orthodox and heterodox economics and their 
related methodologies is the insight that, while the orthodoxy has a particular 
identifiable methodology according to Lawson (2006), heterodox economics has a 
plurality of methodologies mainly due to its heterogeneous nature. This causes 
heterodox scholars like Caldwell (1982), Dow (1985, 1997, 2004, 2007, 2014), Samuels 
(1998), Mäki (1997), Negru (2009) and Negru and Bigo (2008) to actively promote 
methodological pluralism. Dow (2014, p.1), for instance, defines methodological 
pluralism as  
the acceptance of, and respect for, a range of methodological approaches on 
the grounds that no one approach can be demonstrated to be best given the 
nature of the subject matter. 
__________________________ 
20 Colander, Holt and Rosser (2004, p.493) summarise this attitude to “[i]f it isn’t modeled, it isn’t economics, no 
matter how insightful”. 
 32 
 
With reference to the nature of the subject matter, Dow’s (2014) arguments makes use 
of the arguments put forward regarding epistemological uncertainty above. In fact, in 
her earlier work (2007) she justifies methodological pluralism by reference to, among 
other factors, the nature of knowledge, explained as the inability to discriminate against 
ways of constructing knowledge in the absence of a basis of identifying one best 
approach21. Additionally, Samuels (1998, p.302) outlines the existence of different 
methodologies in economics and highlights their meaning by writing that  
[m]ethodological pluralism also affirms that an economist may properly do 
a priori theory, quantitative and/or non-quantitative empiricism, history and 
so on. Methodological pluralism affirms, too, that an economist may 
properly do static partial and/or general equilibrium theory or evolutionary 
economics. Within each of these modes of work there can be, and indeed 
are, varying methodological approaches – and there certainly are variances 
between them. It is also the case that no methodological procedure is or can 
be conducted in practice in absolute isolation from all others (for example, 
the choice is not between pure induction and pure deduction but between 
various procedural combinations of the two). 
Similar to Dow’s (2007, 2014) arguments, but more hidden, is Samuels (1998) 
underlying premise of the possibility to conduct research in economics with different 
methodologies. This premise implies again that the nature of the subject is so complex 
that it cannot be investigated with a single methodology alone. We can find this premise 
all over the literature on pluralism, as will be shown in the case of Caldwell (1982, 
1997) in the following section. Finally, another underlying premise that stands out from 
these two examples, and can also be found elsewhere, is the need for tolerance of 
different methodologies available to the economists. This brings us to the final section 
of pluralism, the demand of tolerance. 
  
__________________________ 
21 A more detailed examination of her specific argument can be found in the next chapter under ‘2.4 Critical 
Reflections on Eclecticism’. 
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1.1.4. TOLERANCE PLURALISM 
The final position found in the literature on pluralism is motivated by a principle of 
tolerance. Negru (2009, p.12) argues that this position on “‘[p]luralism [is] a response to 
developments within the philosophy of science’ and ‘the recognition of alternative 
economic traditions’”. She says that the first plea for tolerance originates from 
Schumpeter (1953) and was later put into the much more detailed context of 
methodological pluralism. As such, the pleas for tolerance and respect are mostly found 
in combination with other arguments, as evident from the quote by Dow (2014) above. 
Others have formulated the need for pluralism in similar ways, with Lee (2011a; b) 
being the only one who holds a pure tolerance position. 
 
1.1.4.1. CALDWELL’S INSPIRATIONAL TOLERANCE 
One of the first contributions to the tolerance view, and pluralism in general, comes, as 
said, from Bruce Caldwell (1982, pp.245–250). In criticising positivism and 
falsificationism, he says that “[m]ethodological pluralism begins with the assumption 
that no single optimal methodology is discoverable” and “it takes as a starting 
assumption that no universally applicable, logically compelling method of theory 
appraisal exists”. From this insight, Caldwell (1982) argues that the methodologists 
need to critically examine methodologies that are available. Because of the starting 
assumption, this examination, or the “rational reconstruction of the methodological 
content” (Caldwell, 1982, p.245), demands to include what is today known as heterodox 
schools of thought. The plea for tolerance lies here in the acceptance of the strengths 
and limitations of different methods from different schools of thought. Moreover, Negru 
(2009) argues that Caldwell (1982, 1991, 1997) saw the importance of pluralism in its 
ability to inspire dialogue in economics between diverse views. Such dialogue or 
conservation requires a mutual respect and tolerance for other people’s arguments.  
 
1.1.4.2. SAMUELS’ ABSENCE OF A SINGLE PRINCIPLE 
Like Caldwell (1982), Warren Samuels (1997a; b, 1998) is critical of a monist position 
in which a single approach to methodology can be identified as privileged or supreme to 
others. This results in two important conclusions on methodological pluralism. First, 
“[t]he case for methodological pluralism ultimately rests on the necessity of choice in 
the absence of a single conclusive final methodological or epistemological principle” 
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(Samuels, 1997a, p.67). This choice of methodology is a central focus in his work and 
in the light of an absence of meta-criteria one might think that the scientific endeavour 
would end up in being futile. However, Samuels (1997a) argues for the importance of 
the critical engagement with different methodologies and the strong scientific discourse 
established through pluralism to counter such worries (Eliassen, forthcoming). 
Secondly, Samuels (1998) further argues that methodologies are never isolated and that 
the economist will encounter a variety of somewhat interdependent methods which are 
all appropriate to research the economy. This dialogue, again, requires tolerance of 
different views. In conclusion, he clarifies that methodological pluralism allows the 
economist to be monist in her method choice, but that the practice of choice itself 
cannot be isolated from other methodological approaches.  
 
1.1.4.3. GARNETT’S LIBERAL CONVERSATION 
Other than Caldwell (1982) or Samuels (1997b, 1997a, 1998), Robert Garnett (2006, 
2011) provides a reason for tolerating pluralism in economics based on a stronger 
emphasis on conversation. He starts off with the identification of a central problem, the 
foremost paradigmatic tendencies within academia. He thus summarises that 
leading heterodox economists (including some who profess to be pluralists) 
are still committed to the paradigmist approach, viewing heterodox 
economics as primarily a search for demarcation criteria that would render 
heterodox economics distinct from and superior to orthodox (main- stream) 
economics. (Garnett, 2006, p.522) 
To overcome this central problem, his aim is to re-define the understanding of science 
by combining McCloskey’s (1983) rhetoric and Sen’s (1999) “capability-centered view 
of human development” (Garnett, 2006, p.522). This means that economics should be 
considered as a critical and liberal conversation between economists with the aim to 
promote intellectual freedom. In accordance to McCloskey's (1983) view on economics 
is a market place for ideas, Garnett (2006) sees the necessity of pluralism in its ability to 
promote this critical and accountable exchange of intellectual content. This intellectual 
exchange is only possible and open if the participants in this exchange tolerate each 
other. 
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1.1.4.4. LEE’S LIVE AND LET LIVE APPROACH 
Lastly, Frederic Lee’s (2011a; b) account of pluralism in economics provides another 
perspective regarding tolerance. He builds his argument on the premise that, at least, the 
orthodox and heterodox theories are generally incommensurable and have nothing in 
common. Between orthodoxy and heterodoxy he draws the following strong dichotomy: 
[N]eoclassical economists reject heterodox theory and focus on how asocial, 
ahistorical individuals choose among scarce resources to meet competing 
ends given unlimited wants, and explain it using fictitious concepts and a 
deductivist, closed system methodology. In contested contrast, heterodox 
economists reject mainstream theory; utilizing empirically grounded 
concepts and an open system, grounded theory methodology, they focus on 
human agency in a cultural context and social processes in historical time 
which affect resources, consumption patterns, production and reproduction, 
and the meaning (or ideology) of economic activities engaged in social 
provisioning. (Lee, 2011b, p.2) 
Hence, Lee (2011a) seems sceptical about pluralism based on the promotion of diversity 
of approaches and instead defines pluralism of tolerance as core of an academic 
freedom that resembles religious freedom in the USA. In the same sense that members 
of different religious groups as well as non-religious individuals, despite all their 
differences, are Americans, all members of the orthodox and heterodox schools of 
thought should be tolerated and considered to be economists, whether they can have an 
intellectual exchange of their ideas or not. However, Lee (2011b) does not say that this 
tolerance also implies mutual respect. Although he agrees to some extent with the 
analysis by Caldwell (1982) or Samuels (1997a; b, 1998), i.e. that there is no single best 
method to conduct research, he also suggests “that a paradigm may be wholly false and 
thus not contribute to the discipline at all; in this case there is no need to be respectful of 
it” (Lee, 2011a, p.574). This becomes especially interesting since he considers the 
mainstream theories to be plainly wrong, hence orthodox economists do not deserve 
respect by heterodox economists.  
 
1.1.4.5. TOLERANCE SUMMARISED 
As we have seen, there are several ways to promote pluralism through the virtue of 
tolerance. We can distinguish between tolerance based upon the explanatory limitations 
of scientific theories and tolerance as part of the academic freedom and discourse within 
 36 
 
a discipline. The former is also, to some extent, relatable to the second ontological 
pluralism defined by Lawson (2009). The similarities are somewhat obvious, while the 
one side ontologically argues for a pluralism of theories due to the fact of a complex and 
irreducible world, the other side argues for pluralism due to the limitations of existing 
theories. In my view these views are not necessarily exclusive but could be combined to 
some kind of meta-pluralism in the following sense: the ontological position of a 
complex and irreducible world fosters tolerance within an academic discourse that 
acknowledges the limitations of theoretical contributions to the discipline. Finally, I do 
not wish to discuss Lee’s (2011a) assessment of the mainstream as being false. The list 
of incoherent aspects of mainstream theories22 is generally too long to outline the 
discussion at this point, even if it might be interesting. 
 
1.2. SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT, HETERODOX AND ORTHODOX 
It has been mentioned that there is a dichotomy between orthodox and heterodox 
economics. To understand this opposition further an investigation into the term schools 
of thought, which can be found quite often in the heterodox economic literature, is 
necessary. How schools of thought are exactly defined in the literature and how they are 
related to pluralism and eclecticism is the leading question here. First, we can loosely 
distinguish between orthodox and heterodox schools and secondly we can differentiate 
them from the term paradigm introduced by Thomas Kuhn (2012). Although paradigms 
and schools of thought are sometimes used interchangeably, Negru (2007) suggests to 
separate them. How can this be done? Kuhn (2012, pp.11–12) defines the paradigm as 
an “accepted examples of actual scientific practice (...) [which] provide models from 
which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research”. It can be said, also 
deriving from this definition, that paradigms encompass ontology, epistemology and 
__________________________ 
22 To illustrate this, Lee (2011a, p.574) writes that  
[f]or example, the objects of study, such as preferences-utility, marginal products, demand curves, 
rationality, relative scarcity, and homogeneous agents, are ill-defined, have no real world existence, 
and where relevant are non-quantifiable, non-measurable. Consequently, the issues and problems for 
which the objects are relevant, such as competitive markets, efficiency, and optimality, are either 
fictitious in that they are unrelated to the real world, or if the issues and problems are clearly located 
in the real world, such as prices or unemployment, the objects have no bearing on their existence. 
Moreover, the methods used to develop theoretical explanations addressing the issues and problems, 
such as deductive methodology and ontological and methodological individualism, generally include 
fictitious objects and utilize concepts that have no empirical grounding hence no meaning in the real 
world. 
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methodology into a, somewhat, consistent ‘whole’ framing acceptable research practise 
within a community23. Hence, paradigms are a more global concept. 
In contrast, Negru (2007, p.19) suggests to understand a school of thought as “a group 
of scientists whose work reflects different forms of commonalities”. These 
commonalities are not limited to ontological questions; they can have various meanings 
including a shared interest in a specific research object. Hence, schools of thought have 
a smaller scale and can live within a paradigm. Furthermore, Dow (2007, p.471) 
allocates these different interests also in the mainstream, where “it is possible to identify 
groupings, around endogenous growth theory, experimental economics, behavioural 
economics, complexity theory and so on”, all within the mainstream paradigm. This is 
further evidence that schools of thought should be separated from paradigms.  
Gruchy (1947, p.18) provides yet another description about schools of thought as 
“common intellectual orientation”, where 
their common orientation or world view is a fountainhead from which flows 
the unity that is to be found running through their economic thought. This 
unity which binds the members of a school of economists shows up in their 
framework of analysis, their psychological theory, and their scientific 
methodology. All three aspects of the school's work exhibit an underlying 
intellectual compatibility. 
The three aspects with regards to the neoclassical school of thought are a static mode of 
analysis, in opposition to a more dynamic, evolutionary mode of, for instance, 
institutional economics, combined with the rationalistic psychology of individuals 
calculating their maximum utility. The third aspect, the scientific methodology in 
neoclassical economics is a mechanistic and atomistic approach, reflecting the static 
world it is embedded in (Gruchy, 1947).  
This definition, however, remains superficial, as it does not allow a real distinction to 
paradigms. Moreover, individual economists can spread their work or interest across 
different schools (Dow, 2007). As said above, not all schools of thought are necessarily 
divided by ontological positions, i.e. their world views, or their methodological 
approach.  
__________________________ 
23 A similar conception was introduced by Lakatos (1970a) under the name research programme which is generally 
different to Kuhn’s (2012) paradigms in several ways. A detailed description is given chapter 3. 
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Hence, differentiating schools of thought in economics comes down to the problem of 
classification as Colander (2000) suggests. Classifying schools of thought must, 
according to him, satisfy five specific criteria. The first one is the demand to organise 
thinking about the problems it refers to, so that even non-specialists can understand it. 
Secondly, a classification must be intuitive and natural so it becomes acceptable for the 
majority of economists. Third, it should work over time and fourth it should be focused 
on content and not ideological issues. Finally, it should have a consistent definition so 
that it does not have multiple meanings (Colander, 2000). It remains questionable 
whether all these conditions can always be adequately met when talking about schools 
of thought in economics. Negru (2007, p.20) thus speaks of “academic entities that have 
a certain degree of coherency” that can never fully satisfy the criteria Colander (2000) 
outlines. This coherency can have multiple appearances, ranging from methodological 
commonalities over commitments and development of theoretical works by specific 
scholars, Marxism for example, or a common interest in a specific research area as 
mentioned above.  
Another distinction with regards to schools of thought relates to the difference between 
orthodox and heterodox economics. Often the neoclassical school of economic thought 
is mostly associated with orthodoxy, as it reflects a dominant mainstream. However, 
Colander (2000) rejects the idea that the neoclassical school is the current dominating 
mainstream. While neoclassical economics can be identified as a school of thought by 
specific characteristics, such as utility maximisation, perfect rationality, methodological 
individualism, general equilibrium approach and certain formalistic modelling 
techniques (Dow, 2007), the modern mainstream today is much more eclectic according 
to Colander (2000)24. This fits well into the analysis from above, where schools of 
thought can be determined by specific interests. The dominance of the mainstream 
arises from the (political) power of those schools of thought able to determine research 
practices and curricula in the majority of universities and research institutes around the 
globe25. By definition, heterodox economics stands then in opposition to this 
mainstream, encompassing a number of schools of thought not accepted by the 
mainstream.  
__________________________ 
24 It is true that the modern mainstream is more open in its methods etc. but as I will show the term eclectic does not 
necessarily fit into this context. 
25 Lee, Xuang and Gyun (2013) provide a study of this process in the UK. 
 39 
 
Dow (2000) and Lawson (1997, 2003b) draw the line between orthodox and heterodox 
economics in the mode of analysis, with the former as a closed-system approach and the 
latter as an open-system approach endorsing evolutionary processes in regarding to the 
relationship of important variables. As said earlier, Chick and Dow (2005, p.265) define 
an open system in accordance with the dictionary as “a material system in which the 
total mass or energy fluctuates; an incomplete or alterable system (of ideas, doctrines, 
things, etc.)”. And Lawson (e.g. 2001, p.169) generally characterises the differences 
between closed and open systems by an absence of event regularities, i.e. “whenever 
event (or state of affairs) x then event (or state of affairs) y”, in the latter. In summary, 
according to both scholars orthodox schools of thought are characterised by this closed-
system ontology while heterodox schools of thought rely on the open-system ontology.  
As a result of this ontological difference, Lawson (2006, p.493) allocates the core of 
heterodox economics in the rejection of the orthodoxy’s “insistence” of using 
“mathematical–deductive method[s]” and thus, “heterodox economics, in the first 
instance, is a rejection of a very specific form of methodological reductionism”. Hence 
and additionally, “the essence of the heterodox opposition is ontological in nature” 
(Lawson, 2006, p.492). Almost identical to this, Backhouse (2000, pp.149–150) 
provides his definition of heterodox schools of thought: 
Heterodoxies are organized schools of thought that share core beliefs about 
the economy and identify themselves as standing apart from the prevailing 
orthodoxy. It makes being heterodox a matter of deliberate choice involving 
more than simply dissenting from orthodox beliefs. 
In conclusion, the umbrella term heterodoxy consists of various schools of thought that 
have a) this rejection in common, but they might not be limited to it, and b) have 
practices that are not accepted by the mainstream. With regards to the former, however, 
it is not necessarily a positive occurrence as Van Dalen (2003) and Negru and Bigo 
(2008) observe. They see a danger in the tendency of schools of thought only to agree to 
disagree with the mainstream without real exchange and conversation between them.  
For the cause of pluralism such conversation is necessary (Negru, 2010). It can be 
beneficial for scientific progress if different schools are in conversation and exchange 
insights and ideas, especially when we talk about schools of thought in the sense that 
they encompass different research objects. As a result, it becomes not only possible for 
individual academics to spread their work across schools of thought (Dow, 2007), doing 
 40 
 
so will allow these economists to take various positions within debates. This is not only 
beneficial for the cause of pluralism, as it enables individual economists to provide and 
appreciate arguments beyond a single school of thought, but also creates another basis 
for the eclectic to choose from.  
For the successful justification of eclecticism, a re-definition of schools of thought, 
which is similar to what Negru (2007) says about commonalities among groups of 
researchers, is introduced in chapter 3. This new definition is mainly based on Larry 
Laudan’s (1987, 1978) earlier work and points out the cognitive and methodological 
commonalities schools of thoughts share. The advantages of the use of these cognitive 
and methodological commonalities over other definitions discussed here are specifically 
important for the general justification and appears novel in the context of heterodox 
economics, but it will also work with some other aspects discussed in the literature.  
 
1.5. SYNOPSIS 
In the current heterodox and pluralist literature, there are several key themes and 
arguments about the current state of economics that are important for the main thesis of 
this dissertation as well. Within the pluralist literature there are key arguments 
identifiable, which are either virtuous or presented on ontological, epistemological and 
methodological grounds. Moreover, we find a heterogeneity of the schools of thought in 
economics, different groups of scientists that share several interests from ontology over 
research objects to the rejection of the orthodoxy in economics (Lawson, 2006; Negru, 
2007).  
The ontological discussion of pluralism remains, however, rather underdeveloped in the 
economic literature. Hence, this chapter made the linguistic turn26 and presented two 
contemporary discussions on ontological pluralism by Matti Eklund (2008, 2009) and 
Kris McDaniel (2009, 2010b, 2013a; b, 2014). The reason for this lies in the fact that 
linguistic concepts play a pivotal role in the later conceptualisation of the justification 
for eclecticism in chapter 3. Other than Eklund's (2008, 2009) examples of ontological 
__________________________ 
26 According to Willamson (2006) the term 'linguistic turn' describes the event in the 20th century philosophy after 
which language became the central theme for philosophers. Hence, this chapter did a linguistic turn by saying that we 
need to look at the nature of ontological questions, and by introducing McDaniel's (2009, 2010a; b, 2013b; a, 2014) 
ontological pluralism. In chapter 4, we will discuss the linguistic turn in more detail. 
 41 
 
relativism resulting from such linguistic turns, the argument presented in chapter 3 does 
not arrive at the conclusion that ontological disputes are shallow.  
With regards to epistemology, the central pluralistic arguments claim the existence of 
uncertainty of knowledge, i.e. there is not one best answer to the question of what 
knowledge is (McCloskey, 1994; Dow, 2007). In the absence of decisive factors 
determining what counts as knowledge and what not (Gettier, 1963), epistemological 
pluralism is characterised by the availability of criteria for knowledge creation and the 
need to agree on what to use (Schurz, 2011). This definition of epistemic pluralism, i.e. 
the existence of sets of criteria for knowledge, becomes relevant in the justification for 
eclecticism, as it is argued that such sets of criteria partly rely on the discursive groups 
one might enter.  
Lastly, the literature on methodological pluralism is introduced, with its central 
argument for the absence of a decisive, best working method of research or, 
metaphorically speaking, that there is no one shoe fitting all sizes (Caldwell, 1982, 
1997; Dow, 2014). From this insight, the literature develops strong arguments for the 
necessity and for tolerating such diversity of methodologies in economics and social 
sciences (Caldwell, 1982; Dow, 1985, 1997, 2004, 2007; Lawson, 2006; Mäki, 1997; 
Negru and Bigo, 2008; Negru, 2009). In the next chapter it will be shown that this 
particular argument is also found in the eclectic literature and thus, it is argued that 
pluralism and eclecticism, at least, share similar grounds. 
Additionally, we find strong arguments for tolerance of plurality, which are not based 
on the limitations of methodologies, but are presented for more virtuous reasons. These 
reasons vary from the need of conversation (Caldwell, 1982; Garnett, 2006, 2011) over 
the absence of isolated methods (Samuels, 1997a; b, 1998) to an apologetic live and let 
live tolerance (Lee, 2011a; b). Despite the latter, arguments for tolerance are likewise 
found in the eclectic literature and the reasoning of, especially, Samuels (1997a; b, 
1998), although not specifically referred to, is implied in the justification of eclecticism 
in chapter 3.  
Finally, the differentiation between heterodoxy and orthodoxy, as well as the definitions 
for schools of thought have been presented. The former is a general dichotomy found in 
the literature, to which this dissertation is considered a part of. The term schools of 
thought will be central in the discussion and justification of eclecticism in chapter 3. 
The specific definition for schools of thought developed in chapter 3 is mostly related to 
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Negru's (2007) account and also incorporates, even if not referred to, Samuels' (1997a; 
b, 1998) absence of isolation.  
To summarise; in order to understand the claim that eclecticism is pluralism within the 
individual and the general justification for eclecticism developed in this dissertation, it 
is necessary to understand the arguments made by pluralists. This allows the 
comparison of both pluralism and eclecticism. Hence, the following chapter will 
investigate the historic and contemporary literature of eclecticism, as well as its 
proponents and critics, to develop a comprehensive understanding of the topic. From 
this, the definition of eclecticism is developed and justified in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: ECLECTICISM: PAST AND PRESENT 
Study the past if you would define the future. - Confucius 
 
The existing literature on eclecticism unveils the concept’s long, diverse and most 
ambiguous, yet interesting history. Originating in philosophy and spreading out into 
theology and architecture, it found its way into more modern scientific disciplines such 
as pedagogy, social science, psychology and the mixed method research community. 
However, historically the importance of eclecticism faced a drastic decline in the 
enlightenment and, thus, the selection of literature nowadays is rather limited. Further 
below the reasons for this decline will be outlined in more detail when the critical 
responses in the philosophical literature are addressed. 
The reviewed literature also exposes the difficulties in finding a common definition for 
eclecticism. In fact, it seems that each author favours his or her own definition, which 
makes it not only hard to find a common ground but also creates issues when it comes 
to the criticism of eclecticism. Here, it appears more that specific, self-defined positions 
are attacked rather than positions from the pro-eclectic literature. Overall, the criticism 
of eclecticism appears to be more polemic in nature, which makes it difficult take it 
serious and to discuss it effectively.  
Despite the difficulties in finding a common definition in the literature, there are several 
similar themes appearing recurrently. These themes can be identified as eclecticism in 
the history of philosophy, eclecticism in education, ontological and methodological 
eclecticism, and idealistic eclecticism. These themes broadly cover categorise the 
literature from the different disciplines and hence, also inform the remainder of this 
chapter. Within this order, the literature is further historically arranged and, as 
mentioned above, the summary of criticism is attached at the end. 
Finally, eclecticism in the economic literature is incorporated in this chapter where 
appropriate, but due to the fact of its little coverage, there is not much to present. In the 
case of economics the concept is just barely mentioned and certainly not conceptualised, 
to my knowledge it can only be found in Richard Bronk (2009), Sheila Dow (1997, 
2007) and Robert Solow (1988). This lack of conceptualisation means, however, that in 
economics there is a substantial gap in this topic.  
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2.1. ECLECTICISM IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
Two of the most important questions for historians and proponents of eclecticism are 
about its emergence and occurrence. This analysis becomes difficult in the case where 
seemingly eclectic philosophers never used this word or identified themselves with it. 
Richard Bronk (2009, p.58), for instance, lists Robert Malthus, John Stuart Mill, Alfred 
Marshall and John Maynard Keynes27 as examples of economists who “have espoused 
an eclectic mix of both the standard ‘social physics’ (…) approaches and the more 
historically aware and holistic (…) approaches”. But neither label these economists 
themselves as being eclectic nor is it quite clear what Bronk’s (2009) criteria for this 
assessment actually are. In the following sections, the history of eclecticism will be 
discussed to identify common themes for the formulation of a definition and to find a 
framework that allows us to identify eclecticism in the works of historical individuals, 
especially economists. If we are able to identify eclecticism in the works of early 
economists, and others, it might be possible to add this to the justification for 
eclecticism developed here.  
There are a number of attempts to examine ancient philosophical sects28 and their 
possible eclecticism. According to Gaukroger (2001, p.29) two historical periods can be 
identified in which philosophical eclecticism was prominent, the Hellenistic and Roman 
period [ca. 400 BC – 400 AD] and a period between the 14th and 17th century when 
“Renaissance Platonism took over elements from the Neoplatonists, Stoics, 
Aristotelians, Neopythagoreans [and] Gnostics”. The Hellenistic and Roman period 
seem easily to be assessed as being eclectic in retro-perspective29, depending on the 
interpretation of the works of philosophers of that time. Donini (1988), refers to 
Aristotle’s description of the composition of Plato’s philosophy from Parmenides, 
Heraclitus, Socrates and Pythagoreans as an indication of eclecticism, which is then a 
synonym of a sect informed by, or based upon, a plurality of earlier sects. The specific 
philosophical statements of Plato’s school are a combination of different ideas of other 
these other sects.  
__________________________ 
27 Additionally, Viner (1927) puts Adam Smith on the list of eclectic economists. 
28 The literature talks about sects but I think we could equally apply the term schools of thought too. 
29 Gibbon (1998, p.27)  famously summarises the Roman period as a time where “the various modes of worship, 
which prevailed in the Roman world, were all considered by the people, as equally true; by the philosopher, as 
equally false; and by the magistrate, as equally useful”. 
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However, the term eclecticism itself can seldom be found in ancient writings (Donini, 
1988). The most important hint, and most likely the first mentioning at all, is a short 
sentence at the end of the introduction of Diogenes Laertius’ (1853, pp.12–13) The lives 
and opinions of eminent philosophers30. Therein, he speaks of “a new Eclectic school” 
and Potamo of Alexandria “who picked out of the doctrines of each school what pleased 
him the most”. Another source, most likely also talking about the same person, can be 
found on an inscription in the city of Ephesus which speaks of “an “eclectic 
philosopher” from Alexandria” (Donini, 1988, p.16). Both sources lead to the 
conclusion that Potamo was an eclectic in the sense that he chose philosophical content 
from different sects based on his own judgement.  
Similarly, Antiochus of Ascalon [ca. 125 – 68 BC] is listed by Dillon (1988) as being 
eclectic, insofar as this means a careful consideration of good arguments from rival 
schools of thought. Here we can also see how Dillon (1988) defines eclecticism. For 
him, like Laertius (1853) above, it is a careful collection of philosophical statements or 
arguments from different and rival philosophical sects. Based on this definition not only 
Antiochus, but “most of the great philosophers are eclectics, and eclecticism is a mark 
of acuteness and originality, as opposed to narrow-minded sectarianism” (Dillon, 1988, 
p.104). However, Dillon (1988) also admits that Antiochus would have been offended 
by such a labelling31. And Donini (1988) likewise describes Antiochus as being eclectic 
but very unique in his approach at the same time, because he tried to find common 
arguments among Platonism, Aristotelianism and Stoicism in order to form them into 
one single doctrine. What this approach distinguishes itself from syncretism is 
unfortunately left open. 
Finally, Donini (1988) explains that Christian philosopher Clement of Alexandria [150 
– 215] and the Roman philosopher and physician Galen of Pergamon [ca. 129 – 200 
AD] are also associated with eclecticism, or at least mentioning it in their own writings. 
While it can be assumed from Clement’s writings that he applied an eclectic method for 
his own philosophy32, the situation in Galen’s case is an eclectic medical school 
(Donini, 1988) in which the members selected from a range of different medical sects 
__________________________ 
30 The original manuscript, written in Greek, originates presumably in the first half of the third century AD. 
31 A third example is Xenophon [430 – 354 BC], who “makes Socrates speak of readings from the works of ancient 
wise men, ‘which we select [eklegometha] on the basis whatever we perceive good’ in them” (Donini, 1988, p.17). 
32 “And philosophy – I do not mean the Stoic, or the Platonic, or the Epicurean, or the Aristotelian, but whatever has 
been well said by each of those sects, which teach righteousness along with a science of pervaded by piety, - this 
eclectic whole I call philosophy” (Alexandria, 2012, p.603), presumably first written between 200 and 205 AD. 
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those opinions and procedures that they perceived as most reasonable (Smith and 
Anthon, 1870). 
At the end, Schneider (2002) and Donini (1988) both argue that there are only a few 
ancient philosophers who mentioned eclecticism in their philosophical works33, whereas 
eclecticism itself became more prominent in early modern age philosophy. The reason 
for this, according to Schneider (2002), is the book De philosophorum sectis liber34 by 
the Dutch theologian Gerrit Janszoon Vos [1577 – 1649] who reinterpreted the writings 
of Diogenes Laetius and included a final chapter on eclectic sects. The differentiation of 
philosophical sects35 in a historical context not only defined the eclectic sect and put it 
at the end of the history of ancient philosophy, but also gave birth to the critical 
philosophical historiography in which those sects became a central object of 
investigation for modern age eclecticism. Thus, eclecticism became more than a 
polemic phrase or a historic category in the early enlightenment. Instead, the term stood 
for “the willingness within philosophy to adept an interpretive relationship with the 
philosophical past” (Schneider, 2002, p.208).  
As we can see, the first framework that will guide us in interpreting the possibility of 
eclecticism of early philosophers is to look if they choose statements, arguments or 
content from a wide range of philosophical sects. In the following section we will 
critically discuss this interpretation approach in more detail. This will allow us to look 
at the works of economist that Bronk (2009) suggests to be eclectic. There are, however, 
some limitations. While it would be undoubtedly fascinating to examine the work of 
Mill, Keynes and others, a complete analysis of their works is simply beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to do so36. Hence, the focus here lies on discussing frameworks and 
not on the application of such frameworks on selected historical scholars in economics. 
  
__________________________ 
33 The reference for this is Jakob Brucker’s work, which will be explained later in this chapter. 
34 First published in 1657. 
35 The term ‘philosophical sects’ means the different schools of thought such as Stoic, Platonic, Epicurean, 
Aristotelian and so on. 
36 To indicate the magnitude such an analysis would require, it shall be noted that, for instance, Keynes’s collective 
writings consist of 30 volumes and Mill’s work comes in 33 volumes. 
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2.1.1 IDENTIFYING ANCIENT ECLECTICISM 
We now have established that eclecticism of both historical periods described by 
Gaukroger (2001) is differently identified. This also means that we have, despite the 
two passages mentioned above, only secondary sources that analyse the workings of 
ancient philosophers. And it is further evident that different historiographical 
interpretations of these ancient texts are based on different conceptions of eclecticism. 
One of the first, comprehensive, and retro-perspective examinations of ancient, but also 
modern age, eclecticism can be found in Johann Jakob Brucker’s [1696 – 1770] 
Historia Critica Philosophiæ (2010a; b), in which he draws upon the work of Diogenes 
Laertius. Hence, he also refers to Potamo of Alexandria as the origin of ancient 
eclecticism, yet admits that the eclectic sect is not known by ancient scholars by that 
name. The reason is, according to him, that philosophers who obviously appear to be 
eclectic understood themselves rather as Platonist, instead of being aware to have 
created a completely new sect. Central to the idea of an eclectic sect for Brucker (2010a; 
b) was the idea that it allowed the philosopher to free himself from the restraint of one 
single sect. He therefore defines 
[t]he true Eclectic philosopher, renouncing every prejudice in favour of 
celebrated names or ancient sects, makes reason his sole guide, and 
diligently investigates the nature and properties of the objects which come 
under his observation, that he may from these deduce clear principles, and 
arrive at certain knowledge. (Brucker, 2010a, p.510) 
For Brucker (2010a; b), however, ancient philosophers did not fully qualify as being 
eclectic according to this definition. In his eye, the ancient eclectics were rather 
syncretists who “instead of choosing the best doctrines and seeking the truth, they had, 
rather, aimed to reconcile widely different opinions” and thus, “philosophy, then, had 
produced the name rather than the practice of eclecticism” (Donini, 1988, p.21). As a 
result, Brucker's (2010a; b) opinion on ancient scholars seems to be that they are rather 
semi-eclectic, not fulfilling his ideal of an eclectic philosopher. Hence, he is highly 
critical about ancient eclecticism as compared to its modern age equivalent, which he 
praises.  
Like Brucker (2010a; b), French philosopher Denis Diderot [1713 – 1784] also 
examined eclecticism and similarly praised modern, and condemns ancient eclecticism. 
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Diderot’s (1779) judgement is equally harsh in his Encyclopédie37 where “the syncretist 
instead do discuss nothing in itself (…) they are occupied only by the means of 
reconciling various assertions, without any regard to their falsehood, or to their truth” 
(Morrissey and Roe, 2013, p.no pagination)38. Both Donini (1988) and Schneider (2002) 
argue that Diderot (1779) was very familiar with Brucker’s (2010a; b) work, which 
explains the similarities between both. More importantly, however, is how he saw 
ancient eclecticism, despite the critical attitude, as something liberating. For Diderot 
(1779) considers especially the sectarian leaders as eclectics, or at least to some 
degree39. Also looking back at Brucker’s (2010a; b) definition, this element of self-
emancipation from the doctrines of one sect is among the essential characteristics of 
eclecticism in the early literature. Diderot’s (1779) closeness to this line of thought 
makes it clear that he saw those leaders predestined to be eclectics, because they freed 
themselves from the doctrines of a single sect and founded their own based on a 
selection of others and own philosophical thoughts.  
Let us turn now to two philosophers who, like Brucker (2010a; b) and Diderot (1779), 
examine the eclecticism of ancient philosophers but are much more critical, if not even 
hostile, to it. The first prominent example here is German philosopher Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel [1770 – 1831]. While he agrees with Brucker (2010a; b) about the 
origin of eclecticism in Alexandria, he says it is descendant of the philosophical schools 
of Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle and does not originate in the work of Potamo of 
Alexandria. Hegel (Reinicke, 1979) explains that Potamo was a mere teacher, for whom 
an eclectic approach is reasonable in the sense that for the purpose of teaching the sects 
are treated equal in his lectures. This, however, does not mean that Potamo was a 
founder of a sect. Moreover, Brucker (2010a; b) concludes from Potamo of 
Alexandria’s existence that the whole Alexandrian school was eclectic, but Hegel 
interprets this seemingly eclectic characteristic of the Alexandrian philosophers as a 
specific self-understanding about their history (Reinicke, 1979). They saw themselves 
as disciples of Platonism, Aristotelianism and Pythagoreanism alike, where “all of the 
__________________________ 
37 Denis Diderot’s Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une Société de 
Gens de lettres, published in in 17 volumes between 1751 and 1772. 
38 In the original: “Les Syncrétistes au contraire ne discutoient rien en soi (…) mais ils s'occupoient seulement des 
moyens de concilier des assertions diverses, sans aucun égard ou à leur fausseté, ou à leur vérité” (Diderot, 1779, 
p.242). 
39 “There is no leader of a sect who has not been more or less eclectic” (Diderot, as cited in Donini, 1988, p.19). 
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previous philosophies could find their place in theirs” (Reinicke, 1979, p.431)40. This 
means that for Hegel (Reinicke, 1979) the eclectic character, that Brucker (2010a; b) 
saw, was in fact a much deeper reflection on how the Alexandrian sect came to be by 
combining elements from different sects.  
According to Hegel (Reinicke, 1979) this combination is not the same as eclecticism, 
due to a deeper understanding of the ‘philosophical idea’. For him, eclecticism is 
something malicious and the “eclectic [philosophers] are to some extent the most 
uneducated people of all, in whose minds the most contradictory ideas find place next to 
each other, without ever bringing their thoughts together and having an awareness of 
their contradictions” (Reinicke, 1979, p.431)41. The other, rather educated side of 
eclectic philosophers who are more aware of this problem, yet still practising it for 
the sake of achieving truth, refused to see the consequences of their 
philosophising. As we can see, Hegel (Reinicke, 1979) develops a clear antipathy 
for eclectic philosophers, especially of the early enlightenment such as Brucker 
(2010a; b), and tries to keep ancient philosophers away from the evaluation that 
they were eclectic. 
Eduard Zeller [1814 – 1908] provides yet another critical historical examination of 
eclecticism in his book A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy (1883). His focus 
lies on a historical reconstruction of the true origin of eclecticism and not so much on 
finding a suitable definition for it. For Zeller (1883) eclecticism is a development, or an 
extrapolation, of scepticism at the transition of ancient to medieval philosophy. 
Scepticism, whose founder is considered to be Pyrrho of Elis [circa 360 BC], arose from 
a philosophical ‘standoff’ between the Post-Aristotelian schools, which Donini (1988) 
identifies as the three Hellenistic schools Stoicism, Epicureanism and Academic 
Scepticism. Ancient scepticism is mostly concerned with epistemology and especially 
with the criteria for truth. Its central question is whether there are evident things, which 
can be used as such epistemic criteria, so that only those statements are accepted to be 
true if they are in agreement with these evident things. Both Stoics and Epicureans 
formulated concepts that define such criteria for truth, which were critically debated by 
the sceptics (Vogt, 2014). Zeller (1883, p.1) now develops a historical theory in which 
__________________________ 
40 Original: “Die Alexandriner hatten den tieferen Standpunkt, daß sie ebensowohl Pythagoreer als Platoniker und 
Aristoteliker waren; alle früheren Philosophien konnten in der ihrigen ihre Stelle finden” (Reinicke, 1979, p.431).  
41 Original: “Solche Eklektiker sind teils die ungebildeten Menschen überhaupt, in deren Kopf die 
widersprechendsten Vorstellungen nebeneinander Platz haben, ohne daß sie je ihre Gedanken zusammenbrächten und 
ein Bewußtsein über ihre Widersprüche hätten” (Reinicke, 1979, p.431). 
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the sceptic position on these “mutually exclusive tendencies” results in an eclectic 
acceptance. This transition from one to the other is explained as a movement from the 
sceptic “neither one nor another” to the eclectic “one as well as the other” (Zeller, 1883, 
p.4). Hence, scepticism is not only the cause but is an inherent characteristic of 
eclecticism, because “the eclectic vacillation between different systems is nothing else 
than the unrest of sceptical thought, a little moderated by belief in the original 
consciousness of truth” (Zeller, 1883, p.21). Here, Zeller’s (1883) view is contrary to 
that of Hegel (Reinicke, 1979), who saw the Academic Scepticism as much deeper than, 
and not as superficial as eclecticism. Eventually, Hegel (Reinicke, 1979) sees Academic 
Scepticism as the final and negative stage of philosophy in which only infinite 
subjectivity exists, without any objectivity, neither in truth nor in existence. As such, 
Academic Scepticism might resemble what the negativity is attributed to with the 
attitude towards claims of objective being, awareness and truth (Reinicke, 1979). 
Although Zeller’s (1883) rationale makes sense to some extent, Donini (1988) criticises 
it as historically inaccurate. First, Zeller’s (1883) assumption that eclecticism is a result 
of the encounter of the three Hellenistic schools, mentioned above, fails from the fact 
that Epicureanism remained very isolated and had no influence on early philosophers 
associated with eclecticism. Furthermore, there is no evidence that those eclectic 
thinkers referred to these three schools only. The mixture is much more diverse, with 
Stoicism from the Hellenistic philosophies and the declining schools of dogmatic 
Platonism, Aristotelianism and Pythagoreanism influencing the eclectic philosophers 
(Donini, 1988). The second limitation is Zeller’s (1883) external influence, i.e. a Roman 
mind set for morality. Donini (1988, p.26) states that under this influence of that frame 
of mind, “eclecticism would necessarily have turned out to be a sort of moralizing 
Stoic-Skeptical-Epicurean lingua franca”42. In contrast, the philosophers of that time 
found their interests in metaphysics in combination with the “pre-Hellenistic ideal of 
pure speculation (theoria)” and “thus Zeller’s theory on the origin and nature of 
eclecticism is a typical example of a priori argument; it explains wonderfully what 
never happened” (Donini, 1988, p.26). At the end, Donini (1988) puts Zeller’s (1883, 
p.22) negative judgements of “the uncritical eclectic treatment of philosophy” in line 
with Brucker’s (2010a; b) definition of syncretism, hence he is not really talking about 
eclecticism all together.  
__________________________ 
42 That is: “language used as a means of communication between populations speaking vernaculars that are not 
mutually intelligible” (Mufwene, 2013, p. no pagination). 
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Finally, with regards to the historical perspective on eclecticism, Praechter, Ueberweg 
and Heinze (1920) introduce a new perspective on the topic, which encompasses a 
wider group of philosophers and is, in some way, much more nuanced. The difference 
from other approaches is that Praechter et al. (1920) interpret eclectic philosophers as 
being single-sect related with the willingness to introduce new ideas from their 
periphery. Hence, they distinguish between orthodox philosophers, who were “hostile to 
the intrusion of alien doctrines”, and philosophers, who “were open to extraneous 
influences” (Donini, 1988, p.28). The latter group of philosophers are then considered 
to be eclectics. Moreover, Praechter et al.'s (1920) interpretation also entails a gradual 
level of eclecticism among members of different sects. This means that some 
philosophers were more eclectic than others, or more orthodox, based on their level of 
acceptance of alien elements. Among the Platonists, for example, they identify Atticus 
[ca. 175 AD] and Taurus [ca. 105 AD] as rather orthodox, while Albinus [ca. 150 AD] 
and Apuleius [ca. 125 – 180 AD] were very much eclectic. And among the Stoics, they 
count Epictetus [ca. 55 – 135 AD] as orthodox and Marcus Aurelius [ca. 121 – 180 AD] 
as eclectic but not as much as Seneca [ca. 4 BC – 65 AD] (Praechter et al., 1920).  
With regard to the latter two, Praechter et al. (1920) introduce two new eclectic 
philosophers and depart from, for instance, Brucker’s (2010a; b) judgement. Although 
Brucker (2010a, p.127) recognises Seneca’s “freedom of judgement”, he positions him 
within Stoicism due to the commitment to this sect expressed by Seneca himself. 
Likewise, Brucker (2010a) sees Marcus Aurelius’ work based solely on Stoicism and 
does not refer to him as being eclectic. Also, Donini (1988) criticises Praechter et al.’s 
(1920) approach by referring to the historical evidence. In the case of Atticus, for 
example, Praechter et al. (1920) ignore in their assessment of his orthodoxy that later 
Platonists saw him as a philosopher who had abandoned the sect, hence it is difficult to 
say that he is an orthodox philosopher committed to Platonism. They further fail to 
appreciate influences from other sects on philosophers when labelling them orthodox as 
well as the conviction of labelled eclectics to be loyal followers of a specific sect. 
Therefore, Donini (1988, p.29) argues that their distinction between orthodox and 
eclectic philosophers “appears less and less convincing” in comparison with the self-
portrayal of those philosophers. 
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2.1.2. IDENTIFYING ECLECTICISM IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
As said above, Brucker (2010a; b) not only provides a historiographical interpretation of 
eclectics in ancient Greece and Rome, but also looks at philosophers of his own time. 
Here, it must be distinguished between two kinds of philosophers; those whose work is 
interpreted by Brucker (2010a; b) and those, who actively saw themselves in the 
tradition of eclecticism. The latter group will be examined later when talking about the 
idealism of eclecticism. For now the focus lies on two of those philosophers, Bacon and 
Leibniz, who are considered to be eclectic based on their contribution to various 
disciplines. It will be shown that the analysis of their work is not without difficulty, but 
it allows us to understand what led to the belief that their work is eclectic, how this 
belief is opposed and to what extent the formation of such beliefs might help to look at 
the works of early economists such as Adam Smith, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, 
David Ricardo or Thomas Malthus.  
With Francis Bacon [1561 – 1626] Brucker (2010a) locates one of the most prominent 
Anglo-Saxon philosophers of the early enlightenment among the eclectic philosophers. 
In fact, he considers Bacon’s comprehensive work on philosophy quite jubilantly as 
much more influential and impacting than any preceding philosopher before. Brucker 
(2010a, p.527) describes Bacon’s ‘brilliant’ contribution to epistemology as most 
important, where he tried to overcome “the prejudices (…) arising from antient [sic!] 
authority” by introducing the inductive methods into physics43. Brucker (2010a) 
specifically exemplifies Bacon’s rejection of the syllogistic method of reasoning as the 
only instrument for the study of nature as characteristic of his general antipathy of 
ancient authorities. Furthermore, as a hint of Bacon’s eclecticism, he mentions that 
Bacon himself not only focused on physics but also presents writings on moral 
philosophy, politics and history. Gaukroger (2001) adds to the discussion of Bacon’s 
eclecticism the combination of inquiry and presentation of results in his writings by 
using a commonplace book. Like other seventeenth-century English philosophers, 
Bacon used these books to present his arguments and findings obtained by his 
application of different methods of inquiry. The use of such a book is a strong 
indication for them that the authors were eclectic, and since it is further known that 
commonplace books were also used by, at least, John Stuart Mill, David Hume and 
__________________________ 
43 The inductive methods were experiments, considered as the only ones to be epistemological valid. 
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David Ricardo44 it can be suggested that they were likewise eclectic. The question 
remains to what extent a commonplace book is truly a sign for eclecticism. 
Blair (1992, p.541) defines the commonplace book's origin in the Renaissance as an 
innovation by humanists of that time. They “adapted a concept with a glorious ancient 
pedigree to suit contemporary, in this case pedagogical, needs”. The reason why 
commonplace books can be understood as part of an eclectic philosophising is the 
following description: 
One selects passages of interest for the rhetorical turns of phrase, the 
dialectical arguments, or the factual information they contain; one then 
copies them out in a note- book, the commonplace book, kept handy for the 
purpose, grouping them under appropriate headings to facilitate later 
retrieval and use, notably in composing prose of one's own. (Blair, 1992, 
p.541) 
In addition, “it may record the origin of a fact (whether bookish or reported by a witness 
or an artisan) but treats each entry independently of its source, as potentially useful 
knowledge equivalent to every other entry” (Blair, 1992, p.547). With this description it 
seems evident that commonplace books show a high degree of eclecticism of their 
authors, hence supporting Gaukroger’s (2001, p.34) conclusion as reasonable. However, 
he carefully notes that the role of the commonplace book in Bacon’s writing remains 
“difficult to assess”. One of the few essays dealing with commonplaces is Bacon’s Of 
the Colour of Good and Evil (Wright, 1868, p.247), in which he discusses colours as 
“apparances of good and evill, and their degrees as places perswasion and disswasion; 
and their severall fallaxes, and the elenches of them [sic!]”. Skinner (1996) explains that 
in this work colours stand for common opinions and Bacon’s intention is to show that 
these common opinions can bring additional support to any debate, regardless of any 
intended or unintended actions that follow. The use of common opinions therefore 
enhances the persuasive power of the argument presented, which allows to conclude 
that this represents Bacon's eclecticism. Yet, he never called himself an eclectic, which 
makes the conclusion not as substantiated as one can hope. 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz [1646 – 1716] is the second example of Brucker’s (2010a; b) 
list of eclectic philosophers in the early enlightenment. To substantiate this conclusion, 
__________________________ 
44 Unfortunately, I could not find out whether Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus used commonplace books. 
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he provides two essential reasons. First, Leibniz engaged in a wide range of disciplines; 
making important contributions in theology, mathematics, law and philosophy. Just like 
in the case of Bacon, this variety of fields Leibniz worked on gives reason to assume his 
eclecticism. The definition Brucker (2010a; b) uses to describe the eclectic philosophers 
does not only require a variety of sources for the philosopher to use, but also 
necessitates to engage with different objects or topics for one’s investigation. In this 
case both Bacon and Leibniz qualify for being eclectic philosophers. What about the 
sources at Leibniz’s disposal? Here, Leibniz also meets the condition set by Brucker 
(2010a), who praises his profound knowledge and application of ancient and modern 
philosophy in all the mentioned disciplines. He especially highlights Leibniz’s 
knowledge of the teachings of Plato, Aristotle and Democritus, thus comparing him 
with Descartes' philosophical background.  
Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether Leibniz was a true eclectic philosopher in the way 
Brucker (2010a; b) understood this concept. Not only does Leibniz never commit 
himself to eclecticism, he is actually critical of it in the correspondence between himself 
and the German theologian Gerhard Meier in 1694. Here, Leibniz says that 
[w]e are not allowed to be eclectics as those, who compile platitudes with 
their opposites, or as those, who write a philosophical history and extract a 
doctrine, instead of turning it into flesh and blood. (Meier, as cited in 
Schneider, 2002, p.246)45 
With this criticism in mind, do we have to give up the idea that Leibniz was an eclectic 
philosopher? It appears that the conclusion that he was eclectic will remain doubtful 
(Schneider, 2002) and is very much dependent on the interpretation of his writings and 
comments. Although the above quote indicates Leibniz’s opposition to eclecticism, in a 
letter to Nicolas-François Rémond [1638 – 1725] Duke of Orleans, dated January 10th 
1714, he writes 
I have found, that most sects are in a good part of what they positively 
claim, are right, but less in that, what they deny. (…) I flatter myself that I 
have entered into the harmony of the various kingdoms and recognize that 
both parties are right, provided that they are not mutually disturbing their 
__________________________ 
45 Original: “Wir dürfen keine Eklektiker sein wie diejenigen, die sogenannte Gemeinplätze mit ihrem Gegenteil 
zusammenstellen, oder wie diejenigen, die eine philosophische Geschichte schreiben und eine Lehre exzerpieren, 
statt sie in Fleisch und Blut zu verwandeln” (Schneider, 2002, p.246). 
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circles, so that everything in the natural phenomena happens in a 
mechanical and a metaphysical way, but that the source of the mechanics in 
metaphysics lies. It was not easy to discover this secret, because few take 
the trouble to combine these two types of studies together. (Leibniz, as cited 
in Schneider, 2002, p.247)4647 
There are two ways how to interpret Leibniz’s position here. First, we can say that he is 
rather pragmatic in his philosophical approach and that perceived his closeness to 
eclectic philosophers of his time lies in the application of different methods of inquiry. 
Another option would be to introduce a new definition for eclecticism, especially for 
Leibniz, as Nourrisson (1860) suggests.  
He distinguishes two kinds of eclecticism, on the one hand the reliance of a variety of 
previous philosophies in the pursuit of knowledge and on the other an attitude of 
conciliation of existing philosophies. And here is where Nourrisson (1860) sees 
Leibniz’s eclecticism, when he considers that it is possible to reconcile philosophical 
sects which are considered to be exclusive or even hostile. If we agree with this 
definition of eclecticism we are able to call Leibniz an eclectic philosopher. Schneider 
(2002), who was critical about Brucker’s (2010a; b) argument, agrees with Nourrisson 
(1860) on this. Schneider (2002) also argues that Leibniz’s eclecticism in the form of 
conciliation finds further evidence in his writings. As the quotation from above 
indicates, and the rest of this works substantiate, Leibniz is much more liberal towards a 
wide range of different philosophical sects, as compared to, for instance, Descartes. This 
openness, however, is simply due to his comprehensive education, where he learned to 
appreciate the wide variety of philosophical sects (Schneider, 2002). Yet, a problem 
with conciliation as criterion nowadays might be the difficultly to distinguish between 
pluralists and eclectics. Appreciation of and conciliation between different schools of 
thought in economics is a quality found in the pluralist literature, as shown in the 
__________________________ 
46 Translated from German to English, while Schneider’s (2002) original source is in French. 
47 Original:  
J’ai trouvé que la plupart des Sectes ont raison dans une bonne partie de ce qu’elles avancent, mais no 
pas tant en ce qu’elles nient. (…) Je me flatte d’avoir pénétré l’Harmonie des différens régnes, et 
d’avoir vu que les deux partis ont raison, pourvû qu’ils ne se choquent point; que tout se fait 
mécaniquement et métaphysiquement en meme tems dans les phénomènes de la nature, mais que la 
source de la mécanique est dans la métaphysique. Il n’étoit pas aisé pas aisé de découvrir ce mystère, 
parce qu’il y a peu de gens qui se donnent la peine de joinder ces deux sortes d’ètudes” (Leibniz, 
1714).  
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previous chapter. Although these qualities are necessary for eclecticism too, further 
criteria are needed to make a proper distinction. 
 
2.1.3 MORAUX’S IDENTIFICATION OF ECLECTICISM 
As we can see, the historical exegesis of eclecticism in the writings of philosophers of 
the past leaves us with some difficulties. If we cannot find a self-commitment in 
someone's writings, we need to find something that clearly characterises the philosopher 
as eclectic. From the example of Leibniz we can see how much this depends on our 
view of eclecticism itself. Different ways have been suggested to find eclecticism in the 
works of philosophers but they all have been subject to criticism. And, we are still left 
with the question whether famous economists have been eclectics as Bronk (2009) 
claims. Although we know that some of these classic economists he mentions used 
commonplace books, this does not necessarily mean they were eclectics. It becomes 
even more difficult if we look at economists who lived in a time when commonplace 
books were no longer in use, hence we cannot solely rely on these books as sole 
evidence. The other indicator put forward by Brucker (2010a; b) is the range of topics 
and disciplines the philosopher is engaged with. Such broad interest in several different 
areas is evidently occurring in the works of Smith, Hume and Mill, but again that does 
not mean they were eclectics as we see in the case of Leibniz. Is there another possible 
solution how we could identify eclecticism in the works of these classic, but also in 
modern economists? 
The framework that Paul Moraux (1984) suggests offers a possible solution to identify 
eclecticism in the works of philosophers who were not committed to eclecticism or did 
not call themselves eclectics. Moraux’s (1984) approach is similar to that already 
presented by Praechter et al. (1920) but has the advantage of overcoming their 
limitations (Donini, 1988). First of all, he objects to the traditional dichotomy between 
orthodoxy and eclecticism as historically inaccurate based on the historical evidence, 
i.e. the lack of written commitment to eclecticism, or even syncretism, of ancient 
philosophers. Instead, Moraux (1984) differentiates between ‘de facto orthodoxy’ on the 
one and ‘intentional orthodoxy’ on the other hand, which is here synonymous to 
eclecticism.  
His use of orthodoxy in both cases is due to the fact that philosophers usually 
committed themselves to one specific sect and did not see themselves as free or 
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independent of them. Hence, the distinction made does not rely on the premise whether 
or not someone shows a commitment but to what degree the person is committed. De 
facto orthodoxy therefore means that the philosopher has a strong commitment to his 
sect while intentional orthodoxy allows an accidental or intentional inclusion of so 
called alien elements or doctrines in the philosopher’s thoughts. In the accidental case 
one can say that these philosophers appear to be “sincerely convinced that they are 
representing the genuine version of their school’s doctrine” (Donini, 1988, p.30)48. The 
intentionality, on the other hand, is simply understood as the willing inclusion of those 
alien elements with the conviction that this is possible and will make one’s philosophy 
better.  
This distinction may shed a new light on, for instance, Diderot’s (1779) observation of 
the more or less eclectic leaders of ancient philosophical sects (Donini, 1988; Morrissey 
and Roe, 2013). The intentional introduction of otherwise alien doctrines into the 
schools they were educated in, or belonged to, may have caused Diderot (1779) to 
conclude they were somewhat eclectic. Under Moraux’s (1984) framework, such a 
conclusion makes more sense than under Diderot’s (1779) own, rather idealistic 
definition of eclecticism. To further illustrate Moraux’s (1984) conception, we can look 
at two examples. He himself refers to Alexander of Aphrodisias [around 200 AD] who 
commits himself to Aristotle in his writings, yet there are elements in his work which do 
not belong to Aristotelianism. For instance, he had a different understanding of the soul 
than Aristotle, but still believed he would not depart himself from Aristotelianism with 
it (Moraux, 1984). Another example may be Antiochus of Ascalon [ca. 125 – 68 BC] 
who was a member of the Platonist sect, but was opposed to the scepticism in the school 
at his time. Instead of agreeing with the scepticism of his fellow disciples he developed 
a retroactive dogmatism, especially in epistemology, which was essentially Stoic. This 
epistemological stance allows, in opposition to scepticism, to have certain knowledge 
with the help of 'cognitive impressions', i.e. in essence the perpetual, sensory 
impressions that Stoic's consider as their truth criterion (Frede, 1987). This could allow 
us to conclude Antiochus’ intentional orthodoxy. Interestingly, Dillon (1988) argues 
that Antiochus might have seen no real differences between Platonism and Stoicism at 
all, only differences in their terminology. This would then allow him to combine their 
__________________________ 
48 Lodge (1944, p.434) gives a metaphorical example of such an intentional orthodoxy among realists, idealists and 
pragmatists as mining companies in his anecdotal paper and explains that at one point “the realist may invent a way 
to include in his system values which at the present we associate with idealist and pragmatic methods of working”. 
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doctrines to oppose the Platonist sceptics. These first examples, among several others49, 
give us an understanding how we can use Moraux’s (1984) framework to identify 
eclectic philosophy. 
There is, of course, one exception that does not really fit into Moraux’s (1984) 
dichotomy of de facto and intentional orthodoxy. This exception is the Greek physician 
Galen of Pergamon [ca. 129 – 216 AD], who sympathises with Aristotelianism on the 
one hand but refuses to acknowledge any specific school as his own. Galen rather 
chooses hypotheses “which he views best because, independently of their origin, he 
considers them as scientifically proven or underpinned by unassailable 
conclusions”50(Moraux, 1984, p.xxii). This means that Galen is driven by an early kind 
of scientism that guides him in his decision what doctrines or principles are best for his 
practices. Nonetheless, it is Galen’s uniqueness among the ancient philosophers that 
allows us to keep Moraux’s (1984) analytical tool.  
There might be some adjustments needed in the light of the definition of eclecticism 
suggested here, especially in the light of a non-historical account of eclecticism. For 
now, we can constitute that the accidental, and even more the intentional, inclusion of 
doctrines from other sources than one’s philosophical background or commitment could 
be understood as a form of eclecticism, whereas this dissertation focuses on the 
intentionality of inclusion for its definition. Eclecticism becomes then an extrapolation 
of pluralism in a similar way Zeller (1883) understands eclecticism as inevitable 
consequence of scepticism. We could further establish a gradual scale with moderate 
steps from pluralism to eclecticism, which allows allocating economists on a certain 
point depending on the range of their inclusion, but for the sake of justifying eclecticism 
the focus will not be on such a scale. 
  
__________________________ 
49 Dillon (1988), for example, also refers to s to Plutarch [ca. 46 – 120 AD] and Atticus to provide further evidence.  
50 Original:  
Über die Grenzen der Schulen hinweg will er sich für die Thesen entscheiden, die er als die besten 
betrachtet, und zwar weil er sie ganz unabhänging von ihrer Herkunft für naturwissenschaftlich für 
erwiesen oder durch unangreifbare Schlussfolgerungen für untermauert hält. (Moraux, 1984, p.xxii). 
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2.2. MODERN ECLECTICISM 
While the literature discussed above is mostly concerned with the question whether or 
not certain historical philosophers were eclectic, and how it could be determined, the 
modern literature focuses more on the practical implications of eclecticism in its 
respective disciplines. Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin’s (2011) and Køppe’s (2012, p.15) 
explanations illustrate this emphasis best, when they say that eclecticism is concerned 
with “one of the most important defining characteristics of the scientific process–the 
selection of those elements, properties, characteristics which define the empirical 
object”. Beside the clear methodological emphasis of this focus, there is also a certain 
ontological commitment emerging from the literature. The empirical object Da Rocha 
Falcão and Hazin’s (2011) and Køppe’s (2012) , and others, talk about, seems to be 
always multifaceted in nature so that different research approaches must be applied. 
This is one of the strongest commonalities the otherwise diverse literature from 
pedagogy, psychology, mixed method research, sociology and economics share.  
 
2.2.1. PEDAGOGICAL RESEARCH 
The literature on educational research can roughly be divided into research into learning 
in general and research into pedagogical practices. For the latter, we can formulate a 
pedagogical eclecticism that is promoted by Taggart (1955). She critically discusses the 
evolution of pedagogical theories and concludes that the implementation of “new 
philosophies, new psychologies and new schools of educational thought as they are 
developed” is the central necessity for the future in teaching. Furthermore, “the eclectic 
viewpoint would enable the educator to extract the sound postulates from each school or 
system of the past and present” (Taggart, 1955, pp.155–156) to improve her own 
teaching. It seems, here, that Taggart (1955) promotes a kind of pedagogical eclecticism 
Hegel (Reinicke, 1979) attests to Potamo. This, however, does not mean that a generous 
selection from the wide range of teaching techniques generally qualifies as pedagogical 
eclecticism, as theory development is not covered here. 
The former category in the literature is then concerned with the, for eclecticism more 
contemporary, theory development in education about how we learn, about learning 
environments and the wider social influences in relation to learning. Here, Da Rocha 
Falcão and Hazin (2011, p.32) emphasis the “heuristic value of eclecticism” for 
developing theories in this and other fields. The reasoning of this heuristic value is the 
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following: Theory development is especially important as each theory investigating an 
empirical object is usually based upon a pre-selection of characteristics of it, and 
therefore we can have a range of competing theories about the same empirical object51. 
Yet, the pre-selection also poses a limitation to the explanatory power of each theory. 
Eclecticism, i.e. the acceptance of different theories, can then overcome these 
limitations and increase the general understanding of the empirical object, but only if all 
theories are considered scientifically equally valuable (Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin, 
2011). Hence,  
eclecticism, then, will be an heuristic, productive and coherent move in the 
context of theory-building if contributors are considered as effectively 
complementary and valuable in terms of layer two (Data-defining and 
hypothesis-creating) and “authorized” by layers three (School of thought) 
and four (Ideology–conception of the world). (Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin, 
2011, p.35) 
To illustrate the meaning of this heuristic value, Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin (2011) 
refer to research into proportional reasoning among school children, an important 
research subject for the development of mathematical curricula in schools.  
Lesh, Post and Behr (1988, p.93) define proportional reasoning as “a form of 
mathematical reasoning that involves a sense of co-variation and of multiple 
comparisons, and the ability to mentally store and process several pieces of 
information”. In addition, Clark (2008, p.6) describes it as the ability “to synthesize and 
connect the multiplicative and equivalent concepts of proportion” which then “requires 
an adequate knowledge of proportion in order to apply the concept in the appropriate 
situation”. A simple example of proportional reasoning presents two equally fast 
students running around a track, whereas the lap-count and time is given for one of 
them. Now, the student is required to calculate the time required by the other runner 
with a different number of laps (Heller et al., 1989)52. This phenomenon, the research 
object focused on (Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin, 2011), has been researched for some 
time and we can identify two theoretical approaches that try to explain proportional 
__________________________ 
51 In some way this reasoning is reminiscent of the underdetermination of theories (Quine, 1951) mentioned in the 
previous chapter, as well as being shortly discussed in chapter 4.  
52 For instance, student A and B are equally fast. Student A took 15 minutes for 8 laps. How long did student B need 
for 12 laps? 
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reasoning; namely the Piagetian and the Vygotskian theories53. The former theory is 
embedded in cognitive psychology and emphasises the development of the human brain 
and its relation to proportional reasoning. The latter, on the other side, examines 
proportional reasoning in networks of semiotic mediators in a social and cultural 
dependent context and is therefore part of a social psychological paradigm. Da Rocha 
Falcão and Hazin’s (2011) claim now says that both theories together, even if 
incommensurable, hold a higher explanatory power than on their own. Selecting both 
the Piagetian and the Vygotskian approach to examine proportional reasoning provides 
a “a) better explanation of developmental ways and obstacles of mathematical knowing 
at school and in other social contexts” and “b) [an] enrichment of pedagogical 
hypothesis on the proposition of auxiliary cultural tools” (Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin, 
2011, p.36). 
An example of such applied research in education that qualifies for Da Rocha Falcão 
and Hazin’s (2011) eclecticism can be found in Stinson (2004, 2009). In his 2004 
dissertation, he investigates the experience of African-American students in schools, 
specifically in the subject mathematics (Stinson, 2004). His research aim is to identify 
the role of the socio-cultural influences on male African-American students, their 
schooling experiences in mathematics and beyond, and how they understand success in 
school. Motivated by a lack of literature on successful African-American students in 
school, most literature focuses on reasons of failure, and unsatisfied with the theoretical 
paradigms available to conduct the necessary qualitative research, Stinson (2004, 2009) 
chooses an eclectic approach to develop a broad understanding of these influences. To 
achieve this, he draws upon post-structural critical race theory54 and critical theory as 
frameworks to inform his qualitative methodology. He explains his approach as 
following: 
Theoretically, poststructural theory made available a different language to 
re-define terms such as person, agency, discourse, and power, as well as the 
theoretical concepts subversive repetition55 and deconstruction56. CRT57 
__________________________ 
53 Referring to Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget [1896 – 1980] and Russian psychologist Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky 
[1896 –1934] 
54 Solórzano and Yosso (2002, p.25) define critical race theory in education as “a framework or set of basic insights, 
perspectives, methods, and pedagogy that seeks to identify, analyse, and transform those structural and cultural 
aspects of education that maintain subordinate and dominant racial positions”. 
55 The “freedom to constitute oneself in an unexpected manner—to decode and recode one’s identity” (Stinson, 
2004, p.57). 
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offered a means of foregrounding race and racism throughout the study, as 
well as the theoretical concepts of counter-storytelling58 and double-
consciousness59. Critical theory put forward the ideological foundation of 
socio-political critique, self-empowerment, and social transformation, as 
well as the theoretical concepts marginalized subjects and hegemony. 
(Stinson, 2009, p.510) 
Within the meaning of Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin’s (2011) eclecticism, all three 
theories used together provide Stinson (2004, 2009) with a broader understanding and 
the possibility to answer his research question than with one theory alone.  
However, objections can be raised to this approach, especially in regard to the 
combination of critical theory and post-structuralism. This is, for instance, put forward 
by Lather (2006), who refers to the incommensurateness of both theories60. Stinson 
(2009), however, argues that the boundaries between post-structuralism and critical 
theory are not as clear as they seem to be and, therefore, the argument of 
incommensurability might fail. Here, he specifically refers to the work by Kincheloe 
and McLaren (2000), who argue that postmodernism61 and critical theory can 
complement each other, especially that critical theory provides a normative 
underpinning for the postmodern critique of Western societies. Hence, this combination 
allows Stinson (2004, 2009) to obtain an understanding of the socially marginalised 
agency of African-American students, which becomes even more interesting against his 
own background and identity62.   
                                                                                                                                                                                  
56 Deconstruction means “to locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose 
with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to 
reconstitute what is always already inscribed” (Derrida, 1998, p.lxxvii). 
57 Critical Race Theory 
58 Counter-storytelling includes “stories of “raced” people whose experiences are often not told; stories that expose, 
analyse, and challenge the majoritarian stories of racial privilege” (Stinson, 2009, p.505; Solórzano and Yosso, 2002). 
59 Double-consciousness is the “sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s 
soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (Bois, 2008, p.12). 
60 For example, the concept of self-empowerment in critical theory is the provision of skills and knowledge for an 
individual to articulate socio-political critiques about his or her environment and to decide how to deal with 
oppressive elements around him or her (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2000). On the other side, the essence of post-
structuralism is precisely the deconstruction of concepts such as self-empowerment (Derrida, 1982, 1992, 1998, 2000, 
2004). This leads to ontological inconsistencies between critical theory and post-structuralism which one can use to 
argue against an eclectic approach as Stinson (2004, 2009) applies. 
61 At this point there arises some confusion, as Stinson (2004, 2009) seems to use post-structuralism and 
postmodernism synonymously while Kincheloe and McLaren (2000) make, despite some commonalities, a 
distinction between postmodernism and post-structuralism. In regard to the critique, it is necessary to identify 
whether the commonalities are addressed or not. Hence, the argument of incommensurability between post-
structuralism and critical theory can still be valid in the light of the commensurability of postmodernism and critical 
theory when the commonalities are not addressed.  
62 He refers to the marginalisation of homosexuals in the US society, saying that 
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2.2.2. PSYCHOLOGY 
Analogous to pedagogy, the psychology literature on eclecticism can also be divided 
into two categories. The first category is the formulation and development of theoretical 
content while the second category focuses on therapeutic approaches and methods.  
With regard to the first category, it is Køppe (2012) who argues that the general 
scientific development is in itself inherently eclectic and that the evaluation of 
eclecticism is therefore connected to the successful or unsuccessful progress in science. 
Similar to the argument by Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin’s (2011), he defines eclecticism 
as the choice of attributes of those objects under examination which determines the 
successful theory development. A theory is then, superficially spoken, the result of an 
examination of chosen characteristics of an object, under the assumption that such an 
object possesses multiple and complex attributes. Køppe (2012, p.15) writes here that 
such an object can “be said to be a concrete operationalizable measure which is 
operationalized differently depending upon the method of measurement”. As an 
example in psychology he refers to the concepts of cognition as object, which has a long 
cross-disciplinary research history. Its history began with focus on the characteristics of 
cognition such as perception, thought and memory in early psychology and went 
through learning and problem solving in B.F. Skinners behaviourism and Tolman’s 
(1848) cognitive mapping over to “the direction of neuropsychology, clinical 
psychology (cognitive therapy), linguistics, and philosophy” (Køppe, 2012, p.16).  
This current development of cross-disciplinary research is the result of three problems 
within cognitive psychology Køppe (2012) identifies. First, there is the concept of 
consciousness. While cognition certainly goes beyond consciousness, i.e. not all 
cognitive processes take place consciously, it remains “somewhat unclear as to what 
extent consciousness is the determining parameter of cognitive psychology” (Køppe, 
2012, p.16). Here, attempts to bring phenomenology and cognitive psychology together 
might solve this problem, but since it is a quite new approach not much can be said for 
now. Secondly, the role of emotions has been of little interest in cognitive psychology 
for some time, but became more important through neuro-scientific research lately. 
Additionally, the role of social processes became included into the research agenda too 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
[b]eing gay excludes me from nearly all social institutions such as education, family, government, 
industry, religion, and so forth. Only small portions of these intuitions have acknowledged my 
existence and value as a contributing human to society and citizen of a democracy. (Stinson, 2004, 
p.70) 
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(Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin, 2011). Finally, linguistics also became increasingly 
interesting in cognitive psychological because of its general understanding of semiotics, 
phonology and syntax, and it is assumed to have an important influence on cognition 
too. On the other side, this eclectic integration bears several problems; as Køppe (2012, 
p.16) says: 
[t]he point, then, is that if all these three areas are acknowledged as being an 
integrated part of cognitive psychology–what, then, is cognitive psychology 
not? (…) One can say that cognitive psychology, on the whole, is devoid of 
meaning due to its considerable [sic!] but also that it constitutes itself as a 
cross-disciplinary school of thought, but must have some definable feature 
(…)–and what is it then?  
The concern here is that cognitive psychology, through integration, becomes 
undistinguishable from other disciplines and might become an equivalent to what has 
been coined as economic imperialism, i.e. the application of analytical methods of 
economics to non-economic problems. As Køppe (2012) observes, however, this 
tendency is not a particular problem of eclecticism itself but a general danger in theory 
development and cross-disciplinary research. As a result he concludes that eclecticism 
must be treated carefully, but neither as a priori positive or negative for scientific 
progress. 
The second category in which eclecticism is discussed is concerned with therapy 
approaches in psychology, where the patient becomes the central object of inquiry or 
treatment. The reason for the rise of eclecticism in therapy, according to Slife, Reber 
and Gantt (2003, p.5), lies in the fact that there has been a growing dissatisfaction 
among therapists with single theory approaches, because “behaviorists may tend to 
overlook problems of thinking, just as cognitivists may tend to overlook problems of 
behavior”. Jensen, Bergin and Greaves (1990) provide empirical evidence for this 
conclusion. According to their study over 68% of participating psychologists identify 
themselves as eclectics due to their dissatisfaction. If we take earlier studies, it is 
evident that this number has increased over the past decades, from 50% in the 1970’s 
(Garfield and Kurtz, 1975) to 64% in 1980 (Patterson, 1986) to the figure given by 
Jensen, Bergin and Greaves (1990). Additionally, further literature can be found that 
supports the conclusion that therapists are dissatisfied with single theoretical approaches 
due to the wide range of needs they encounter with their patients (Goldfried, 1980; 
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Norcross, 1986; Prochaska and DiClemente, 1986; Lazarus, Beutler and Norcross, 
1992).  
Unfortunately, it was not possible to find figures for the 2000s, that would indicate 
whether the number of dissatisfied therapists increased, decreased or stagnated in 
relation to the 1990s. Nonetheless, the argument for an existing dissatisfaction, which 
results in eclecticism can still be found, as shown in the case of Slife, Reber and Gantt 
(2003). There are, however, two interesting observations from this dissatisfaction of 
single theoretical approaches to an otherwise wide variety of therapeutically needs of 
the patients, which can be interpreted as the complexity- or multiplicity-of-the-object 
argument mentioned by Køppe (2012). First of all, we can find early arguments for 
eclecticism that are strikingly similar to the once found in the literature of the early 
enlightenment. For instance, Lazarus, Beutler and Nocross (1992, p.11) argue that the 
solution of this tension between therapeutic need and available therapies lies in the 
selection of “what appears to be best from a variety of methods, approaches, or styles”. 
If we recall the definitions of eclecticism by, for instance, Brucker (2010a; b) we can 
see how the idea behind eclecticism, the choice of what is best, has little changed even 
though in psychology it seems more focused on actual methodological questions and 
less on a philosophical foundation. The second observation comes from Goldfried 
(1980, p.991), who identifies a “Kuhnian-type crisis” in the psychologists' paradigm due 
to the dissatisfaction of the current practices. But is the emergence of eclecticism truly 
this kind of crisis? Kuhn (2012, pp.74–75) summarises such a crisis by saying that 
“novel theory emerged only after a pronounced failure in the normal problem-solving 
activity”. In the present case in psychology the dissatisfaction described finds its origin 
on the failure of the problem-solving activity, but other than Kuhn (2012) describes 
there is not necessarily a novel theory emerging, since eclecticism is not about finding 
or developing one single new theory.  
The question is what we can make out of this. There are several possible answers to the 
question of a paradigmatic crisis in psychology. First, one could say that it is half a 
“Kuhnian-type crisis” (Goldfried, 1980, p.991), or at least it was such a crisis at that 
time period and now this has been resolved into a new, cognitive paradigm. On the 
other hand, the whole idea of a crisis can be abandoned if we reject a Kuhnian 
paradigmatic structure in psychology completely. Staats (1981), for example, argues 
that psychology is in a pre-paradigmatic state, in which the psychological schools of the 
20th century are still competing for the position as dominant paradigm. Hence, we 
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cannot assign a crisis in which an existing paradigm is replaced after a dissatisfaction of 
a current practice arose. Yet others reject Staats’ (1981) assessment of psychology as 
being pre-paradigmatic and argue that psychology cannot at all be viewed in the way 
Kuhn (2012) understood science (Rychlak, 1975; Koch, 1981; Henley, 1989; Leahey, 
1992; Koch, 1993)63. Instead, psychology consists and has always consisted of several 
coexisting paradigms that make a Kuhnian revolution obsolete (Hergenhahn and 
Henley, 2013)64.  
Let us return to the question of eclecticism in psychology. A comprehensive analysis of 
eclectic practice can be found in the works of Slife (1987), Slife and Reber (2001) and 
Slife, Reber and Gantt (2003), which is to some extend building on previous work of 
Lazarus and Beutler (1992). All in common is the identification and differentiation of 
technical integration, technical eclecticism and unsystematic eclecticism as current 
trends in psychological therapy for the above outlined problem. Here, the purpose of 
technical integration is understood as to “increase comprehensiveness by combining 
theories and thereby multiplying the number of categories and techniques available to 
address [the] clients’ needs” (Slife and Reber, 2001, p.3)65. From this definition we can 
see that technical integration is the direct answer to the realisation of the multiplicity of 
issues brought up by the patients and the problems associated with addressing these 
issues with a single theory-based therapy. We can also see how this is very close to the 
argument by Køppe (2012) that a single theoretical approach is inadequate to deal with 
a multifaceted research object, which in the case of therapy is the patient.  
Then, we have technical eclecticism, which is described as the view that an “effective 
combination” of therapy approaches must be based on a “systematic” selection of 
procedures from a “decision-making system” built upon a strong empiricism and not 
just on an “integrating disparate view[s] of psychotherapy” (Lazarus and Beutler, 1993, 
p.383). This means that with technical integration we have actual activity, while 
technical eclecticism provides the heuristic or decision tool for how to act most 
effectively. Interestingly, empiricism here plays the role of a meta-theoretical restrictor 
for the psychologist to make his or her decision. This is not without complications, as 
__________________________ 
63 In fact, Kuhn (2012) was sceptical himself about the paradigmatic nature of social sciences etc. as shown in more 
detail in chapter 3. If psychology is not considered a natural science, then Kuhn (2012) might have agreed with the 
criticism. 
64 Hergenhahn and Henley (2013) further refer to Mayr’s (1994) description of biology as a science unlike Kuhn’s 
(2012) version, with multiple, coexisting paradigms that are in a Darwinian kind of competition and conclude that 
psychology might be seen as similar.  
65 See also Held (1995), Prochaska and DiClemente (1986) and Wachtel (1977, 1987). 
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Slife and Reber (2001) suggest. How is the application of this meta-theory not negating 
the aspired eclecticism? A closer look reveals the contradictory nature of both 
approaches which leads to a failure of their premises. Slife and Reber (2001, pp.4–5) 
conclude that  
both approaches ultimately rely on precisely what they try to avoid – a 
single set of assumptions and thus a single theory. In the case of theoretical 
integration, multiple integrative theories are reduced to a single meta-theory 
that guides the integration of theories or the use of techniques (…) The only 
way to organize and bring coherence to practices, of course, is through some 
formal or informal theory or meta-theory.  
It seems that technical eclectic or technical integrative therapists would only be 
superficially eclectic, or gradual intentional orthodox (Moraux, 1984). The coherent 
composition of different therapy approaches, for instance, requires a set of basic 
assumptions from a scientific paradigm, such as empiricism, rationalism or positivism 
(Slife and Reber, 2001). In the case of technical eclecticism, empiricism fulfils a vital 
role yet it constrains the approach to a single meta-theory or paradigm, hence a 
contradiction or limitation to eclecticism.  
Can the latter category of unsystematic eclecticism solve this problem then? James and 
Gilliland (2003, p.294) describe unsystematic eclecticism as taking “bits and pieces 
from different theoretical systems”, so essentially it can be argued that this approach is 
not bound by an empirical meta-theory, even if this remains speculative. Furthermore, 
unsystematic eclecticism has received mainly criticism, simply because it is 
unsystematic and therefore considered unscientific (Norcross, 1986; Howard, Nance 
and Myers, 1987; Slife, 1987; Jensen, Bergin and Greaves, 1990; Lazarus, Beutler and 
Norcross, 1992; Lazarus and Beutler, 1993). However, in chapter 3, with the help of 
epistemic pluralism defined in chapter 2, it will be argued that such radical eclecticism 
is neither contradictory nor unsystematic and unscientific.  
 
2.2.3. MIXED METHOD RESEARCH 
The literature in the mixed method research community is mostly concerned with 
methodology and the justification of the application of different methods. Hence, it 
finds itself deep in the paradigmatic discourses that were discovered in the previous 
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section on psychology and expands them into social sciences and pedagogy66. Central to 
these paradigmatic discourses is the question of Kuhn’s (2012) incommensurability 
thesis. Some of the debates in this thesis will be outlined further in chapter 3, but first 
the question of eclecticism shall be addressed.  
There is a line of argument that makes mixed method research predestined to 
eclecticism, because it is very similar to the ontological positions outlined in the 
previous sections. This line argues that mixed method research is best suited for 
research on complex issues or objects, and therefore, according to Rossman and Wilson 
(1994, p.315), it should be “shamelessly eclectic”. Or more precisely, “mixed method 
research is (…) the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines 
quantitative and qualitative research techniques, approaches, concepts or language into a 
single study” and further it “legitimate[s] the use of multiple approaches in answering 
research questions, rather than restricting or constraining researchers' choices” (Johnson 
and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p.17). Just like eclecticism, whether historical or modern, 
mixed method research is rather anti-dogmatic in its core and the emphasis on the 
choice of different methods makes the comparison even more suggestive. Therefore, 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2012) speak of methodological eclecticism as a core of mixed 
method research, in which the research chooses from a range of methods to conduct his 
or her research. As said above, the arguments for choice itself is partly based upon the 
denial of the incommensurability thesis and the incompatibility of methods thesis. The 
first thesis is mostly understood as the claim that it is impossible to combine qualitative 
and quantitative research methods due to their epistemological, ontological, or other 
paradigmatic differences. These differences, on the other side, inform far reaching 
criticism of mixed method research, from the concern of a watered down qualitative 
research as result of untrained researchers (Denzin, 2009a) to the demarcation of the 
opposing compatibility thesis (Gage, 1989; Howe, 2004; Lincoln, 2010)67.  
There are three options that the literature suggests to deal with the incompatibility of 
methods thesis in regard to mixed method research. The first, and easiest one, is to 
accept it and to fully dismiss mixed method research. Despite being a valid option, it 
does not really allow the application of eclecticism and avoids some metaphysical 
__________________________ 
66 An overview of the paradigmatic discussion are presented, amongst others, by Lincoln (2010) and Koro-
Ljungberg (2004). 
67 This differences, namely “(1) quantitative and qualitative methods were fundamentally different, or incompatible 
(incommensurable), and (2) interpretive, or theoretical paradigms were also incompatible” (Denzin, 2009a, p.310), 
resulted in the so called ‘paradigm wars’ of the 1980’s (Gage, 1989).  
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discussions for mixed method research. Such discussions are, however, important as 
Lincoln (2010, p.7) argues68. She says that metaphysics “tell us something about what 
the researcher thinks counts as knowledge, and who can deliver the most valuable slice 
of this knowledge. They tell us how the researcher intends to take account of multiple 
conflicting and contradictory values she will encounter”69. Hence and secondly, it is 
necessary and interesting to enter the philosophical discussion on incommensurability 
and maybe try to find an argument that dismisses this thesis, or at least allow some 
adjustments in favour for mixed method research. And thirdly, one can take a pragmatic 
stance as Morgan (2007) or Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) suggest, which also 
dismisses the incompatibility thesis.  
With option number one dismissed, we can further distinguish the second option into 
two categories. The first category accepts the incompatibility in some way and tries to 
argue its way around it. Lincoln (2010), for instance, makes such a point and suggests 
that although, for instance, positivism and interpretivism have strong epistemological 
dissimilarities, they both together deliver valuable and useful insights about any 
researched object. Here, we can identify several aspects from the eclectic literature 
above. First of all, the tolerance of different paradigms or theoretical approaches as we 
have seen in the case of Piagetian and the Vygotskian theory of cognition and Da Rocha 
Falcão and Hazin’s (2011, p.32) emphasis the “heuristic value of eclecticism”. In both 
cases the limitations of theories or the theoretical pre-selection of characteristics of the 
object of inquiry consolidate the argument that the combination of several, possibly 
incommensurable, approaches provide wider insights than any single approach. 
Secondly, it is possible to adopt the ideas from psychology that mixed method research 
is either in a pre-paradigmatic state (Staats, 1981) or that the Kuhnian notion of a 
dominant paradigm does not apply (Rychlak, 1975; Koch, 1981; Henley, 1989; Leahey, 
1992; Koch, 1993; Hergenhahn and Henley, 2013). At least the latter conclusion seems 
intuitive, as mixed method research, according to the definition above, borrows from 
different, in paradigms embedded, quantitative and qualitative methods. Hence, one 
could say that mixed method research portrays some kind of meta-methodology in the 
way empiricism portrays a meta-theory for the technical eclecticism in psychology 
__________________________ 
68 See also Guba and Lincoln (1992). 
69 Likewise, Teddlie and Tashakkori (2012) stress out the importance of mixed method researchers to engage in 
philosophical discussions about the incompatibility thesis. This quote also bears resemblance with the definitions for 
ontology, epistemology and methodology by Fleetwood (2005) used in the previous chapter. 
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(Slife, 1987; Slife and Reber, 2001; Slife, Reber and Gantt, 2003). But then, following 
the criticism from above, mixed method research cannot be seen as being eclectic at all.  
The second category, found in Koro-Ljungberg (2004), has a similar critique of the 
paradigm situation but dismisses the incompatibility thesis through a post-structural 
deconstruction of the scientific discourse70. Koro-Ljungberg (2004), in reference to 
Foucault (2013) and Lather (2001), particularly looks into the meaning of validity and 
concludes that this concept can have different meanings across various scientific 
discourses71. Or as Lather (2001, p.244) puts it: “some [validity] practises [sic!] travel 
across paradigms and ontologies; some are less nomadic, less border crossers”. What 
does this insight imply for the problem of incompatibility of methods raised in the 
criticism for mixed method research? If shared, validity, i.e. the accurate 
correspondence to certain, only marginally different72, epistemological and 
methodological conditions, plays a meta-theoretical role in the sense empiricism plays 
for the technical eclecticism in psychology, but it remains doubtful whether it creates 
the same tautology as above, after it has been deconstructed. The reason for this will be 
discussed further below, first let us conclude the thoughts on validity and 
incompatibility.  
Now, it cannot be argued for an incompatibility of methods when these methods, 
although coming from different paradigms, fulfil the same, or only marginally different 
validity conditions. Incompatibility does only apply among methods with different 
validity conditions under the constraint that the researcher considers only one set of 
validity conditions acceptable. To illustrate the meaning of this conclusion further, one 
may refer to D’Agostino's (2014) interpretation of Kuhn’s (2012) and Feyerabend’s 
__________________________ 
70 Deconstruction is a term introduced and used by Jacques Derrida (1982, 1992, 1998, 2000, 2004) and portrays an 
analytical procedure or tool to analyse literature or text in general, whereat everything is considered to be text in his 
philosophy, and therefore everything can be deconstructed. Derrida (2000, p.300) latest definition for deconstruction 
says that 
each time that I say ‘deconstruction and X (regardless of the concept or the theme),’ this is the 
prelude to a very singular division that turns this X into, or rather makes appear in this X, an 
impossibility that becomes its proper and sole possibility, with the result that between the X as 
possible and the ‘same’ X as impossible, there is nothing but a relation of homonymy, a relation for 
which we have to provide an account.  
71 Here we can see what Derrida (2000) means with the relations of homonymy between X, in this case validity. The 
deconstruction of validity shows us the difference between the final significance of validity, the intentional meaning 
whose existence is dismissed by the deconstructivist, and the underlying, unintentional expression of the concept. 
Consequently, there is no stable meaning of validity but a contextual account for it and the relation of homonymy of 
in this concept.  
72 The reason why I speak of a marginal difference will be explained with the help of a conclusive quote from Koro-
Ljungberg (2004) further below. 
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(1993) arguments on incommensurability73. In the style of his syllogism on 
incommensurability, the following argument against the generalisability of the 
incompatibility of methods is suggested: 
P1. Deconstruction shows that there are different conceptions of validity in 
scientific discourses (Lather, 2001; Koro-Ljungberg, 2004). 
P2. It is assumed, at least, that a successful combination of paradigmatic-
different methods depends on a shared conception of validity, i.e. the 
accurate correspondence to only marginally different epistemological and 
methodological conditions. 
P3. There are instantiation of methods from paradigms with different 
validity conceptions, as deconstruction shows (Lather, 2001; Koro-
Ljungberg, 2004). 
∴  Only these particular methods are incompatible under the terms assumed 
in P2. 
∴  Incompatibility of paradigmatic-different methods is not generalisable.  
Of course, there is always the possibility to dismiss this rationale and retreat to a 
position that holds the incompatibility of methods thesis valid. Premise one can be 
dismissed in a number of ways but most simply by rejecting the underlying post-
structural philosophy here. For this dismissal one could, for instance, refer to Sokal and 
Bricmont (1999) and their criticism of post-structural philosophies. However, the 
deconstruction of validity by Koro-Ljungberg (2004) and Lather (2001) is a straight 
forward, critical analysis of a specific concept, and how it is used, in scientific practice 
and not the misuse of scientific terminology and the production of incomprehensible 
writings in post-structuralism criticised by Sokal and Bricmont (1999). Premise two 
represents the conclusion by Koro-Ljungberg (2004) and Lather (2001) about validity in 
scientific discourse. It is automatically dismissed when premise one is dismissed but 
could also be refuted on its own. The easiest way would be to present an argument that 
shows that successful research based on a combination of different methods does not 
rely on a shared concept of validity. Finally, premise three can only be dismissed if 
deconstruction is dismissed, because it follows from it. Yet, premises two and three are 
__________________________ 
73 D’Agostino (2014) interprets incommensurability between theories but I think his syllogism can also be applied, if 
modified, to methods.  
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supported by evidence from the history of science. Koro-Ljungberg (2004, pp.609–610) 
refers to feminist ethnography as an example of this development, which arose from 
“ethnography methods of studying cultures” and critical ethnography, which studies the 
“empowered and disempowered groups of people”. So naturally, feminist ethnography 
shares the ontological, epistemological and methodological positions and hence, there is 
at least one example of sharing ontological, epistemological and methodological 
positions. Similar arguments can be made about the ontological and epistemological 
sharing of schools of thought in economics. For instance, in chapter 4 the historical, and 
thus shared, 'footprints' of pragmatism in contemporary philosophy are identified, as 
well as Marxist historical relativism and its possible importance for modern economic 
Marxists. 
Realising that there are different conceptions of validity, and in consequence mixed 
method research does not fail due to an incompatibility of methods, further opens the 
way to eclecticism. Other than empiricism as guide for the selection of therapeutic 
approaches in psychology, validity would not be the same a meta-theoretical guide 
because it does not exist as a single concept. If there is not one concept of validity but 
many, as deconstruction suggests, then it allows eclectic choice to take place74. This is, 
however, mostly overlooked and the prevailing discursive fields in science keep the 
notion of incompatibility alive. Koro-Ljungberg (2004, p.616) concludes from this that 
[i]n this ideal world of the hegemonic community, ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological diversities and accompanying 
theoretical challenges are more easily overlooked and often dismissed as 
invalid and non-scientific only because knowledge is produced differently. 
Furthermore, she argues that mixed method research is best suited to promote a critical 
dialogue between different scientific discourses with the help of constellation (see also 
Bernstein, 1992). As she explains: 
Constellations are formed by placing two or more perspectives within the 
same formation, not in a unified fashion but as interrelated entities. For 
example, Critical and deconstructive ethnography are both variations of the 
same theme, simultaneously having their epistemological identities and 
__________________________ 
74 If we can deconstruct empiricism in the same way as validity, we might be able to solve the tautology of its meta-
theoretical appearance for therapy selection. The argument of different concepts is further developed in chapter 3 and 
is one of the major points in the justification of eclecticism. 
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methodological constructions. (…) Constellation implies interreference and 
the simultaneous presence of multiple theoretical perspectives. Therefore, 
the complete separation of perspectives becomes impossible, as well as any 
sharing of theoretical or epistemological identity. (Koro-Ljungberg, 2004, 
pp.616–617)  
The final remark in Koro-Ljungberg’s (2004) conclusion clarifies why the notion of 
'marginally identical validity' concepts is used above. She acknowledges that in the 
diversity of scientific discourses it is impossible to have perfect identical 
epistemological and methodological conditions. Between some scientific discourses 
these differences might just be nuances, but that still means we have not a perfectly 
shared philosophical identity. Then, of course, the question arises when these 
differences become so important that leads to, in regard to validity, a situation described 
in premise three. 
The fourth option is a pragmatists' approach to the incompatibility thesis and the 
underlying paradigm structure. Some of the main arguments for a pragmatic approach to 
mixed method research are similar to the eclectic arguments, see for instance Køppe 
(2012). The pragmatists argue that the choice of method should exclusively be guided 
by the research question and not by one’s own paradigm (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 
2012). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) further argue that paradigmatic differences, 
especially ontological ones, have little meaning for pragmatists and how they conduct 
their research. This makes pragmatists less eclectic, as the eclectic literature so far 
shows how much aware eclectic researcher are, or must be, about ontological or 
epistemological differences. Moreover, dismissing the importance of these differences 
from the pragmatist also means to dismiss the implications of the incompatibility of 
methods, or even the incommensurability of paradigms (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2012). 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p.21) summarise the modern, pragmatic research 
programme in regard to mixed method approaches in the following points: 
(1) determine the research question; (2) determine whether a mixed design 
is appropriate; (3) select the mixed-method or mixed-model research design; 
(4) collect the data; (5) analyse the data; (6) interpret the data; (7) legitimate 
the data; and (8) draw conclusions. 
Here, it is reasonable to focus on the first point first, because it is legitimate to ask 
where the research question comes from or what actually determines the 
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appropriateness of the question. One could argue that determining the question is 
implicitly paradigm driven and hence, the pragmatic researcher cannot argue that 
paradigmatic differences do not matter for his or her research.  
In contrast to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie’s (2004) claim that for pragmatists these 
paradigmatic differences do not play an important role, Morgan (2007) looks at the 
paradigmatic influence on the researcher and argues that paradigms are not as one-
dimensional as one might think. His approach is to differentiate, or deconstruct, the 
term into four different kinds of paradigms. The first interpretation sets paradigms in the 
realm of a worldview, encompassing everything from morals, aesthetics and 
experiencing the world. The second kind of paradigms are the epistemological stances 
which influence the definition of research questions and their answers. These stances, 
Morgan (2007) mentions realism and constructivism as two examples, are, according to 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2012), the source of the incommensurability discussion. 
Thirdly, we encounter the Kuhnian paradigm as shared beliefs among members of 
research communities and fourth “paradigms as model of examples of research” 
(Morgan, 2007, p.53) which present a best solution to a given problem within one field. 
Based on this, Morgan (2007, p.54) concludes that 
[t]he model examples researchers use to demonstrate the key content of their 
field reflect a set of shared beliefs about both the research questions they 
should ask and the methods they should use to answer them. Shared beliefs 
about research topics and methods are, in turn, based on epistemological 
stances that summarize researchers’ assumptions about what can be known 
and how to go about such knowing. And at the broadest level, assumptions 
about the nature of knowledge and reality are an important component of 
each researcher’s worldview.  
Here we can see that all four kinds of paradigms are interwoven and therefore there 
exists no straight forward top-down hierarchy75 from paradigms to method choice. This 
conclusion implies that rejecting a paradigm or a particular set of methods has 
__________________________ 
75 Here: 
Different assumptions about the nature of reality imposed limits on assumptions about the nature of 
knowledge and what could be known. These assumptions, in turn, limited the range of 
methodological assumptions about generating knowledge (with the understanding that this topic 
concerned general issues in producing knowledge, rather than mechanical concerns about the use of 
methods themselves). (Morgan, 2007, p.56) 
see also Lincoln (1985) and Guba and Lincoln (1992). 
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substantial implication on each other. But Morgan (2007) is not much concerned with 
these possible issues simply because “workaday scientists rarely have either the time or 
the inclination to assess what they do in philosophical terms” (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994, p.117). In Morgan’s (2007, p.69) eyes the whole research process, working 
through all four kinds of paradigms, is much more abductive and complex, where the 
research questions are not inherently “important”, and methods are not automatically 
“appropriate”. Furthermore, he argues that Kuhn’s (2012) incompatibility thesis of 
paradigms would rather cause communication barriers, which do not exist based on 
daily observations76. So instead of searching for differences, a pragmatic approach 
would emphasise shared meanings while issues of language and meaning are constantly 
considered.  
 
2.2.4. SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 
This final section on eclectic literature looks into contributions in sociology and 
economics. The reason why both fields are combined in one section is their disciplinary 
affinity, in contrast to those economists who rather see economics as a natural science, 
and secondly for the practical reason where the lack of literature in economics could not 
fill its own sub-section in this chapter. And just like in the sections above, we will 
encounter similar arguments for an eclectic research approach in both disciplines.  
According to Sanderson (1987) the topic of eclecticism became more popular in the 
literature of sociology in the mid half of the last century, about the same time it started 
in psychology. Especially with the disappearance of functionalism in sociology, and to 
some extend anthropology, during the 1960’s, an evident rise of pro-eclectic positions 
in the literature can be identified77. Within this literature the preferred topic is social 
evolution, i.e. the question how societies have changed over time and what are the 
driving factors behind it. This topic itself is, of course, not limited to the eclectic 
literature, but it is naturally suited well in this area because of the following arguments. 
As said, questions of social evolution are concerned with the way of how societies 
developed over time and what factors play an important role in it. Early it was clear that 
__________________________ 
76 He describes a conference where a realist and a constructivist talk to an applauding audience as evidence for the 
inexistence of an, at least, strong incommensurability. 
77 See, for instance, Dahrendorf (1959), Goody (1973, 1976), Harris (2001), Klaas (1998), Blau and Merton (1981), 
Service (1968), Stinchcombe (1987), or Turner (2003). 
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the development of a single theory or the identification of a singular prime-mover must 
be futile due to the complexity of societies. Instead 
[t]here is no single magical formula that will predict the evolution of every 
society. The actual evolution of the culture of particular societies is an 
adaptive process whereby the society solves problems with respect to the 
natural and to the human-competitive environment. These environments are 
so diverse, the problems so numerous, and the solutions potentially so 
various that no single determinant can be equally powerful for all cases. 
(Service, 1968, p.406) 
Hence, we can say that the common theme of complexity identified in the other 
disciplines above is also a central aspect of sociological eclecticism. Moreover, Sil 
(2000, 2004) and Sil and Katzenstein (2010a; b) argue for a problem-driven research 
agenda in social sciences, with a special focus on international relations and political 
sciences, in a similar way the research question centred argument in psychology and 
elsewhere is constructed (Køppe, 2012).  
Similarly to psychology, sociologists also argue that eclecticism is a necessary 
condition of scientific progress or theory development (Dahrendorf, 1959; Turner, 
2003). Dahrendorf (1959, p.118) explains that “[e]clecticism may be a sin in 
philosophy, but science is essentially eclectic. In fact, a scientist who is not as such an 
eclectic is no scientist or at least a bad one” and Turner (2003, p.vii) explains that 
“today, theory is more eclectic, and this is all to the good”. Additionally, Blau and 
Merton (1981, p.1) describe the eclectic openness under the term ‘theoretical pluralism’, 
which represents “the appropriate state of sociology at large”. 
Naturally the question is how this eclectic openness manifests itself in sociology and if 
so, is it different from the other disciplines discussed above? Indeed, there are some 
differences in sociology, as Harris (2001) explains. He clarifies that eclecticism in 
sociology does not mean that all theories are equally treated but that the determinants of 
social evolution ‘might’ be considered equally under all conditions. Important for him is 
that the eclectic sociologist remains ‘agnostic’ to avoid the dogmatic stance of, for 
instance, cultural materialists, who argue that materialistic and behaviouristic proceses, 
i.e. competition, politics, technology etc., are central determinant for social evolution. 
Instead, the eclectic sociologist only confirms that they might be probable, that none is 
a priori true but also not a priori false. This allows the eclectic sociologist to 
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hypothesise in a broader way, even when the considered determinants or even theories 
might be mutually exclusive, but also contains the risk to lead to theoretical 
inconsistencies (Harris, 2001).  
Stinchcombe (1987, p.4) sheds light on this sociological eclecticism by explaining that 
the eclectic sociologist has “a firm conviction that some things are to be explained one 
way, some another (…) Some things are to be explained by personality dynamics, some 
things by their consequences, and some things by ecological causes” and so on. He 
refers to Max Weber, Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim as exemplary sociologists who 
had such an eclectic approach of combining a variety of methodological strategies to 
formulate theories about social phenomena. To speak of eclecticism in the case of Max 
Weber, however, seems confusing to say the least, as he is generally known for the 
formulation of methodological individualism, claiming that all social phenomena must 
be explained by individual actions or “the intentional states that motivate the individual 
actors” (Heath, 2010, p.no pagination). This prospect is hardly compatible with what 
has been described as eclecticism so far.  
Going back to the theory based approach, and not so much the determinant based view 
just described, Sil (2000, 2004) and Sil and Katzenstein (2010a, p.10; b) offer yet 
another interpretation for eclecticism, or what they call ‘analytical eclecticism’. They 
define it as 
[a]ny approach that seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively integrate 
analytical elements – concepts, logics, mechanisms, and interpretations – of 
theories or narratives that have been developed within separate paradigms 
but that address related aspects of substantive problems that have both 
scholarly and practical significance. 
Other than Harris (2001), the emphasis here lies on the theoretical variety in social 
sciences that will allow us to choose and pick those elements that are considered to be 
significant for the problem at hand. Hence, Sil (2000, 2004) and Sil and Katzenstein 
(2010a; b) are closely related to the same arguments for eclecticism we already 
encountered in psychology and mixed method research. Moreover, the proposal of 
analytical eclecticism is informed by a critique of research practices in social sciences.  
There are three specific points Sil (2000, 2004) and Sil and Katzenstein (2010a; b) 
highlight that can be considered their motivation for suggesting and developing an 
eclectic approach. First, there is Lindblom and Cohen’s (1979) observation of a 
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communication barrier between social scientists and policy makers. The general 
problem is that the former develop overly conceptualised knowledge while the latter 
require easy-to-understand insights and suggestions. Naturally, the latter group also 
expresses dissatisfaction with this overly conceptualised knowledge formulated by 
social scientists, especially if they themselves do not belong to this group. Although this 
is certainly an issue, not only in sociology, it remains unclear how analytical eclecticism 
can make a difference here. The use of different theories, methods or approaches does 
not guarantee a more understandable, less conceptualised research output.  
Secondly, Sil (2000, 2004) and Sil and Katzenstein (2010a; b) refer to Hirschman’s 
(1970) critique of paradigm-bound research. In reviewing two books, John Womack’s 
(1970) Zapata and the Mexican Revolution and James L. Payne’s (1968) Patterns of 
Conflict in Colombia, Hirschman (1970) explains how Payne’s (1968) own sociological 
paradigm leads him to make rather outrageous conclusions about politicians and the 
political order in Colombia. These conclusions say that politicians in Colombia, unlike 
US politicians to whom they are compared to, are mostly interested in pursuing and 
maintaining power and that this is the sole reason for the perceived misery of the 
country's population. As Hirschman (1970, pp.334–335) concludes, 
Payne, from the first page to the last, breathes brash confidence that he has 
achieved complete understanding of his subject, whereas Womack draws 
conclusions with the utmost diffidence and circumspection. His respect for 
the autonomy of the actors whose deeds he recounts is what gives his book 
its special appeal and probably contributed to the spectacular accolade he 
received.  
The complete understanding of the subject may sound more appealing and as a proof of 
Payne’s (1968) scholarly achievements, but the critical point is that the paradigm forces 
Latin American, or all second and third world countries, into cycles of law-like 
behaviour, they define extreme limitations to the plausible moves of individuals and 
societies. Here, Hirschman (1970) refers to Marxism as a paradigm that develops such 
constraints. Under this paradigm, every capitalist society is, so to say, doomed to fail 
without giving much account to the uniqueness of these societies. This is where 
Hirschman’s (1970, p.337) criticism is located, when he argues that “any theory or 
model or paradigm propounding that there are only two possibilities-disaster or one 
particular road to salvation-should be prima facie suspect”. It is then of course 
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reasonable to assume that analytical eclecticism, as defined above, can overcome such 
limitations, as it is not bound by any single paradigm.  
Finally, Sil (2000, 2004) and Sil and Katzenstein (2010a; b) prefer Larry Laudan’s 
(1978, 1996) work on research traditions over Kuhn’s (2012) paradigms and Lakatos’ 
(1970a, 1976) research programs78. Laudan (1996, p.83) defines research traditions as 
(1) a set of beliefs about what sorts of entities and processes make up the 
domain of inquiry; and (2) a set of epistemic and methodological norms 
about how the domain is to be investigated, how theories are to be tested, 
how data are to be collected, and the like.  
Other than Kuhn (2012) or Lakatos (1970a, 1976), Laudan’s (1978, 1996) approach 
allows these research tradition to coexist and compete with each other over an extensive 
period of time, thus avoiding the Kuhnian crisis and single paradigm manifestation 
circle. They further overlap in the sense that they produce claims or insights about the 
same issues in social sciences. Sil and Katzenstein (2010a; b) even highlight that under 
Laudan (1978, 1996) a scholar can work within different traditions even if this is 
considered to be incommensurable by others.  
So what is the overall lesson from these critiques? In summary, for Sil and Katzenstein 
(2010b, p.9) there is a constant threat for social sciences to become “a cluster of 
research activities addressing artificially segmented problems” that fail to address 
problems with a wider or more holistic perspective. Moreover, they argue that the 
embracement of intellectual pluralism, or the mere acknowledgement of multiple 
causations, is not enough. Instead, only their analytical eclecticism is suitable, which is 
an 
intellectual stance a researcher can adopt when pursuing research that 
engages, but does not fit neatly within, established research traditions in a 
given discipline or field, [can provide] an alternative understanding of 
research practice that is coherent enough to be distinguishable from 
conventional scholarship and yet flexible enough to accommodate a wide 
range of problems, concepts, methods, and causal arguments. (Sil and 
Katzenstein, 2010a, p.412) 
__________________________ 
78 The justification of eclecticism in chapter 3 likewise relies on aspects of Laudan's work as primary source for the 
argument.  
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Therefore, we can conclude that analytical eclecticism offers insights that would have 
never emerged from single-paradigmatic research alone, and thus may overcome some 
of the issues identified by Lindblom and Cohen (1979).  
Despite the sophistication of its conceptualisation, analytical eclecticism does not really 
show how it will be able to overcome the dichotomy between social scientists and 
policy makers. Even eclectic social scientists, able to “accommodate a wide range of 
problems, concepts, methods, and causal arguments” (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010a, 
p.412) are not necessarily, by their own nature, able to communicate their findings in a 
way that laymen policy makers would not only understand it but could make good 
policies with it.  
Finally, the contributions about eclecticism in the economic literature shall be 
examined. As said above, the research into this topic revealed only a limited number of 
such contributions in the economic literature79. One of the early contributions can be 
found in Robert Solow’s (1988) Comments from Inside Economics, in which he 
explains why he considers himself to be an eclectic economist. This is not only 
interesting in terms of his rationale but also the fact that Robert Solow is usually 
considered to be a mainstream or orthodox economist, and not a heterodox proponent of 
pluralism, which in return means that it is hard to believe that he could be an eclectic 
economist when we agree upon the hypothesis that eclecticism must be seen in strong 
relation to pluralism in economics. The simple reason why he believes himself to be an 
eclectic is his own conception of eclecticism. Yet, his conception, although being 
somehow and intuitively appealing, remains vague and would lead, if applied honestly, 
to the situation where everybody is eclectic.  
For the sake of promoting eclecticism, one has to give Solow (1988) credit for making 
the point that eclecticism is misunderstood by many scholars nowadays. This 
misconception, as he argues, says that eclectics lack protected values and clarity in their 
thinking, or as he rather poetically summarises it: “the wind bloweth where it listeth and 
the hopeless eclectic – like me – sayeth whatever he damn pleaseth” (Solow, 1988, 
p.31). In his contrary understanding the eclectic has a rather difficult position of 
constantly making decisions in the absence of ‘blind’ certainty, i.e. paradigmatic 
answers to questions of scientific importance. But this is how far we can agree with 
__________________________ 
79 Quite recently, Yanis Varoufakis (Yanis Varoufakis | Highlights | Cambridge Union, 2015, min. 7:18-7:23) 
mentioned the need for eclecticism, i.e. “pick and choose ideas that makes sense from those who come before”, in a 
speech at the Cambridge University Union to emphasis what he has learned from the Cambridge tradition. 
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Solow's (1988, p.31) judgement, because his interpretation of eclecticism makes it a 
position of accepting arguments as long as they do not “go too far” or accepting partly 
opposing arguments too. What does this mean? 
Solow (1988) illustrates with two cases concerning what he means with accepting 
arguments 'as long as they are not going too far', or accepting partly opposing 
arguments. For the first example, he refers to a constructivist approach by Nelson 
Goodman (1984) and a subsequent critical book review by Fleisher, Feldman and 
Bruner (1986). On the one side, Solow (1988) agrees with Goodman’s (1984) epistemic 
constructivist approach, which basically says that knowledge about the world is 
constructed as a result of cognitive interpretations of perceptual observation. The 
underlying point is that the world as it is and the world we perceive are not 
superimposable due to the limitations of our senses. On the other side, Solow (1988, 
p.32) agrees with the criticism of Fleisher, Feldman and Bruner (1986), saying that 
Goodman’s (1984) rationale leads to the conclusion that “there is no real world at all”, 
only subjective perception80. Although in agreement with the notion of construction via 
interpretation, Solow (1988) still believes that an ‘objective’ world exists. In the second 
example, Solow (1988) argues that McCloskey (1983) and Klamer and McCloskey 
(1988) also go too far in their argument about rhetoric and conversation in economics. 
Although he admits that there is a certain truth about the rhetoric strategies found in 
arguments of economists, Solow (1988, p.33) says that “some modes of argument lend 
themselves to sloppiness (…) some method of persuasion are more worthy than others. 
That is what I fear the analogy to conversation tends to bury”. This means that not only 
rhetoric as method guarantees persuasion in arguments but that, for instance, empirical 
evidence can be convincing too.  
The dissatisfaction with Solow’s (1988) eclecticism has already been mentioned above. 
It seems that his eclecticism is essentially making all of those with a minimum level of 
reflective thinking eclectics as well. It is in fact not only not uncommon, but obviously 
evident that people do agree with some parts of arguments, or to some degree with a 
line of reasoning. That he, in some way, agrees with the constructivist approach of 
Goodman (1984) or the rhetoric argument by McCloskey (1983) and Klamer and 
McCloskey (1988), but remains critical to some aspects of their arguments, is already 
intuitively reasonable, and likely a position found in various individuals, and would 
__________________________ 
80 This is, arguably, a common and false interpretation of radical constructivism, which is not denying the existence 
of an objective reality but rather denies the existence of objective knowledge about this reality. 
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therefore make 'everybody' eclectic. There remains no criterion of demarcation to 
distinguish between eclecticism and non-eclecticism unless one is to accept a line of 
argument to its full logical consequences. It is questionable if this can take place with 
anything but one's own position. It can be assumed that McCloskey (1983) has a high 
degree of certainty for her own argument, but does this also apply to arguments made 
by others? Possibly not. Agreement and disagreement with certain positions and 
arguments can be found in McCloskey (1994), where interviewees Arjo Klamer and 
McCloskey both clarify their agreement on several occasions81. Does this make them 
eclectic economists? Most likely not. Therefore, it is doubtful to call Solow’s (1988) 
idea eclecticism, even if he thinks so. 
The next proponent of eclecticism in economics is Richard Bronk (2009), whose book 
The Romantic Economists has been mentioned a few times before. He calls for a 
disciplined eclecticism in economics, which combines, intentionally or unintentionally, 
several of the arguments that have also been presented in the literature above. The 
following three characteristics are important for Bronk’s (2009, pp.288–289) disciplined 
eclecticism: 
First, it is disciplined in the way it links the choice of theory in each case to 
the result of a multi-paradigm scan used to determine the nature of the 
situation studied in the working definition of the analytical or practical 
problem requiring a solution; secondly, it is disciplined in its use of 
experience and logic to define a set of criteria for theory selection that make 
clear the conditions in which certain paradigms, models, or sets of 
assumptions can be expected to work; and thirdly, it is disciplined by the 
virtue of keeping paradigms carefully discrete and not attempting the sort of 
general synthesis of different paradigms that is recipe for conceptual 
confusion.82 
The adjacency of this definition with what we have already encountered in the literature 
of, for instance, eclecticism in mixed method research or psychology, is the implication 
of the coexistence of several paradigms and different paradigmatic methods, and their 
__________________________ 
81 For example, Klamer and McCloskey (1988) remarks on John Romer and Jon Elster's support for methodological 
individualism that “I agree that methodological individualism does not have a one-to-one relationship with a 
particular ideology. I have some problems with the Romer-Elster approach – and so by the way other contributors to 
Rethinking Marxism” (McCloskey, 1994, p.353). 
82 Similar arguments of a “problem-dependent methodology” can be found in Boland’s (1982, p.302) and Caldwill 
(1991). 
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qualification in answering specific research questions. Here some seem to be better 
qualified than others depending on the inquired problem. Furthermore, this conclusion 
arose before, Bronk (2009) argues that disciplined eclecticism will foster inter-paradigm 
dialogue, a necessity for researchers to understand a complex world and to develop their 
theories further. Instead of synthesising, the researcher takes a sequence of different 
perspectives and applies them to the same research question. Thereby, the researcher 
makes sure to have a broader understanding of the issue compared to a single-
paradigmatic approach. The familiarity with his reasoning shows that Bronk (2009), 
intentionally or unintentionally, brought existing arguments into economics.  
While Bronk's (2009) definition of disciplined eclecticism provides an adequate 
formulation and justification for the need of eclecticism, the working definition in this 
dissertation does deviate from some of his core premises, i.e. the clear cut view on 
paradigmatic structure within economics. In the following chapter, a different, less 
structured and more fluid perspective of the structure economics, more following 
Negru's (2007) conceptualisation and being based on literature from the philosophy of 
science (Feyerabend, 1993; Kuhn, 2012; Lakatos, 1970a; b, 1976, 1978, Laudan, 1987, 
1978, 1996, MacIntyre, 1977, 1984, 1988), is presented to justify eclecticism, which 
cannot fully use of Bronk's (2009) explanation.  
Finally, the cross-disciplinary eclecticism in law and economics shall move into focus. 
Here, Kerkmeester (2000) says that most scholars are either pragmatic or eclectic, 
despite the existence of several strong schools of thought, such as the Chicago Law and 
Economics, Public Choice Theory, Institutional Law and Economics and 
Neoinstitutional Law and Economics (Mercuro and Medema, 1997). Arcuri (2008) lists 
Robert Ellickson83, Robert Cooter and Eric Posner as prominent scholars in the 
discipline of law and economics who are seemingly eclectic. As reasons for eclecticism 
within the field she further argues “that the mainstream paradigm is inadequate for an 
interdisciplinary enterprise such as L&E, that eclecticism is superior, and that indeed it 
is already practiced to various extents” (Arcuri, 2008, p.80). The reason for the 
superiority of eclecticism, here defined as the selection of “what appears to be best in 
various doctrines, methods, or styles” (Arcuri, 2008, p.79), is allocated by her in the 
strength of empirical, behavioural research in comparison with, for example, classic 
rational choice theory. To illustrate this point, Arcuri (2008) describes that rational 
__________________________ 
83 See, for instance, Ellickson (1998). 
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choice theory predicts that drug related crimes would decrease when the punishments 
would outweigh the benefits of drug use. However, she refers to research showing that 
drug addicted criminals are seldom stopped by harsh punishments, hence the predictions 
of the classic rational choice theory fail. Therefore, so the argument goes, rational 
choice theory should only be applied where it is appropriate, and scholars need to accept 
irrational behaviour that will change the outcome of certain situations. Then, of course, 
one could ask whether the rational choice theory has any appropriate area of application 
with the amount of behavioural research showing how ‘irrational’ people actually act, 
but this shall not be the point of discussion here. Important is the emphasis that certain 
theoretical aspects, as well as methods, should only applied to specific problems and 
that the researcher needs to make a decision when, where, how and which of these 
different approaches are best applied to investigate the issues defined by the research 
questions. 
 
2.3. IDEALISTIC ECLECTICISM 
We have seen that, especially in the early writings, eclecticism entails the absence of 
commitment to specific philosophical sects, or in the recent writing to one specific 
paradigm or school of thought. This does not mean, however, that there is an absence of 
commitment to eclecticism itself. As said earlier, there are those eclectics whose work 
was interpreted to be eclectic by others and those who praised their own eclecticism. 
This latter group is the focus of this section, which discusses their idealistic eclecticism. 
Idealism here is not related to the philosophical movement that has been made famous 
by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hill Green, Bernard 
Bosanquet, Richard Lewis Nettleship, and others, (Dunham, Grant and Watson, 2014). 
Instead, in this context it should rather be understood simply as a person having high 
ideals, which may or may not be unrealisable (Wiktionary, 2013). Idealistic eclecticism 
then, as portrayed below, results in the belief of it having a superior position over the 
philosophical alternatives it is compared with.  
Since it has been noticed that the ancient philosophers never related themselves to 
eclecticism, idealistic eclecticism finds its roots in the early enlightenment. We have 
already used Brucker’s (2010a; b) extensive analysis of eclecticism in ancient and early 
enlightenment writings and we know he was fond of eclecticism himself. Likewise, 
Denis Diderot (1779), presumably inspired by Brucker (2010a; b), develops a very 
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positive and inspiring view on eclecticism of his time in his Encyclopédie under the 
term Eclectisme he writes that 
[t]he eclectic is a philosopher who, trampling underfoot prejudice, tradition, 
antiquity, general agreement, authority–in a word, everything that controls 
the minds of the common herd–dares to think for himself, returns to the 
clearest general principle, examines them, discusses them, admits nothing 
that is not based on the testimony of his experience and his reason; and from 
all the philosophies he has analyzed without respect and bias he makes for 
himself a particular and domestic one which belongs to him…. There is no 
leader of a sect who has not been more or less eclectic…. The Eclectics are 
among the philosophers who are the kings on the face of the earth, the only 
ones who have remained in the state of nature, where everything belonged 
to everyone. (Diderot, as cited in Donini, 1988, p.19)84 
Beside these two, there are several other philosophers who not only praised eclecticism 
but also made it to their own ideal of inquiry. With Victor Cousin [1792 – 1867] there is 
a second French philosopher who promoted eclecticism at a time when it had already 
disappeared from philosophical discourse, or was negatively assessed in many parts of 
Europe85. His intellectual influence and popularity, however, made his eclecticism 
widely regarded as state philosophy in France and his work was translated and 
published throughout Europe (Kelley, 2001). According to Cousin (2006), eclecticism is 
a superior philosophy that, through combination of the true in the sects, surpasses their 
weaknesses (Kelley, 2001; Hatzimichali, 2011). He therefore recommends “an 
enlightened eclecticism, which, judging with equity, and even with benevolence, all 
schools, borrows from them what they possess of the true, and neglects what in them is 
false” (Cousin, 2006, p.33).  
It is important to notice here that Cousin (2006, p.9) was fairly convinced about his 
ability to distinguish between what is true and what is false based on the “one true 
__________________________ 
84 In the original: 
L'éclectique est un philosophe qui foulant aux piés le préjugé, la tradition, l'ancienneté, le 
consentement universel, l' autorité, en un mot tout ce qui subjuge la foule des esprits, ose penser de lui 
- même, remonter aux principes généraux les plus clairs, les examiner, les discuter, n'admettre rien 
que sur le témoignage de son expérience & de sa raison; & de toutes les philosophies, qu'il a 
analysées sans égard & sans partialité, s'en faire une particuliere & domestique qui lui appartienne … 
il n'y a point de chef de secte qui n'ait été plus ou moins éclectique … les Eclectiques sont parmi les 
philosophes ce que sont les souverains sur la surface de la terre, les seuls qui soient restés dans l'état 
de nature où tout étoit à tous. (Diderot, 1779, p.5:270; Morrissey and Roe, 2013, p.no pagination).  
85 The reason for this negative assessment will follow in the next sub-chapter. 
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doctrine” of spiritualism. This is not without problem, as Cousin’s (2006) spiritualism 
works as a meta-guide or, as Hatzimichali (2011, p.12) describes it, an “ideological 
commitment” to a set of standards providing a means to identify truth in different 
philosophies. If we remember Slife and Reber’s (2001) criticism of empiricism as sole 
basis for eclecticism in therapy, we see what inconsistencies arise when a single 
doctrine is guiding the researcher or philosopher in his differentiation between truth and 
falsehood, especially when considering the variety of existing truth theories. For Cousin 
(2006), however, this would not have been an issue at all, since he believed this 
principles to be of divine origin. 
Additionally, we can find three German individuals in the early enlightenment who 
share a similar appraisal of eclecticism as Cousin (2006), and are praised by Brucker 
(2010a; b) too. The first is the physicist Johann Christoph Sturm [1635 – 1703], whose 
eclecticism “was strongly guided by his academic practise, his teachings and 
experiments” (Albrecht, 2004, p.119), and his view that the move of his profession from 
Aristotelian philosophy to Cartesian philosophy, from one sect to the other, was a 
wrong step. He himself kept some concepts of Aristotelian philosophy for his own 
philosophy, experimental methodology and teaching practices, as he understood this 
eclectic approach to be superior than the commitment to a single sect (Gaab, 2004). In 
summary, Sturm’s eclecticism was, in a sense, a philosophia novantiqua and was used 
to justify experimental physics and chemistry (Schneider, 2002).  
The second, and more prominent, member of the group is the lawyer Christian 
Thomasius [1655 – 1728], who appears to be most likely inspired by Sturm (Schneider, 
2002). Thomasius (2001), who is considered to be one of the leading German thinkers 
of the early enlightenment (Kelley, 2001), shows an antipathy towards sectarian thought 
and values the historical freedom of judgement of eclecticism (Schneider, 2002). In his 
Introduction to Court Philosophy Thomasius (2001, p.50) expresses his aversion by 
saying that 
I call an eclectic philosophy one which requires that one does not alone 
depend on the teachings of a single philosopher or should commit 
eventually to the words of a single master/teacher, but shall collect from the 
teachings and writings of all teachers, everything which is true and good, 
into the treasure chambers of his mind, and not just conduct reflexion upon 
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the authority of the teacher but whether this or that philosophy is well-
grounded. 86 
This quote makes it also clear that Thomasius (2001) is not very different in his view on 
eclecticism compared to others of his time. Especially the anti-sectarian sentiment was, 
as has been shown above, quite common among proponents of eclecticism in early 
enlightenment. Moreover, Brucker (2010b, pp.566–570) recognises Thomasius’ (2001) 
influence, when he “introduced Eclectic freedom into German schools”, but also notes 
critically that the “specimens of the philosophy of Thomas (…) contain too many hasty 
and ill-founded positions”. Whether or not Thomasius’ (2001) eclecticism was indeed 
unsubstantiated is not important at this point. What matters are his strong commitment 
to and his appraisal of eclecticism, which in his case is “about the intellectual 
autonomy, about the iudicium and the understanding of the finiteness of human insight” 
(Schneider, 2002, p.238)87. 
Finally, Arnold Wesenfeld [1664 – 1727] is a philosopher who recommended 
eclecticism based upon hermeneutical reasons (Wesenfeld, 1694) and who wrote, 
according to Schneider (1992), one of the most comprehensive but unrecognised works 
on eclectic philosophy of his time. In it, he argues that the hermeneutical power of 
eclecticism allows understanding different philosophical positions while simultaneously 
preserving the intellectual independence of the philosopher. This insight has, for 
Wesenfeld (1694), important consequences in terms of philosophical truths. As he 
writes, eclectic philosophers do not have a corpus of a priori truths. For them, truths are 
neither Aristotelian nor Platonian nor Christian, instead these sects are mere 
approximations to the underlying truths that the eclectic tries to uncover (Schneider, 
2002). For that reason Wesenfeld (1694) also sees a strong importance in the 
__________________________ 
86 Another translation is provided by Kelley (2001, p.584):  
I call eclectic philosophy (…) not what depends on the teaching of an individual or on the acceptance 
of the words of a master, but whatever can be known from the teaching and writing of any person on 
the basis not of authority but of convincing arguments. 
Beside my own translation I used the translation in Kelley (2001) to indicate the content of the quote. The translation 
of 18th century German into modern English is not easy. The original says:  
Ich nenne aber eine Eclectische Philosophie eine solche, welche es erfordert, daβ man von dem 
Munde eines einzigen Philosophi allein nicht dependieren, oder denen Worten eines einzigen Lehr-
Meisters sich mit einem Ende verpflichten soll, sondern aus dem Munde und Schrift aller Lehrer, 
alles und jedes was wahr und gut ist, in die Schatz-Kammer seines Verstandes sammeln müsse, und 
nicht so wohl auf die Autorität des Lehrers Reflexion mache sondern ob dieser und jener Lehr-Kunst 
wohl gegruendet sey. (Thomasius, 2001, p.50) 
87 In the original: “(…) um intellektuelle Selbstständigkeit, um das iudicium und um Einsicht in die Endlichkeit 
menschlicher Einsicht” (Schneider, 2002, p.238). 
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combination of the observation of nature and the study of historical philosophical sects 
to reveal these underlying truths (Kelley, 2001).  
Without going into further detail, the analysis of Wesenfeld's (1694) work makes it 
clear what idealistic role the eclectic philosopher takes here. She is able, unlike 
sectarian philosophers, to look behind the curtains of sects and doctrines to reveal the 
objective truths about nature. It seems that this conclusion reveals two essential 
elements in Wesenfeld’s (1694) eclecticism; first an acknowledgement of the limitations 
of philosophical sects, similar to something we have encountered in the reasoning 
behind schools of thought or paradigms in the more modern eclectic, but also pluralist, 
literature, and an ontology and epistemology that appear to be more realist, i.e. that 
Wesenfeld (1694) claims that objective truths about nature exist and can be known. 
There is, of course, a wide range of criticism that can be brought to this claim of truth 
realism, but there shall be no attempt here to either discuss or refute this criticism. I 
wish, however, to remark that this criticism does not falsify eclecticism itself, since it is 
possible to focus on the first element, the acknowledgement of limitations, as it is done 
in the modern literature, to keep eclecticism viable.  
 
2.4. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON REASONS OF DECLINE 
As indicated before, eclecticism has always attracted a good amount of criticism from 
various sources. Hegel’s (Reinicke, 1979) antipathy of eclectics and Zeller’s (1883) 
conclusion of eclecticism being a distorted, uncritical evolution of scepticism have 
already been discussed above, but these are just two examples of general criticism. 
Moreover, Leibniz's critical position of eclecticism, found in at least one occasion, has 
been discussed. It appears that the general criticism is as plentiful as the different 
conceptions of eclecticism itself, which may lead to the conclusion that some are mere 
attacks on straw men. Nonetheless, eclecticism almost disappeared in philosophy and 
has, until today, a rather negative reputation. Therefore, before the direct criticism of 
eclecticism is analysed, possible reasons of why eclecticism became negligible in 
philosophy at the time of the enlightenment are investigated.  
Donini (1988) holds Immanuel Kant [1724 – 1804] responsible for the near 
disappearance of eclecticism in philosophy, but does not explain his conclusion. It 
seems therefore necessary to investigate Kant's influence, especially under the 
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consideration of Mensch’s (2013) argument that Kant was in fact eclectic himself prior 
to the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1870)8889. With this argument 
in mind, it seems less obvious how he could have been responsible for the decline of 
eclecticism. Regarding the two decades from the 1750’s onward, Kant’s student Johann 
Gottfried von Herder [1744 – 1803] characterised this time as Kant’s prospering period 
where he 
[e]xamined Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, and Hume, and 
investigated the laws of nature of Newton, Kepler, and the physicists, he 
comprehended equally the newest works of Rousseau … and the latest 
discovery in science. He weighted them all, and always came back to the 
unbiased knowledge of nature and to the moral worth of man. (Herder, as 
cited in Mensch, 2013, p.52)90 
This quote gives us a first hint of Kant’s eclecticism, as it describes an investigative 
philosophical position equally to that of self-proclamed eclectics and what Brucker 
(2010a; b) finds in others. And with Mensch’s (2013) and Scarbi’s (2010) analysis of 
Kant's educational background, it seems that his eclecticism arose as result of the 
academic culture during his studies at the University of Königsberg, where he not only 
studied but lived almost his entire life. Does this mean that Donini (1988) is wrong? Not 
necessarily, as there are two points that could have caused Kant to be responsible for the 
decline of eclecticism, and ultimately his own change of mind;  his fame, or his impact 
on continental philosophy, and his Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1870), which 
Mensch (2013) sees as some kind of a turning point in his thoughts.  
__________________________ 
88 Published in the 1781 to 1790 period, considered as a time of his greatest achievements, it actually lies at the end 
of Kant’s academic career. 
89 Mensch (2013) emphases Kant’s broad interest in social discourse in the 1750’s and 1760’s and his avoidance of 
any dogmatic attachment to a specific school of thought unless a satisfying foundation of metaphysics were 
established, which he finally accomplished in the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1870). Whether or not he really 
established a solid foundation of metaphysics is open to discussion and shall not be part of this thesis. 
90 The translation in Mensch (2013) has been written in modern English. The original says:  
Mit ebendem Geist, mit dem er Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, Hume prüfte und die 
Naturgesetze Keplers, Newtons, der Physiker verfolgte, nahm er auch die damals erscheinenden 
Schriften Rousseaus (…) sowie jedem ihm bekannt gewordene Naturentdeckung auf, würdigte sie 
und kam immer zurück auf unbefangene Kenntnis der Natur und auf moralische Werte des Menschen 
(Herder, 2012, p.no pagination) 
while Clewis (2015, pp.17-18) translate it as:  
He examined with as much spirit Leibnitz, Wolff, Baumgarten, and Hume, as he followed the 
development of physics, the laws of nature as expounded by Kepler and Newton, and as he responded 
to the writings of Rousseau (…) and every new discovery he assessed, and he always returned to the 
genuine knowledge of nature and to the moral value of man. 
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The answer to the question of why this work was a turning point is rather speculative, 
but within the relevant literature three possible and likely explanations can be found. 
The first argument from Scarbi (2010) takes Kant’s general interest in metaphysics into 
the focus. Before the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1870), metaphysics were usually 
associated with theology and not very famous among eclectic philosophers, this is 
particularly true for Christoph Thomasius. Kant’s (1870) work, however, made 
metaphysics respectable in contemporary philosophy. The eclectic’s unwillingness to 
engage in metaphysics therefore puts them into a corner where they are no longer 
respected or considered relevant by other philosophers.  
The second argument from Kuehn (2001) informs us about some kind of ‘illumination’ 
Kant had somewhere between 1768 and 1770. This, so Kuehn (2001, p.179) says, “was 
the result of a sudden, decisive, and radical change in his philosophical outlook, not a 
fruit of a long, focused search” and finally resulted in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(Kant, 1870). In this regard, Kuehn (2001) also speaks of a change in Kant’s scepticism. 
It should be emphasised here that this scepticism is not really related to the Sceptic sect, 
which Kuehn (2001, p.180) calls ‘global’ scepticism, but rather means a ‘local’ form of 
scepticism, in which individual philosophers are simply “doubtful in some way and to 
some degree”. This implies that Kant was not generally sceptic of the idea that a 
reasonable formulation of metaphysics cannot be achieved but rather that it has not been 
found yet. Hence, he remained neutral to the teachings of different philosophical sects 
until the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1870), in which he believed 
to have found a reasonable, philosophical foundation of metaphysics. This neutrality 
then could be understood as eclecticism, although it seems to be more similar to 
Leibniz’s rather pragmatic philosophising.  
Finally, Hatzimichali (2011, pp.10–11) argues that Kant “opposed ‘historical 
knowledge’ (based on someone else’s reason) to ‘rational knowledge’ that results from 
examination of the principles which have provided the ground and structure for 
philosophical opinion over the course of history”. With this, Kant shifts away from a 
central aspect of eclecticism, i.e. the acceptance of historical, philosophical statements 
or teachings, which, due to his fame, could have had an important impact on the 
perception of eclecticism at his time (Hatzimichali, 2011). However, the real reason 
behind this observable change of mind remains speculative, as Mensch (2013) points 
out. Moreover, she argues that he actually kept some of his eclecticism in his post- 
Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1870) writings, but it remains unclear exactly where. 
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With a possible central reason for the disappearance of eclecticism discussed, the more 
un-speculative and direct criticism of eclecticism can be investigated, especially in 
regard to the modern literature. Here, Sanderson (1987) discusses a series of critical 
points and general misconceptions that he identifies in the eclectic literature in 
sociology. Although he focuses on sociological literature, his criticism is so general that 
it can be applied easily to all the other disciplines discussed above. The first issue he 
addresses is a dichotomy of “open-minded eclectics” and “rigid dogmatists” (Klaas, 
1998, pp.7–8). On the one hand, eclectic sociologists fail to distinguish between 
dogmatism and simple commitment to one’s own research interests. On the other, he 
says, eclectics are likewise dogmatic. Sanderson (1987) arrives at this conclusion by 
referring to Rokeach’s (1960) definition of dogmatism, which says that dogmatism is 
rather a structure of thought and less content related. Therefore, if a researcher holds a 
specific viewpoint without digressing, even an eclectic one, she can be considered to be 
dogmatic. Secondly, Sanderson (1987) argues, in agreement with Harris (2001), that 
eclecticism’s weakness lies in the necessity of logical inconsistencies arising from the 
combination of different theories, especially from different paradigms. For him, logical 
consistency is the most important criteria of theory development. Thus, “theories that 
are logically inconsistent or contradictory cannot possibly hope to achieve empirical 
success, comprehensiveness, novelty of prediction, and so on” (Sanderson, 1987, 
p.321). This criticism, however, assumes that eclecticism means an inconsistent 
combination of different theories. Yet, eclecticism is, based on the reviewed literature, 
not necessarily associable with a simple combination of concepts and theories and it 
does not produce a new, inconsistent or illogical theory itself. If such illogical 
inconsistencies appear, they are already embedded in the theories used. His third critical 
point addresses the simplicity concept of theory development, a concept being a subject 
of discussion in philosophy for a long time and that basically states that, ceteris paribus, 
simpler theories are preferable to complicated ones. Kant (1870, p.303), to provide an 
example of a previously mentioned philosopher, refers here to a “well-known scholastic 
maxim, which forbids us unnecessarily to augment the number of entities or principles 
(entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda)”, nowadays also known under the 
name Occam’s razor91. Here, Sanderson (1987, p.323) makes a distinction between 
“simplicity as economy and simplicity as unification”, to illustrate his concerns. 
__________________________ 
91 Named after the 14th century scholastic philosopher and theologian William of Ockham [1287 – 1347]. 
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The former described the desire of having a theory with the least numbers of concepts 
and principles, to which eclecticism is in opposition, as it enlarges the principles used 
for research, and the latter regards to the maximisation of phenomena a theory can 
explain. This is based upon Maxwell’s (1974a; b, pp.140–141) concept of ‘aim oriented 
empiricism’, which he describes as follows: 
According to the view to be advocated here-a view which may be called 
'aim oriented empiricism'-the fundamental aim of pure science is to discover 
more and more about an underlying simplicity, coherence, unity, harmony, 
order, beauty, or intelligibility which we conjecture to be inherent in the 
universe (or inherent in the phenomena we are investigating). According to 
aim oriented empiricism there is, in other words, inherent in the basic aims 
of science a wild metaphysical conjecture–namely, that the world (or the 
domain of phenomena under investigation) is intelligible.  
He then goes on and refers to the historical developments in science to proof his point: 
Some of the greatest contributions to science are precisely contributions 
which "unify" apparently diverse phenomena (often against a background of 
entirely different metaphysical blueprints): there is, for example, Newton's 
unification of the motion of terrestrial and astronomical bodies by means of 
his laws of motion and law of gravitation; Maxwell's unification of 
electricity, magnetism and optics (further unified by the special theory of 
relativity); Einstein's unification of gravitation and geometry. (Maxwell, 
1974b, p.266) 
With this, Sanderson (1987, p.325) concludes that eclecticism “undermines the 
achievement of simplicity and unification” and that it “does not treat the world as 
simple and unified, but as complex and disjointed”. Moreover, his emphasis on the role 
of empiricism, or specifically Maxwell’s (1974a; b) ‘aim oriented empiricism’, leads 
him to stress the importance of ‘the strategy of comparative theory assessment’, which 
he relates to Lakatos’ (1970a) ‘sophisticated falsificationism’92. Now, Sanderson (1987) 
__________________________ 
92 Herewith, Lakatos (1970a) argues that a comparative testing of theories is very much context depended and not, as 
Popper (2002) suggests, purely based on their contrasting juxtaposition with rigorous empirical facts. This context 
dependency is a theoretical dependency that relies on the accurateness of other theoretical works and is best explained 
by the Galileo example. In principle, Galileo’s discovery of mountains on the moon falsifies the Aristotelian model 
and its assumptions that “celestial bodies are faultless crystal balls” (Lakatos, 1978, p.98), but the power of these 
observations rely on the accuracy of optical theories which determine that his telescope provides accurate 
magnifications of objects far away. Quine (1951, 1976), Duhem (1991) and others refer to this as the 
underdetermination of theories, as already mentioned earlier.  
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argues that since eclectics interpret all theories as equally valid, this comparative theory 
evaluation is impossible. For illustrative purposes he described a historic ‘thought 
experiment’ in which eclectic cosmologists “would have argued that the big bang theory 
explains some aspects of the universe, whereas the steady-state theory explains other 
aspects” (Sanderson, 1987, p.328)93. Historically however, the big bang theory has 
replaced the steady-state theory in astronomy, because it has been ‘declared better’ 
based on a comparative testing.  
Here, however, one may argue that Sanderson’s (1987) criticism fails to address, or 
consider, some essential points. First of all, his application of Occam’s razor remains 
vague. Occam’s razor can be divided into the ontological principle  
other things being equal, if T1 is more ontologically parsimonious than T2 
then it is rational to prefer T1 to T2.”, the epistemic principle “if theory T is 
simpler than theory T*, then it is rational (other things being equal) to 
believe T rather than T*” and the methodological principle “if T is simpler 
than T* then it is rational to adopt T as one's working theory for scientific 
purposes. (Baker, 2010, p.no pagination) 
Here, it is not quite clear to what Sanderson (1987) refers to, when he says eclecticism 
violates simplicity. The most obvious principle addressed seems to be the ontological 
one, when Sanderson (1987, p.325) criticises eclecticism of treating “the world as 
simple and unified, but as complex and disjointed”. First, we have an obvious 
ontological conflict here which the Occam’s razor cannot solve. Either we have a world 
that is reducible, and the ontological principle is true in the sense that a theory T* must 
be preferred over T if T* has less ontological commitments when, at the same time, it 
has the same theoretical virtues (Baker, 2010), or the world is complex and 
ontologically parsimonious theories may fail to describe this world. Sanderson (1987) 
fails to appreciate that eclectics argue for the latter94 and, even more important, the 
ontological principle faces some serious practical limitations. Here, Holsinger (1981, 
pp.144–145) remarks that 
__________________________ 
93 In short “in a steady state universe that had been around forever, there should be nothing special about looking 
back in time–you would expect to see young and old galaxies alike” (Fox, 2002, p.68) while the big bang theory 
explains the current universe in the light of the expanding universe, the right and predicted amount of helium 
observable and the background radiation. The contradiction here lies in the fact that one theory proposes a universe 
with and the other theory a universe without a beginning. 
94 One might even be tempted to say that Sanderson (1987) calls for what Dennett (1996, p.82) defines as greedy 
reductionism, where “scientists and philosophers underestimate the complexities, trying to skip whole layers or levels 
of theory in their rush to fasten everything securely and neatly to the foundation”.  
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since Occam's Razor ought to be invoked only when several hypotheses 
explain the same set of facts equally well, in practice its domain will be very 
limited… [C]ases where competing hypotheses explain a phenomenon 
equally well are comparatively rare. 
This means that the more common situation in science is that a set of different theories 
overlap in some ontological postulates but also have other distinct postulates that are not 
shared. In these cases the application of Occam’s razor cannot be successful (Baker, 
2010).  
Secondly, Maxwell’s (1974a; b) account has a clear focus on science and it can be 
debated whether his ideas of simplicity and unification can be translated into social 
sciences at all. Moreover, it can be seen how his ‘aim oriented empiricism’ poses a 
meta-theoretical role that could lead to the same results as in the mixed method research 
case described above, where a single meta-theoretical position could lead to 
contradictions and incommensurability itself (D’Agostino, 2014).  
Finally and to finish this section, the criticism of eclecticism from the economic 
literature will be discussed. This criticism, limited to a few paragraphs in Sheila Dow 
(1997, 2007, p.3), defines eclecticism simply as “unstructured pluralism” with “an 
absence of selection criteria”. This absence makes her compare eclecticism with 
Feyerabend’s (1993) radical pluralism of anything goes, which, in her eyes, is 
incompatible with the creation of knowledge. Moreover, she also argues that an 
eclecticism, she speaks of pluralism of method here, based on a problem-driven choice 
of method generally lacks a convincing ontological and epistemological support (Dow, 
1997). Consequently, she rejects eclecticism altogether.  
There are some issues with Dow’s (1997, 2007) criticism that need to be discussed. 
First of all, Marques and Weisman (2009, p.81) argue that Dow has generally a Kuhnian 
approach to pluralism in relation to paradigms and “seems attracted by” Kuhn’s (2012) 
incommensurability thesis, because it rules out epistemological meta-criteria, and alerts 
economists about serious communication issues and the implied necessity to intensify 
academic discourse. Marques and Weisman (2009) argue that many positions in the 
heterodox community about pluralism, with whom Dow seems to agree with, are in fact 
inconsistent with Kuhn (2012). The issues with a Kuhnian paradigm perspective have 
already been outlined, so a repetition is unnecessary here. Furthermore, chapter 4 will 
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provide another discussion of Dow's general criticism after the justification for 
eclecticism is formulated in chapter 3.  
Quite interestingly, however, Dow (2007) apparently provides arguments that can be 
used to support eclecticism in her recent work, and a closer look shows how variations 
of them have been used in the pro-eclectic literature. The focus of her argument is 
epistemic in nature and rests upon insight that knowledge about reality can be 
differently constructed, without necessarily having the possibility of unifying these 
'knowledges'. Hence, she develops an ethical argument which states that when 
knowledge is differently constructed and there are no possibilities to either unify them 
or to identify one best approach, then it is ethical to a) “develop sufficient awareness of 
difference” and b) “not to reject them simply because they are different” (Dow, 2007, 
p.11). In fact, this acknowledgement of different ways of knowledge creation and its 
acceptance is implicit, for instance, in the description of Piagetian and the Vygotskian 
explanations of proportional reasoning as described by Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin 
(2011).  
Moreover, the idea of a plurality of ways to construct knowledge, pluralism in 
epistemology, is essential for the eclectic philosophers as the absence of such variety, 
not only epistemic but also ontological and methodological, would make it impossible 
to develop the argument for eclecticism at all. Here, Dow (2007) additionally refers to 
the nature of the subject matter of economics, the individual behaviour, to accent the 
need for pluralism. Yet her argument is almost equal to ones presented in the eclectic 
literature (see, for instance, Køppe, 2012). According to her, “the nature of individual 
behaviour (with its social and creative aspects) is too complex to be predictable (even 
stochastically)” (Dow, 2007, pp.15–16) and therefore there cannot be a single best 
approach, a theme that reoccurs frequently in the eclectic literature as well. Hence, the 
practical implications force Dow (2007, p.16) to conclude, quite eclectically, that 
“policy-makers are then better equipped to understand that behaviour, and its 
consequences, if knowledge is built up from a variety of approaches, and indeed a 
variety of questions asked”. Dow (2007) focuses on promoting pluralism but by doing 
so, she applies the same arguments that are also used by pro-eclectic scholars. Hence, it 
is not surprising that I propose that eclecticism and pluralism are closely related, 
because they apply the same arguments.  
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2.5. SYNOPSIS 
Now that the literature on eclecticism, stretching over a time period of several centuries, 
has been briefly presented, the question may be asked what exactly eclecticism is, 
especially after so many different conceptualisations arose. With regard to the historical 
literature, Donini (1988) summarises six essential understandings that emerge from the 
writings. First and most common today, is the negative interpretation of eclecticism as 
an uncritical composition of diverse philosophical elements, something that Donini 
(1988) sees originating from Zeller (1883) and Hegel (Reinicke, 1979). Secondly, there 
is a value-free evaluation that defines eclecticism as a sect, in which philosophers 
combine elements from different heritages. Third, eclecticism defined in reference to 
Moraux’s (1984) intentional orthodoxy, where philosophers commit themselves to a 
sect but include elements of others because they are convinced they are compatible and 
helpful. Fourth, the pedagogical approach of Potamo and Clement of Alexandria (2012) 
can be defined as eclecticism, where the focus lies on equality of philosophical sects for 
the purpose of teaching them. Fifth, philosophers who share a similar eclecticism as 
Potamo and Clement of Alexandria but also show a strong anti-dogmatic and anti-
sectarian attitude, and sixth, Antiochus of Ascalon’s and his attempt to prove a 
combination of Platonism, Aristotelianism and Stoicism is possible. Nonetheless, 
Donini (1988) argues that the first point is disappearing within scholarly discussion and 
with regard to point six, some academics argue that Antiochus has nothing to do with 
eclecticism at all. Points four and five are also criticised by him, because the assumed 
deliberation of choice is rarely found in antiquity. Thus, only points two and three 
remain for a proper and widely effective description of historic eclecticism (Donini, 
1988).  
Eclecticism in more recent literature is justified through some key ontological, 
epistemological and methodological issues raised in several different disciplines. The 
ontological starting point seems monist and argues for the acceptance of, in some way, 
complex objects of inquiry (Køppe, 2012) that, and here the epistemic and 
methodological arguments are applied, requires different strategies and approaches to 
fully comprehend them in terms of theory development, simply because a single-theory- 
or single-method-approach is by its own limitations not able to examine these objects 
thoroughly enough. This line of reasoning is, however, not much different from that 
found in the pluralist literature discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, we also 
find a partial or full rejection of Kuhn’s (2012) incommensurability thesis and his view 
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of paradigmatic science and, in the case of mixed method research, a rejection of the 
incompatibly of methods thesis. Within the pluralist literature, at least Sheila Dow 
seems to prefer Kuhnian thoughts, while it remains questionable whether Kuhnian 
incommensurability and paradigmatic structure of science make sense in and for the 
pluralist movement in economics (Marques and Weisman, 2009). 
There are only two noteworthy variations of these general arguments for eclecticism in 
psychology and sociology. In psychology eclecticism is not only found in theory 
development but also in therapy, where the same eclectic rationale occurs. Here, the 
'complex patient' requires a unique and individual mix of therapeutic approaches to help 
with her conditions. These therapeutic techniques can be taken from different theoretical 
backgrounds that are usually not considered to be compatible, like behaviourism and 
cognitivism. In sociology, Harris (2001) shifts the eclectic focus from theories and 
methods to determinants of social evolution, which are a priori equally important and 
gain different significance only in a theoretical context. That means that we need to 
consider a set of determinants {x1;…;xn} as a priori equally important, but when we 
wish to investigate social evolution the theories we use will only use a subset of these 
determinates in such a way that theory A={x1;…;xg} and theory B={xh;…;xn} and so on. 
To call this eclecticism is, on the other hand, somewhat problematic. Harris (2001) 
points out that this is a rather idealistic conception of theory identity; while it is true that 
different determinants for phenomena in sociology exist and that there are theories 
which cover different ones, in reality theoretical bodies are less clear cut. There remain 
theories in which determinants either overlap, or are even identical.  
Finally, the critical literature of modern eclecticism (Sanderson, 1987; Dow, 1997; 
Harris, 2001; Dow, 2007) has been discussed, which generally argues that eclectics 
have a misconception of scientific practice and are themselves unscientific. Although 
the criticism has not been fully refuted, several issues have been identified with the 
arguments against eclecticism that would require the critics to rephrase or rethink their 
positions. Until this is done and new criticism has been presented, eclecticism itself can 
still be pursued. Before we continue to justify eclecticism for economics, it is worth 
spending time thinking about its general meaning, or in simple terms: how shall we 
understand eclecticism here?  
It is argued that the existing definitions are not fully suitable for the purpose of this 
dissertation. Yet, aspects of these previous definitions can be used to conceptualise 
eclecticism. One of the central aspects of eclecticism is the anti-dogmatism, or anti-
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sectarianism, of its proponents. Although it has been argued that this anti-dogmatic 
position is itself dogmatic (Sanderson, 1987), it seems unclear to what extent this 
dogmatism is fundamental, or whether this argument can essential be applied all the 
time. For the economists, this view simply holds that one does not identify herself with 
one or another school of thought, which is perfectly fine to begin with. Moreover, this is 
also a first criterion of demarcation between eclectics and pluralists, whereas the latter 
can still be committed to one particular school of thought while acknowledging the 
existence and necessity of others.  
Secondly, there is a constant notion of intentionality in the eclectic literature. Due to 
reasons described, i.e. the epistemological and methodological ones discussed in the 
previous two chapters, eclectics choose deliberately from the plurality of approaches. 
Here, reference can be made to Moraux's (1984) intentional orthodoxy as being 
synonymous with eclecticism, while the de facto orthodoxy, or the more accidental 
inclusion of alien elements in one's own sect. For the eclectic economist, this means to 
adopt aspects of different schools of thought etc. deliberately, while accidental 
inclusions cannot be called eclecticism.  
That being said, eclecticism can be understood as a leitmotif for individual researchers 
to be unprejudiced, to have as no commitment to a particular economic school of 
thought and treat them as a priori valuable for the pursuit of one's research aspirations 
by deliberately choosing from the available range of historical and modern economic 
concepts, ideas and practices. The applications of this range 'of what is there' allows to 
critically evaluate these concepts, ideas and practices and makes eclecticism therefore 
neither uncritical nor arbitrary. How this critical evaluation is achieved is central to the 
justification of eclecticism in the following chapters. The justification will built upon 
the arguments already presented in the previous two chapters and develops its 
arguments with the help of a variety of literature from the philosophy of social science 
to build the case. Moreover, this first definition will be extended by two more levels, i.e. 
paradigm-like groupings and conceptual schemes, to discuss lack of commitment and 
the way choice is further made beyond schools of thought.  
The absence of school or paradigmatic commitment, and hence the absence of a set of 
guiding principles for conducting research, motivates the problem of choice, how can 
we make a reasonable choice in the absence of commitment to a particular framework 
that provides choice critiera. This problem of choice shall be the central issue of the 
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reminder of this dissertation and will be discussed along with the justification for 
eclecticism in the following chapter. Ultimately, it is rejected as being a severe problem.
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CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC ECLECTICISM 
Excellence is never an accident. It is always the result of 
high intention, sincere effort, and intelligent execution; it 
represents the wise choice of many alternatives - choice, not 
chance, determines your destiny. – Aristotle 
 
Derived from the examination of past and present eclectic literature, conducted in the 
previous chapter, it is suggested to broadly define eclecticism as an individual 
philosophical position for the researcher that demands an unprejudiced but critical 
acceptance of and a deliberate choice from a range of available historical and modern 
scientific concepts, ideas and practices as guidance for one’s own research. The 
definition is purposefully kept broad to cover most of the aspects from the literature 
discussed in the previous chapter, thus avoiding conceptual precision at this point. It is 
also broader in comparison to the two possible definitions of eclecticism Donini (1988) 
declares as feasible, and by excluding the notion of a predominant school of thought 
held by the individual researcher it tends to disagree with Moraux’s (1984) ‘intentional 
orthodoxy’.  
The chosen definition transcends the historical, and allows the inclusion of the more 
recent literature found in disciplines like psychology, sociology, pedagogy and mixed 
method research. Moreover, it is based on central arguments found both in the eclectic 
and pluralist literature. There remain, however, some issues with this form of 
eclecticism; namely where eclecticism and pluralism are alike, what their differences 
are, and how eclectic choice can be justified.  
In the following chapter, these questions will be addressed. First, the common ground 
will be explored. Then, the history and possibility of rational choices in the scientific 
context will be explored, as the problem of choice in the absence of a single set of 
guiding principles has been identified as a central issue for eclecticism at the end of the 
previous chapter. This discussion will lead to a conceptualisation of rational choices, 
which will allow to lay the foundation for eclectic choices. Here, a three layer concept 
of the relationship between schools of thought, what will be called paradigm-like 
groupings and conceptual schemes is developed. Based on this concept, it is illustrated 
what making choices mean in all three layers and where we might encounter difficulties. 
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Especially when moving towards the outer layer, the conceptual schemes, it is argued 
that choices become increasingly difficult due to the nature of conceptual schemes and 
the impact on the individual researcher. This creates a natural border against a kind of 
'choice relativism', i.e. in the absence of guiding principles one can freely chose 
between everything there is.  
 
3.1. ECLECTICS AND PLURALISTS: SHARING COMMON GROUND 
There is a consistency in the arguments from both eclectics and pluralists that makes the 
conclusion that eclecticism and pluralism are close, at least, reasonable. Despite the fact 
that pluralists in economics have fewer disciplinary differences in their research object 
than the eclectics in the reviewed literature, they share some fundamental philosophical 
positions. It appears that some eclectics and some pluralists are so close to each other in 
their reasoning that one might be tempted to use the labels interchangeably. This is not 
to say that all pluralists are eclectics, or the other way around. The different positions 
one can find within the pluralists’ literature does not allow to make this inference. 
Hence, it more seems that eclecticism is a subset of pluralism or, as we might say, all 
eclectics are pluralists while not all pluralists are necessarily eclectics.  
 
3.1.1. PHILOSOPHICAL BASICS 
One of the strongest commonalities is the ‘one size does not fit all’ or the ‘no one best 
approach’ argument that we encounter in both the pluralist and the eclectic literature. 
This argument, famously first used by Caldwell (1982, p.245) to dismiss positivism in 
economics, claims that “no universally applicable, logically compelling method of 
theory appraisal exists”. A certain variety of this argument can be found elsewhere (see, 
for instance, Dow, 2014; Mäki, 1997; Samuels, 1998) and is usually used to distinguish 
heterodox economics from orthodoxy. Yet, there are also variations of this argument 
found in the eclectic literature despite the fact that the precise rationale might differ 
substantially here. Recall, for instance, the arguments presented above by Service 
(1968, p.406), “[t]here is no single magical formula that will predict the evolution of 
every society”, or Stinchcombe (1987, p.4), the eclectic sociologists has “a firm 
conviction that some things are to be explained one way, some another”. Despite their 
disciplinary differences we can see the core premise in all of these arguments. As shown 
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in chapter 2, the eclectic literature in all disciplines more or less rests upon this premise, 
even if it is differently outlined.  
With regards to this first argument, there is an underlying point made by pluralists and 
eclectics alike. For theories or methods to be inadequate to ‘fit all sizes’, the object 
under investigations must have specific characteristics; it must be ontologically 
somewhat complicated, diverse, irreducible, even complex. It has been said before that 
in economics Lawson (1997, 2003b, 2004, 2009) and Dow (1997, 2007, 2008) are most 
prominent in this particular ontological position. Lawson’s (2006, pp.496–497) concept 
of social ontology makes this point clear; he describes the social realm as “highly 
interconnected and organic” where “the social realm is emergent from human 
(inter)action, though with properties irreducible to, yet capable of causally affecting, the 
latter”. Chick and Dow (2005) make, in principle, the same assertion about society as a 
whole and, although not necessarily agreeing with Lawson, they and other pluralists 
seem to hold a similar ontological notion of a complicated, if not complex, multifaceted 
reality (i.e. Mäki, 1997; Samuels, 1998). 
Basically the same arguments are used by eclectics to justify their eclecticism. In the 
previous chapter, it has been shown how this is achieved. Eclecticism in psychology, for 
instance, is based upon the premise that the human mind, as object of their research or 
therapy is very much multifaceted and different theories offer different 'access points'. 
This is best illustrated with the example of proportional reasoning and the Piagetian and 
the Vygotskian approach to it, which has been outlined in the previous chapter. 
Therefore, and in general, there cannot be a single theory or a single therapy that can 
guarantee rich insights into or successful treatment of the human psychology (Slife, 
Reber and Gantt, 2003; Køppe, 2012; Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin, 2011). Likewise, the 
same reasoning is used in educational research (Stinson, 2004, 2009) and sociology 
(Stinchcombe, 1987; Sil, 2000, 2004, Sil and Katzenstein, 2010a; b). This specific 
perspective on the object of inquiry results in a second similarity between eclectics and 
pluralists, i.e. the role of knowledge one can gain about these objects of inquiry.  
Since there are different theories or perspectives which might examine the same or 
different aspects of a complex object, the created knowledge is likewise fundamentally 
different. Both eclectics (Koro-Ljungberg, 2004) and pluralists (Dow, 2007) 
acknowledge that knowledge can be produced in different ways and that we do not 
possess objective criteria to perfectly discriminate one way from another. Dow (2007) 
and other pluralists, use this epistemological argument to lay a foundation for the 
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justification of methodological pluralism, i.e. these are the different ways to create 
knowledge and none of them is in any way better than the other95. Eclectics like Lincoln 
(2010) emphases not the plurality of ways to create knowledge so much but rather the 
epistemological deficiencies of different approaches. The Piagetian and the Vygotskian 
approaches, mentioned in the previous chapter, are not only different ways to create 
knowledge, but their very theoretical nature, the one being derived from a cognitive, 
neuro-scientific paradigm and the other from a social-psychological paradigm, does not 
allow them to create knowledge about their object of inquiry that is exactly captured by 
the other. Therefore, both approaches used together in an eclectic fashion, will provide a 
broader knowledge about the subject than one of them alone. Despite having different 
conclusions, although they are arguably rather close, both eclectics and pluralists start 
with the same epistemological premise in this respect. 
 
3.1.2. PLURALIST AND ECLECTIC TOLERANCE 
Finally, it has been mentioned in chapter 1 that there are pluralists who argue for 
pluralism from a more ethical point of view, which was named ‘tolerance pluralism’. 
Most notably, these arguments are brought forward by Bruce Caldwell (1982), Warren 
Sammuels (1997a; b, 1998) Robert Garnett (2006, 2011) and Frederik Lee (2011a; b). 
Despite different justifications, all basically claim the need for tolerance as it allows and 
promotes the academic freedom and fruitful conversation among economists. The 
inclusion of different perspectives into the critical conversation among economists is 
thus necessary for the positive development of economics, as this conversation is seen 
as the general reason for scientific progress.  
Among the eclectic literature, demand for tolerance is most evident in the earlier 
writings, although it is somewhat intrinsic in the modern literature as well, as the case of 
the Piagetian and the Vygotskian approaches demonstrates. As it has been shown in 
chapter 2, the core notion of eclecticism is the critical consideration of ideas and 
philosophies while, at the same time, there is a distrust in the belief in or following of 
leaders of philosophical sects which are attributed to the development of the otherwise 
investigated ideas. This core principle is specifically highlighted in Diderot’s (1779; as 
cited in Donini, 1988, p.19) definition, which says that the eclectic “dares to think for 
himself, returns to the clearest general principle, examines them, discusses them, admits 
__________________________ 
95 Here, the discussion of epistemological pluralism in chapter 1 should be remembered.  
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nothing that is not based on the testimony of his experience and his reason”. In this, 
some sort of a priori tolerance of philosophical ideas can be identified, which are then 
scrutinised by the eclectic's own reason. This is, contrary to the critics, not a stance of 
accepting everything at face value, but rather comparable to the demand for tolerance as 
basis for fruitful and critical academic discussions in the pluralists' literature discussed 
above. One can say that eclecticism is, in some sense, taking the ‘pluralist dialogues’ 
and turns it into a ‘pluralist monologue’, what the pluralist seeks to establish between 
members of a research community will happen inside the mind of an eclectic.  
Such an inner debate of different philosophies, or theoretical contributions to one’s own 
field, is, of course, a difficult task but it is not unimportant as the eclectic literature 
suggests. Stinson (2004, 2009), for instance, successfully demonstrate how such an 
inner debate of different theoretical concepts lead to a significant contribution in his 
research area. Likewise, it should be possible for a pluralist economist not only to 
engage in fruitful discussions with members of different schools of thought, but to have 
her own productive thought processes of the contents of these schools, which can result 
in the implementation in her own research. This kind of reflection itself is, at the end of 
the day, an important aspect of critical thinking and the improvement of one’s own 
academic skills. 
 
3.1.3. PLURALISTS AND ECLECTICS: FIRST SYNOPSIS 
In summary, the conclusion that eclecticism and pluralism are related is legitimate. Both 
eclectics and pluralists require a plurality of philosophies/theories/schools of thought to 
flourish, both argue from a post-positivistic stance and both promote the notion of 
tolerance towards these different philosophies/theories/schools of thought. The finer 
differences in the arguments cause eclecticism not to be equivalent with pluralism, an 
important observation that should not be unnoticed. Eclecticism has a stronger emphasis 
on the individual academic while pluralism, despite speaking to the individual, appears 
to be more of a community effort. Hence, eclecticism should be understood as a special 
kind of pluralism, which still promotes the use and acceptance of plurality of ideas but 
focuses more on how the individual can make use of this in her own research; one might 
say it is pluralism within the individual. 
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3.2. A PROBLEM OF CHOICE 
When the eclectic is unprejudiced, i.e. she is not guided by a single paradigm or school 
of thought or, in the worst case, some authority in her discipline to choose her research 
question and methodology, then the question emerges how someone can choose from 
the plurality of theories etc.? Is there a rational methodology that is independent of such 
influences that allows the researcher to choose the right way to conduct her research, 
and if so, is that not contrary to the whole idea of eclecticism? In economics, Nancy 
Cartwright (1999) points out the lack of an existing methodology for method choice, 
and that this cannot be done by existing methodologies. She concludes that 
our whole package of sophisticated techniques – mostly statistical – for 
testing regularity claims are of no help in the decisions about choice among 
models. How do we decide? As far as I see we have no articulated 
methodology, neither among philosophers nor among economists (though 
we may well have a variety of unarticulated methods). (Cartwright, 1999, 
p.149) 
In the following this specific problem will be addressed and I will attempt to sketch out 
what choice means for an eclectic economist, and how such choice can be made.  
 
3.2.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
Rational choices are not only a subject in economic theory about how individuals make 
their consumption and saving decisions, but have been an immensely debated topic in 
the history of philosophy of sciences, especially with regards to scientific methodology. 
The criticism that has been raised by famous academics like Sir Karl Popper, Thomas 
Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Imre Lakatos, W. V. O. Quine or Hilary Putnam over the 
previous decades has implied that there is only a very small prospect for a methodology 
that can offer rational grounds for method choices, and/or anything that can offer these 
choices for theories, very small (Laudan, 1987). This seems to be a problem for the 
eclectics, as they claim to make their choices based on their own rationality. This begs, 
at least, the question whether eclecticism is, at the very beginning, already futile or 
highly irrational. Yet, there are also some who defend rational choices of theories. The 
most notable proponents are Larry Laudan and Alasdair MacIntyre. They give us the 
possibility for, at least, some kind of rational choice for the eclectic economist.   
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3.2.1.1. AGAINST RATIONAL CHOICE 
One of the first criticisms about the possibility to rationally choose between 
theories/methods is given by Karl Popper (2002, p.34) who treats methodological rules 
as mere conventions. He argues that, at the very end, methodological rules are not 
deduced but chosen based upon the scientist’s “intuitive idea of the goal of his 
endeavours”96. His interpretations tells us that the scientist is driven by pre-scientific 
ideals and/or ideologies and that there is no scientific, or philosophical, method to 
determine how to choose the best method or even what the best method is.  
It is generally accepted that Thomas Kuhn (2012) argues for the inexistence of a method 
for choice in a similar fashion as Popper (2002) does. We must, however, be careful 
with such a hasty conclusion, as Kuhn (2012) does not deny the existence of good 
reasons to be persuaded for choosing one theory over the other. What he says is that 
[t]here is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic decision 
procedure which, properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to 
the same decision. In this sense it is the community of specialists rather than 
its individual members that makes the effective decision. (Kuhn, 2012, 
p.200). 
The reason for this lies in the fact that the reasons for choices, such as simplicity, 
fruitfulness etc., can be differently valued by two groups, thus leading to a disagreement 
without one of them being wrong or unscientific. The problem then is a problem of 
persuasion and the application of words with different meaning, in the context of 
economics one might think again of McCloskey (1983, 1994). These different meanings 
are the essence of differences in paradigms and thus, there cannot be any scientific 
meta-methodology for paradigm choice97. The reason is that as methodological rules are 
__________________________ 
96 Additionally, he also argues that he does not 
believe that it is possible to decide, by using the methods of an empirical science, such controversial 
questions as whether science actually uses a principle of induction or not. And my doubts increase 
when I remember that what is to be called a ‘science’ and who is to be called a ‘scientist’ must always 
remain a matter of convention or decision. (Popper, 2002, p. 31)  
97 Putnam (1991, p.128) summarises Kuhn's (2012) argument as following: 
[D]ata, in the usual sense, cannot establish the superiority of one paradigm over another because data 
themselves are perceived through the spectacles of one paradigm or another. Changing from one 
paradigm to another requires a 'Gestalt switch'. The history and methodology of science get rewritten 
when there are major paradigm changes; so there are no 'neutral' historical and methodological canons 
to which to appeal. 
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always embedded within a paradigm and, thus, cannot transcend them to be used by the 
researcher for her paradigm choice98. It is impossible for such methodologies to answers 
questions of what to value and how to value it, because they are already pre-supposed 
by these methodologies. Hence, any argument about paradigm choice put forward with 
the help of paradigm embedded methodologies is circular (Kuhn, 2012).  
It is important to notice, however, that Kuhn (2012) defends himself against an 
interpretation of his work that says he is a relativist, who denies the existence of good 
reasons for theory choice altogether. In summary, this interpretation says that 
the proponents of incommensurable theories cannot communicate with each 
other at all; as a result, in a debate over theory-choice there can be no 
recourse to good reasons; instead theory must be chosen for reasons that are 
ultimately personal and subjective; some sort of mystical apperception is 
responsible for the decision actually reached. (Kuhn, 2012, pp.198–199) 
Kuhn (2012, p.199) clarifies here that “[m]ore than any other parts of the book, the 
passages on which these misconstructions rest have been responsible for charges of 
irrationality”. This means that he and Popper (2002) do not share the same opinion as 
commonly thought. 
Another, less direct, argument is presented by Paul Feyerabend (1993), who claims to 
have shown, with the help of historical examples of scientific advancement, the 
inexistence of rational methodological rules for theory choice. According to him, 
rationalistic rules that determine the correct way science is supposed to be done cannot 
account for the development and change of preference of scientific theories, because 
these contradicted the methodological rules of the scientific communities at their time. 
As examples he refers to famous, historic changes in science like Galileo’s favour 
towards the heliocentric world-view or the discovery of Brownian motion to argue that 
these must be declared unscientific or pseudo-science since they broke with the existing 
methodological rules. Therefore, general rules, induction and deduction, the rule of 
consistency and even rules of rationality, have limitations and cannot guarantee best 
__________________________ 
98 Kuhn (2012, p. 94) specifically explains that  
[l]ike the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves 
to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life. Because it has that character, the 
choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal 
science, for these depend in part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue. When 
paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. 
Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm’s defense. 
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practise or the best advancement of science. Scientists who claim to have such rules 
must either acknowledge their limitations or must declare the examples above to be 
pseudo-scientific.  
Quite interestingly, Imre Lakatos (1970b) argues that a rational methodology for theory 
comparison, and therefore choice, might still be possible despite the criticism raised by 
Kuhn (2012) or Feyerabend (1993). If that is true, however, this begs the question of 
why he is considered to be against rational theory choice. The reason for this lies in 
Lakatos' (1970b) argument that only his methodology of research programmes provides 
a rational, historic reconstruction of scientific practise, reconstruction at which Popper's 
(2002) falsificationism fails, but that this does not mean that a rationale is achievable 
quickly, i.e. an instantaneous heuristic or meta-methodology that allows one to decide 
what theory or methodology is the best. The epistemological criteria for instant 
rationality set up by justificationism have, as he argues, “crumbled under the weight of 
epistemological and logical criticism” (Lakatos, 1970b, p.108) in the past. Popper 
(2002) tries to give some guidance with his falsificationism, a pragmatic-coventionalist 
meta-methodology, while Feyerabend (1993) declares science to be, historically, 
irrational.  
While Lakatos (1970b) tries to defend the rational reconstruction, he also argues that 
falsificationism, if applied as meta-criterion, itself is falsified by history. The reason 
why it fails the test of history lies, according to Lakatos (1970b), in the fact that Popper 
(2002) never develops a history of science himself. While his main treatise makes 
reference to the falsifiability of leading scientific theories they are never fully discussed 
in detail. Lakatos (1970b, p.113) remarks that a poor rational reconstruction of scientific 
history, based on one's methodology, may make a historian “either misread history in 
such a way that it coincides with his rational reconstruction, or he will find that the 
history of science is highly irrational” and that “Popper's respect for great science made 
him choose the first option”99. While Kuhn (2012) and Feyerabend (1993) fall into the 
second category and reject the rational reconstruction, Lakatos (1970b) points out that 
anomalies and inconsistencies should let us not abandon the idea of the possibility for 
such a universal methodology of rational theory choice and comparison.  
__________________________ 
99 What Popper (2002) argues is that experiments must be used to falsify theories but he fails to see that grand 
theories in the history of science were, in Lakatos' (1970a, p.112) own words, were born and “progressed in an ocean 
of anomalies”, exactly those anomalies which would have falsified them.  
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What he proposes is his methodology of scientific research programmes, which is 
supposed to make a rational comparison between theories, or research programmes, 
based upon historical “progressive and degenerate problemshifts” (Lakatos, 1970b, 
p.99)100. Now, it is rational for a scientist to remain within a research programme, as 
long as it remains progressive, i.e. “as long as its theoretical growth anticipates its 
empirical growth, that is, as long as it keeps predicting novel facts with some success 
('progressive problemshift')” (Lakatos, 1970b, p.100). In the case of two competing 
research programmes it is rational to change between the two of them when a 
'degenerative problemshift', i.e. it provides merely “post-hoc explanations either of 
chance discoveries or of facts anticipated by, and discovered in, a rival programme” 
(Lakatos, 1970b, p.100), makes it rational to choose the superseding programme101. 
This is also the reason why instant rational choices are impossible, because choosing 
between research programmes is a long and complex process, there is a certain time 
factor eminent. Lakatos (1970b, p.104) even acknowledges that “[o]ne may rationally 
stick to a degenerating programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after”. This 
is a response to Kuhn's (2012) and Feyerabend's (1970, p.215) critical remarks that “it is 
easy to see that standards have practical force only if they are combined with a time 
limit (what looks like a degenerating problemshift may be the beginning of a much 
longer period of advance)”. This is, for Lakatos (1970b, p.104), a request for a “firm 
heuristic advice about what to do”, i.e. instant rationality, and not what he indented to 
deliver. He later makes clear “that scientific research programmes do not offer instant 
rationality”, because it may take decades for one programme to supersede another and 
therefore, on a sidenote, “Kuhn is wrong in thinking that scientific revolutions are 
sudden, irrational changes in vision” (Lakatos, 1978, p.6). 
__________________________ 
100 Other than Popper's (2002) falsificationism, it is not a single theory which is falsified but complete research 
programmes. Single theories within a programme might still be rejected, but this is due to the introduction of a new 
theory with a broader empirical content and not due to falsification. 
101 Blaug (1976) provides an insightful explanation of how the Keynesian revolution should be understood as 
Lakatosian research programme and not as Kuhnian paradigm shift. He argues that Keynes (2008) introduced a 
progressive research programme at a time where classical economics, specifically its full employment equilibrium 
concept, became increasingly degenerate, i.e. it no longer provided a rational for the economic situations it faced, in 
particular with regards to the Great Depression and its impact on unemployment etc.. At that time, many economists 
already held policy views that would be called Keynesian but they had not the theoretical means to support them 
adequately. Blaug (1976, p.163) concludes that  
[t]here was, in other words, no lack of explanations for the failure of the slump to turn into a boom, 
but the point is that these explanations were all 'ad hoc', leaving intact the full-employment 
equilibrium implications of standard theory. The tendency of economists to join the rank of the 
Keynesians in increasing numbers after 1936 was therefore perfectly rational; it was a switch from a ' 
degenerating' to a 'progressive' research programme (…). 
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Similar to Kuhn and Popper, Hilary Putnam (1981a, 1982, 2002) argues for the 
impossibility of a rational choice of theories detached from personal ideals, or in his 
specific case values. In a pragmatist move102, Putnam (1981a, 1982, 2002) argues that 
epistemic standards, such as 'coherence', 'plausibility', 'reasonableness' and 'simplicity', 
must be understood as normative values; they determine what 'ought to be' in scientific 
reasoning. This argument is supported by Putnam's (1982, 2002) rejection of the 
Humean fact-value distinction. Instead he argues, like the classic pragmatists, for an 
entanglement of facts and values, where ethical judgements have a factual basis and 
scientific statements have a normative element. Although he rejects Kuhn's (2012) 
notion of subjectivity103, he admits that a set of such epistemic standards does not allow 
us to judge the accuracy of an alternative set of epistemic standards in understanding the 
world, as we judge “through the lenses of those very values” (Putnam, 2002, p.33; 
Rasmussen, 2008). Reasoned theory choice cannot be detached from such values, 
because reasonableness itself is such an epistemic value. Even the attempt to detach 
oneself from these values must be futile, as Putnam (1981a, p.136) concludes, because 
“without the cognitive values of coherence, simplicity, and instrumental efficacy we 
have no world and no 'facts', not even facts about what is so relative to what”104.  
Finally, in his essay Epistemology Naturalized W. V. O. Quine (1969) presents 
arguments for a shift in the focus of epistemology towards a scientific enquiry of how 
knowledge is, cognitively, created by human beings105. Kim's (1988, p.385) 
interpretation of naturalised epistemology (NE) suggests that “Quine's principal 
argument in this paper against traditional epistemology is based on the claim that the 
Cartesian foundationalist program has failed”, i.e. that the central focus of traditional 
epistemology, the search for the conditions under which beliefs are justified to be held, 
is an ill-founded approach. Epistemology should inquire how we form beliefs and not 
state how we should form beliefs. As a consequence, so Kim's (1988, p.388) reading, 
__________________________ 
102 He refers to the classical pragmatists such as Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead (Putnam, 
2002). 
103 See Putnam (1981a) for more details. 
104 Elsewhere, Putnam (1987a, p.36) summarises this problem as follows:  
To talk of “facts” without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing; the word “fact” no 
more has its use fixed by Reality Itself than does the word “exist” or the word “object”.  
However, Putnam (1987a) holds a position where some facts about the world are discoverable and not merely 
legislated, thus rejecting soliphism and allowing realism to remain viable.  
105 Here, 
the business of naturalized epistemology, for me, is an improved understanding of the chains of 
causation and implication that connect the bombardment of our surfaces, at one extreme, with our 
scientific output at the other. (Quine, 1995, p.349) 
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Quine “is asking us to set aside the entire framework of justification-centered 
epistemology” and “to put in its place a purely descriptive, causal-nomological science 
of human cognition”. This results in a similar rejection of a normative character for 
epistemology that will allow the methodologists to suggest a best practise as we have 
seen above, although here the reasoning is very different.  
However, it must be said that Kim's (1988) reading is not without problems. Gibson 
(1995), for instance, agrees with the interpretation that NE breaks with the idea of the 
possibility for a philosophical, and thus scientific, justification of knowledge, yet he 
argues that NE itself sets normative standards by suggesting that scientific findings can 
be utilised against sceptical doubts106. Likewise, in his critical interpretation Johnson 
(2005, pp.84–85) concludes that “Quine is clearly proposing that we study the way 
subjects construct their pictures of the world, not countless idiosyncratic ways in which 
individual subjects may do so”, but also highlights that “his proposal to naturalize 
epistemology does not involve abandoning the normative”. Instead, Quine generally 
suggests to discover the norms that regulate theorising with the help of psychology, 
which allows us to find the criterion that we conform to. Therefore, epistemology is not 
be surrendered to psychology but psychology must be employed to guide epistemology 
in its efforts to understand the normative standards scientists use when making the 
connections between experience and theory (Johnson, 2005)107.  
At the end it seems that there are overwhelming cases against a meta-methodology that 
allows us to rationally choose between different theories or methodologies, to properly 
exclude theories or methodologies based upon universally shared set of rational rules. 
Instead, when choosing our research approach we apply norms and values that are 
determined by an environment, which includes but is not limited to the research 
paradigm (Kuhn, 2012). The researcher is embedded in this environment and cannot 
free herself from this to pursue a value-free, objective research approach. Indeed, the 
sociology of science, or research, generates serious problems for a simplistic set of 
epistemological standards, but we might not have to give up the pursuit for guidance 
yet.   
__________________________ 
106 Gibson (1995) interprets from Quine (1969) that sceptical doubt presupposes accepted scientific claims and 
therefore, scepticism is located within the scientific domain. 
107 Johnson (2005, p.88) summarises this point by concluding that “psychology will identify the norms we adhere to, 
and philosophy will tell us that, by virtue of their being the ones we adhere to, they are the ones we are to adhere to”. 
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3.2.1.2. PRO RATIONAL CHOICE 
For Alasdair MacIntrye (1988) the criticism against the idea of a rational justification of 
theory choice, but also with regards to morality and justice, is a mere continuation of a 
discussion of rationality that began in the Enlightenment. The project of the enlightened 
thinkers, so MacIntyre (1988, p.6) argues, was the development of those “standards and 
methods of rational justification” that would “appeal to principles undeniable by any 
rational person”. The problem with this aspiration was, as it turned out, that “both the 
thinkers of the Enlightenment and their successors proved unable to agree as to what 
precisely those principles were which would be found undeniable by all rational 
persons” (MacIntyre, 1988, p.6). The fact that, historically, there is no agreement on 
such principles leads him to two important conclusions; first that there are no neutral, 
meta-philosophical principles allowing to make such rational choice and second, that it 
is still possible to make reasonable justifications in one's choices of research 'traditions'. 
How is this possible? 
First, it must be clarified that MacIntyre (1988) uses tradition-constituted and tradition-
constitutive enquiry as central concepts to describe different historical approaches of 
philosophical and moral inquiry, which remain loosely defined but makes the 
impression to be similar to Lakatos' (1978) research programmes. Facing the problem of 
defining rational justification, or justice, he explains that those very concepts are 
embedded within such traditions and therefore are dependent on the historical context 
those tradition are set in. Understanding the historical context of these concepts gives 
rise to the title of his book where he asked, facing the claim that a person needs to be 
just, Whose Justice? (MacIntyre, 1988). Acknowledging the historical context further 
leads MacIntyre (1988, p.166) to admit “that there is no neutral way of characterizing 
either the subject matter about which they give rival accounts or the standards by which 
their claims are to be evaluated” if we are facing two rival traditions. Moreover, 
MacIntyre (1988, p.351) emphasis later that “there is no set of independent standards of 
rational justification by appeal to which the issues between contending traditions can be 
decided”, thus he is very much in agreement, as it seems, with Kuhn (2012), 
Feyerabend (1993) and others.  
However, he does not agree with their conclusions, which he divides as being 
relativistic on the one hand, i.e. there is no rationality per se, or as perspectivist, i.e. 
there is no truth or falsity but only different perspectives on reality (Flett, 1999; 
MacIntyre, 1988; Snider, 1989). Instead, MacIntyre (1988) argues that it remains 
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possible to acknowledge the need to change a tradition from within its own rational 
justification framework. This is achieved via epistemological crises (MacIntyre, 1977), 
which occur once the set of current problems or issues handled results in an increasing 
decay of internally held certitudes108. At such a point the members of the tradition 
realises that, by its own standards and the use of its own intellectual resources, it will no 
longer solve these issues (Flett, 1999; MacIntyre, 1988). The only solution, according to 
MacIntyre (1988, p.362), is “the invention or discovery of new concepts and the 
framing of some new types of theory” that will be able to meet three important criteria, 
namely 
[f]irst (…) [it] must furnish a solution to the problems which had previously 
proved intractable in a systematic and coherent way. Second, it must also 
provide an explanation of just what it was which rendered the tradition, 
before it had acquired these new resources, sterile or incoherent or both. 
And third, these first two tasks must be carried out in a way which exhibits 
some fundamental continuity of the new conceptual and theoretical 
structures with the shared beliefs in terms of which the tradition of enquiry 
had been defined up to this point. 
These three conditions are both applicable for a crisis that occurs within a tradition and 
between rival traditions, which allows to determine the superiority of one over the other 
by virtue of their ability to solve their own crisis. Here, I also see the point of departure 
from Lakatos' (1970b, p.99) “progressive and degenerate problemshifts” in his research 
programmes, which remain unclear on the ability to choose between different 
programmes. In summary, MacIntyre (1988) claims that one can reasonably choose 
between rival traditions, or identify the time for change, based upon their success, or 
failure, to deal with epistemological crises. This clearly differentiates him from Lakatos 
(1970b, 1978) who argues that a strong, guarded core within research programmes can 
prevent such an epistemological crisis to cause a rapid change. Moreover, it also 
appears that MacIntyre (1988) is very much in line with Kuhn (2012) with regards to 
the speed of change. Now with the similarities somewhat mentioned, one may ask the 
question what the particular differences between all three scholars are. 
Miner (2011) argues that the major difference between Lakatos and MacIntyre is their 
understanding of the incommensurability thesis, which might also allow us to include 
__________________________ 
108 Which seems to be very similar to Kuhn's (2012) anomalies, which are responsible for paradigm shifts. 
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Kuhn here. Kuhn (2012, p.102) introduces the incommensurability thesis by arguing 
that shifts between paradigms also involves a changes of semantic meanings, for 
example he notes that “the physical referents of these Einsteinian concepts are by no 
means identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name”. 
Shapere (1995, p.139) summarises this by saying that the new paradigm 
introduces entirely new meanings, standards, methods, and goals, making 
any deductive relationship between the two impossible. Indeed, the 
argument continued, the differences are so profound that any sort of 
comparison is impossible.109 
Lakatos (1978) rejects this version of incomensurability entirely, firstly by pointing out 
that Newton was able to work simultaneously within two different paradigms110. The 
second objection is based upon his claim that rational theory choice remains possible, 
which, however, means that incommensurability must be rejected. Incommensurability, 
in his understanding, is absolutely incompatible with rational justification for theory 
choice111 and since he claims to have shown the possibility for some kind of rational 
justification incommensurability must then be rejected (Miner, 2011). MacIntyre (1984) 
likewise rejects this strong definition of incommensurability but argues that initially 
incommensurable, rival theories, under a weaker conception, are not necessarily 
incompatible. Miner (2011), with reference to Shapere (1995), clarifies that the initial 
incommensurability thesis, as defined above, does in fact entail three kinds of 
incommensurability; one of meaning, one of standards and one of goals. With this in 
mind, MacIntyre (1984) rejects incommensurability of meaning, arguing for the 
comparability of rival theories based upon a shared meta-vocabulary. He points out that  
in physical theory the concepts of weight, of mass as defined by Newton and 
of mass as defined within quantum mechanics, concepts embodied in 
incommensurable bodies of theory, have all to be understood as concepts of 
__________________________ 
109 Below, I will pick up on this notion of incommensurability and substitute it with a different definition.  
110 Lakatos (1978, p.112) specifically says that this “undermines Kuhn's thesis of the psychological 
incommensurability of rival paradigms”.  
111 Miner (2011, p.227) summarises Lakatos' (1978) second reason as follows: 
If rival and ostensibly incommensurable theories are neither inconsistent with each other, nor 
comparable for content (see Lakatos, 1978, p.91), then it becomes impossible to say that allegiance to 
one research program is more rational than allegiance to another. If such comparative judgements are 
impossible, then it appears that while scientists may decide to switch from one large-scale theory to 
another, there are never any reasons that mandate or justify the switch. The conclusion is that 
incommensurability and rationality in theory-change are simply incompatible. 
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that property of bodies which determines their relative motion, if we are to 
be able to understand what makes those bodies of theory contending rivals. 
And it is this shared higher order vocabulary, this stock of senses and 
references provided at the level of Weltanschauung, which makes it possible 
for the adherents of rival incommensurable bodies of theory to recognize 
themselves as moving towards what can be specified at that level as the 
same goals. (MacIntyre, 1984, pp.42–43) 
One might be tempted to object to the general reasoning. MacIntyre (1988) is arguing 
that there is no tradition independent meta-rationality offering guidance for theory 
choice or evaluation for arguments, yet he introduces a meta-criterion with the demand 
for traditions' success, or failure, to be determined by the conflict between their own 
standards and the problems they face, i.e. the epistemological crisis, which seems to 
represent that particular neutral “standing ground” whose existence MacIntyre (1988, 
p.350) denies altogether: a contradiction? Not according to Miner (2011, p.232), who 
clarifies that this meta-criterion may just be shared among many scientific traditions, it 
does not stand on neutral grounds and that “MacIntyre can easily deny that he is 
invoking a meta-criterion which hovers outside of the relevant traditions”. However, 
two other problem arise, of which the first is similar to the issues Kuhn (2012) and 
Feyerabend (1970) observe with Lakatos (1978).  
Firstly, MacIntyre (1988, 1977) does not offer an explanation of how one can 
distinguish between a theory that has failed by the traditions standards or one that just 
shows temporary weakness due to some unforeseen anomalies. Like in the case of 
Lakatos (1978) it remains difficult, if not impossible, to decide when we should give up 
a theory. Secondly, even if this problem can be overcome and proper criteria can be 
formulated that allow us to decide about success and failure, it remains unclear whether 
success and failure should be the dominant criteria for a normative rationality. Miner 
(2011) argues that it is possible that two incommensurable theories A and B come from 
two different traditions with different standards. While theory A faces simple standards, 
which are easily met, theory B has much harsher criteria for success and might therefore 
fail. Given such a situation, it is questionable whether success and failure are adequate 
normative criteria, when traditional standards differ in such a way.  
The final argument for the restoration of a rational methodology is provided by Larry 
Laudan (1987). Like MacIntyre (1988), he explains that the existence of rival 
methodologies and the inability of methodologists to agree on a set of standards that 
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warrant scientific endeavours gave rise to the criticism that has been outlined above. He 
further sees the criticism of modern methodologies founded in the failure of rational 
reconstruction of previous scientific actions. Methodology, so he goes on, ought to be a 
theory of rationality that provides meta-criteria to allow an independent judgement of 
paradigmatic actions, but by failing to do so methodology itself becomes inadequate for 
such a purpose. Laudan (1987, p.21) calls this the Meta-Methodological Thesis (MMT), 
which dictates that “a methodology of science is to be evaluated in terms of its ability to 
replicate the choices of past scientists as rational”. However, MMT proponents, he 
remarks, make a fundamental mistake by merging methodology and rationality112.  
Instead, Laudan (1987) argues that rationality and methodology must be kept apart, 
since rationality involves the judgement of actions based on one's aims and beliefs 
(cognitive aims) while methodologies provide strategies and frameworks to achieve 
these aims. Hence, to apply current methodologies “to assess the rationality of past 
scientists [is] only [appropriate] if their cognitive utilities were identical to ours, and 
only if their background beliefs were substantially the same as ours” (Laudan, 1987, 
p.21). Laudan (1987) seems to make an argument for bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) 
in the historical context here, and introduces a slightly different definition for 
methodologies than is usually used. The standard definition defines methodology as set 
of strict rules, or 'categorical imperatives', while Laudan (1987) wishes to see them as 
rather as 'hypothetical imperatives', context-dependent suggestions for best ways to 
achieve one's cognitive aims. By doing so, he believes to be able to reformulate 
methodological rules from “'[o]ne ought to do x'” to “'[i]f one's goal is y, then one ought 
to do x'” (Laudan, 1987, p.24), whereas y is determined by the context-depent aims and 
beliefs of the researcher. Furthermore, the latter imperative is only warranted if, and 
only if, “[d]oing y is more likely than its alternatives to produce x” (Laudan, 1987, 
p.24).  
Laudan (1987) admits that this reformulation does not circumvent the need for meta-
methodological rules that allow us to test these new imperative rules, thus creating a 
logical regress when attempting to justify such rules. However, he argues that there 
might be some meta-methodological rules that are shared by all involved parties, thus 
__________________________ 
112 Laudan (1987, p.23) specifically highlights that 
[r]ationality is one thing: methodological soundness is quite another. Since that is so, the historicists 
rejection of the methodological enterprise, like his rejection of specific methodologies, on the ground 
that they render the history of science irrational is a massive non sequitur. 
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serving as neutral ground. His first suggestion of such a meta-criterion, which might be 
shared by all paradigms, is formulated as follows: 
If actions of a particular sort, m, have consistently promoted certain 
cognitive ends, e, in the past, and rival actions, n, have failed to do so, then 
assume that future actions following the rule “if your aim is e, you ought to 
do m” are more likely to promote those ends than actions based on the rule 
“if your aim is e, you ought to do n”. (Laudan, 1987, p.25) 
At the first glance this criterion seems convincing, although vague, but there might be 
contestation by contemporary methodologists. However, without going into much detail 
here, Laudan (1987) seems certain that only Popperians would reject his proposal, 
therefore he is convinced his criteria will result in consensus among philosophers of 
science.  
Given the meta-criteria and the reformulation of methodological rules as 'hypothetical 
imperatives', with the additional warrant, it is possible to formulate a meta-
methodological question for a rational choice/rejection of methods/theories: 
[G]iven any proposed methodological rule (couched in appropriate 
conditional declarative form), do we have – or can we find – evidence that 
the means proposed in the rule promotes its associated cognitive end better 
than its extant rivals? (Laudan, 1987, p.26) 
If such evidence can be found, then choices between rival methodologies, and 
presumably theories, can be justified; but if such evidence cannot be found then the 
situation remains inconclusive (Laudan, 1987). This is, of course, not unproblematic, as 
it requires the general acceptance of the evidence by all involved parties. It is not sure 
whether such a consensus can always be achieved. This puts methodology on unstable 
grounds as there is no categorical meta-criteria that tell us precisely what to do. Laudan 
(1987, p.29) confirms this observation but argues that it is not really an issue at all, 
instead concluding that “[t]here are those who would like to make methodology more 
secure than physics; the challenge is rather to show that it is as secure as physics”. 
There are, nonetheless, more serious issues with Laudan's (1987) separation of 
methodology and rationality, as Kaiser (1991) remarks. Specifically, he argues that 
Laudan (1987) has three major misunderstandings with rationality per se, with the idea 
of methodological norms and with scientific progress. Instead of taking methodological 
rules as 'hypothetical imperatives', Kaiser (1991, p.438) suggests to understand them as 
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“straight-forward imperatives” which “function much like social norms”. For instance, 
Kaiser (1991, p.440) illustrates the weight of these norms by remarking that if a 
“scientist's publication is to count as an acceptable addition to scientific knowledge, 
then the relevant norms pertaining the study should be (explicitly) obeyed” while 
“breaches of some of these norms may, at times, be permissible, but any such deviation 
requires extensive justification”. Scientific enterprise, for him, is therefore a social 
endeavour that, with the help of reward and sanction mechanisms, allows us to 
understand the meaning of each of these norms for the relevant scientific group or 
institutions. Thus, methodological norms are much stronger and precise in determining 
behaviour and not, as Laudan (1987) suggests, mere general suggestions of how to act 
or what to do when one wishes to achieve certain goals113.  
Secondly, Kaiser (1991, p.445) criticises Laudan's (1987) conception of rationality as 
too simplistic, focusing too much on “actions, aims and beliefs” and having an over-
reliance on self-confessions. While it is certainly important to consider the differences 
in aims and beliefs of previous scientists such as Newton, who, according to Laudan 
(1987), had a different idea of the aim of science than contemporary scientist have 
today114, it remains unclear to what extent these self-reported aims are clear to the 
individual researcher herself. It can either happen that actions are taken strategically or 
that, in some cases, individuals do “not necessarily have the best access to the true 
explanation of his actions, not even to his rationality” (Kaiser, 1991, p.445). This does 
not render Laudan's (1987) thoughts on rationality wrong but it shows they are missing 
important points. Kaiser (1991) notices that he neglects to distinguish between 
rationality of actions, beliefs and ends and values, and also the differentiation between 
individual and collective rationality115, with the latter being a candidate for the future 
consideration of rationality in science. Then, institutionalised rationality restricts 
cognitive acts and behaviours of individuals in such a way that it excludes some acts 
based upon given evidence. Methodology then becomes a device to interpret those 
scientific norms, and the emerging scientific knowledge, which are epistemologically 
__________________________ 
113 For example, methodological norms concerning experimental work that dictate the need for randomly chosen 
participants and control groups are not general but provide precise instructions for a scientist to work (Kaiser, 1991). 
114 Laudan (1987, p.22) points out that “Newton, […], saw it as one of the central aims of natural philosophy to 
show the hand of the Creator in the details of his creation” while modern scientists, or most of them, do not hold such 
a religious view for the aim of science anymore.  
115 The difference here is that actions that are rational for the individual are irrational for a group, best example to 
illustrate such actions is the Prisoner's Dilemma (Kaiser, 1991).  
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prior to it rather than formulating those norms as hypothetical imperatives. What 
follows is a reinstatement of MMT, where 
[a] methodology of science is to be evaluated in terms of its ability to 
replicate the choices of past scientists as scientifically rational in the sense 
that the choices are in accordance with and defended with the awareness of 
the dominant norms of science. (Kaiser, 1991, p.450).  
In summary, it is clear that the proponents of rational justification for theory or 
methodology choice do not disagree with the fundamental insights raised within the 20th 
century philosophy of science, namely the inexistence of a meta-methodology that puts 
us into a super-position to judge scientific paradigms, or traditions or however one 
wishes to call them, independently. We are, so to say, stuck in context and unable to 
free ourselves from this. However, the proponents also remind us that this context-
dependency involves rationality and other criteria, and values, so that saying science 
itself is an irrational endeavour (Feyerabend, 1993) is a premature conclusion. Instead, 
arguments are put forward that allow rational choices between rival 
paradigms/traditions/theories, either with rationality coming from within traditions 
(MacIntyre, 1988), or a separation of methodology and rationality (Laudan, 1987), or by 
reflecting on the normative power of methodological rules they have on the scientific 
communities (Kaiser, 1991).  
These insights need to be considered carefully and may allow us to finally bring the 
eclectic economist to life! As said above, eclectics as well as pluralists rely on a set of 
post-positivist arguments to justify their position. These rational justifications are 
'tradition-embedded' (MacIntyre, 1988) but they are sometimes formulated in a 
normative way, both in a hypothetical (Laudan, 1987) or a straight-forward (Kaiser, 
1991) manner, depending on the author. Now, Laudan's (1987) and Kaiser's (1991) 
arguments for methodological norms and cognitive aims will be used for the remainder 
of this dissertation for two purposes. First, it serves in defining schools of thought, as 
well as paradigm-like groupings, and secondly it help us to understand how and the 
eclectic choice can be made in this environment.  
 
3.2.2. LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR ECLECTIC CHOICE 
It should be clear by now that we have a variety of different research approaches the 
eclectic can choose from. In chapter two it is shown that there are at least two paradigm-
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like groupings, orthodox and, subsequently, heterodox economics, with each having a 
subset of 'schools of thought'. Chang (2014) lists a minimum of nine major schools of 
thoughts in economics, namely Austrian, Behaviourist, Classical, Developmentalist, 
Institutionalist, Keynesian, Marxist, Neoclassical and Schumpeterian, plus a number of 
sub-schools like Feminist, Neo- and New-Keynesian and New and Old Institutionalism 
and so on. However, it is shown in chapter two the current definitions of schools of 
thoughts are vague or problematic and for the remainder of this chapter, which will 
discuss eclectic choices in the light of schools of thoughts in economics, rather 
unsatisfactory. 
With the help of the discussion on rational justification of choices by researchers above, 
we are able to redefine schools of thought in a way which will be helpful for the 
following discussion. It is suggested, by synthesising Lakatos (1978), Laudan (1987), 
MacIntyre (1988) and Kaiser (1991), that schools of thought provide a set of more or 
less coherent cognitive aims and methodological norms for a group of economists, 
which have strongly guarded core assumptions that are immunised with the help of 
nomological hypotheses (Albert, 1994b; Albert, Darell and Maier-Rigaud, 2012) and a 
set of auxiliary hypotheses, which are subject to more severe scrutiny. Some of the core 
assumptions, but also some of the cognitive aims, are shared with other schools of 
thought while others are not. Borrowing from Shweder (1986), these norms and 
cognitive aims can be categorised in universal and non-universal rational processes. 
Candidates for universal rational processes are, according to him, logical principles, 
“common patterns of hypothetical reasoning, means-ends analysis, causal analysis, and 
experimental reasoning” (Shweder, 1986, p.180). The non-universal rational processes 
are specific assumptions and concepts which a researcher uses to construct explanations. 
Candidates for such non-universal rational processes in economics are the rationality 
hypothesis, methodological instrumentalism, methodological individualism, 
marginalism or the equilibrium hypothesis116.  
However, the Shweder's (1986) dichotomy can only be a first suggestion as it faces 
some problems. Specifically the above listed non-universal rational processes appear to 
be somewhat universal as they can be found in both orthodox and some heterodox 
schools of thought alike. The reason for this seems, to me, to be twofold. First, some of 
__________________________ 
116 I believe that this new conception of schools of thought fulfils at least two, and might satisfy another, of 
Colander's (2000) five criteria outlined in chapter 1. It certainly allows economist to spread their work across 
different schools of thought as demanded by Dow (2007). 
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the shared norms and cognitive aims might stem from a wider, paradigm-like grouping. 
It is said by Lawson (1997, 2003b) and Dow (2000) that the specific difference between 
orthodox and heterodox economics lies in the mode of analysis, with the former having 
a closed-system ontology and the latter, in the best case, an open-system ontology, 
while Lawson (2006, p.493) also points out the insistence on “mathematical–deductive 
method[s]” as common feature to the orthodoxy. This shows that some norms and aims 
are not limited to schools of thought but are found in a higher level position. Secondly, 
schools of thought might arise as a result of an epistemological crisis, as described by 
MacIntyre (1988), but due to the guarding nomological hypotheses, some of these 
norms might be taken over into the new school of thought. Keynesian economics reject 
Say's Law, which was an essential tenet in Classical economics, while both hold that, 
for example, “competition in supply and demand is the motive force which holds the 
economic system in equilibrium” (Hayes, 2006, p.9)117. Likewise, New Institutional 
Economics, developed by Ronald Coase, Douglas North and Oliver Williamson, retains 
the importance and causal efficacy of institutions from Old Institutional Economics, but 
they diverge “in their analytic foundations in terms of an open system analysis of an 
historical process and a closed-system analysis of equilibrium outcomes, respectively” 
(Potts, 2007, p.343).  
As a result, we might need to introduce, at least, a third rational process beside the 
universal and non-universal, which only contains these paradigm-like group norms and 
cognitive aims. We then can create a structured order of norms and aims as shown in 
illustration 1, below118. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
117 Keynes (2008, p.15) himself explains in chapter 2, section V, where he agrees with the postulates of the classical 
economists. He points out, for instance, that he is “not disputing this vital fact which the classical economists have 
(rightly) asserted as indefeasible. In a given state of organisation, equipment and technique, the real wage earned by a 
unit of labour has a unique (inverse) correlation with the volume of employment”.  
118 Similar arguments of layering can be found in the eclectic and mixed method literature, for instance in Køppe 
(2012), Morgan (2007) or Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin (2011).  
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This illustration is a clear departure from commonly accepted concept of paradigms, as 
it allows the existence of meta-norms and -aims that are shared among paradigms and 
therefore rejecting, at least, the incommensurability of meaning and, as one can argue, 
the incommensurability of goals as defined by Miner (2011) and Shapere (1995)119.  
This does not mean, however, that we have to throw incommensurability out of the 
window. As said above, Shapere's (1995) interpretation of the incommensurability 
thesis is not without criticism. Remembering D'Agostino (2014, p.523), where he offers 
a syllogistic re-interpretation of the incommensurability thesis, that also reflects Kuhn's 
(2012) clarification against the charges of relativism described above, which says that 
(1) If you assume that theory-comparisons, e.g. between T and T*,  depend on 
certain simple logical relations between the  implications of these 
theories (e.g. that the implications of T are a  sub- or super-set of those of 
T*), then 
(2) there are instantiations of T and T*, in the history of science, which  stand 
in no such simple relations with one another and, therefore,  
(3) are incommensurable in the terms assumed,  
__________________________ 
119 For Shwerder's (1986) candidates for universal rational processes content the incommensurability of goals.  
Figure 1: Layers of methodological norms and cognitive aims 
 
Non-universal rational 
processes on the level of 
schools of thought. 
Paradigm-like group 
specific rational 
processes. 
Universal rational 
processes on the level of 
conceptual schemes. 
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(4) which, since the scientific community does know how to compare  in 
these cases,  
(5) shows that the assumed preconditions of theory-comparability  (premise 1) 
must be rejected. 
Instead of proposing a clear relativist position, the incommensurability thesis now says 
that under a set of given conditions a theory comparison might be impossible but, when 
conditions are changed, can be conducted anyway. This also means that two schools of 
thought, or paradigm-like groups, are only completely incommensurable if they do not 
share any methodological norm or cognitive aim on any level. Considering what has 
been said about the universals, such a situation is then very unlikely. Furthermore, 
incommensurability now becomes a case-dependent inability of comparison for some 
methodological norms and cognitive aims. Looking again at institutional economics, the 
methodological norm of the “closed-system analysis of equilibrium outcomes” (Potts, 
2007, p.343) in new institutional economics cause the “open system analysis of an 
historical process[es]” of old institutional economics to be incommensurable, but 
comparison between both schools of thought is still possible based upon other 
methodological norms or cognitive aims. Candidates for such norms could be the 
fruitfulness, simplicity, significance or validity on the paradigm-level or Shwerder's 
(1986) universal rational processes on the next level120. The next two questions then are: 
where do we make a choice and how do we rationalise choices of methodological norms 
and cognitive aims?  
 
3.2.3. MAKING THE ECLECTIC CHOICE 
For making a choice, the eclectic requires a guiding question she can ask herself which 
might help her to determine what to do. For this, let us consider Laudan's (1987) 
methodological question as guide. This question asks whether we can find good reasons 
that the methodological norms support their related cognitive aims better than their 
rivals, if such exist at all. There are two possible outcomes for this question; either we 
have a positive answer, i.e. we have the required evidence and can make a choice, or we 
have negative answer, i.e. we cannot find good reasons to make our choice. As a 
consequence of the negative answer we might search for another criterion to make a 
__________________________ 
120 See the discussion on validity by Lather (2001) in chapter 2 for how different validity concepts can live across 
different research traditions or paradigm-like groupings. 
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final choice or become simply arbitrary in our choices. However, I believe that we will 
never arrive at this arbitrariness121 of choice, as demonstrated in the following sections.  
Let us first look at the outer layer of illustration one, the universal methodological 
norms and cognitive aims, which Shweder (1986, p.180) lists as logical principles, 
“common patterns of hypothetical reasoning, means-ends analysis, causal analysis, and 
experimental reasoning”, and whether we can answer the methodological question 
negatively. Now we must ask ourselves if we can find a) alternative norms and aims and 
b) if we can come up with good reasons or evidence to accept the alternatives. At least 
in the case of the universal logical principles, for instance the law of identity, the law of 
non-contradiction or the law of the excluded middle, it seems that we do not have any 
alternatives available. We might, theoretically, say that the alternatives are simply their 
denial. However I would argue that any kind of world-view or conceptual scheme122 
with such alternatives is not only inconsistent but simply inconceivable123 and therefore 
cannot be used to generate a negative answer to the methodological question124. For the 
other candidates, it might be possible to find alternatives in other conceptual schemes.  
Laudan (1987) has already pointed out the historic difference in cognitive aims with 
Newton having a different understanding of the purpose of science than contemporary 
scientists, a first example of alternative aims coming from different conceptual schemes. 
We may also find conceptual schemes in which hypothetical and experimental 
reasoning have either totally different patterns to what 'we' are used to or are completely 
__________________________ 
121 Here, arbitrariness may be best understood as a strong form of global relativism, in which “all beliefs, regardless 
of their subject matter, are true only relative to a framework or parameter” (Baghramian and Carter, 2015, p.no 
pagination) and thus, choice of belief has no rational basis. This is the situation where selection criteria are absent 
(Dow, 2007). 
122 The idea of conceptual schemes holds that raw sense data is always interpreted by concepts, which themselves 
can differ substantially across different language, cultural or geographical groups. Conceptual schemes are 
interconnected sets of high-level, abstract concepts that allow us to allocate the empirical or historical reality into 
discrete sets of mental categories. Rescher (2008, p.324) summarises that 
[d]ifferent cultures and different intellectual traditions [...] will [...] describe and explain their 
experience-their world as they conceive it-in terms of concepts and categories of understanding 
substantially different from ours. They may, accordingly, be said to operate with different conceptual 
schemes: with different conceptual tools used to “make sense” of experience-to characterize, describe, 
and explain the items that figure in the world as best one can form a view of it in terms of their 
features, kinds, modes of interrelationship and interaction. 
However, it is important to note that conceptual schemes do not promote truth relativism, i.e. saying that what is true 
according to one scheme is false in another. Instead their meaning is about what is true, or false, in one scheme 
cannot be expressed in another. Furthermore, the inability of expressing expressions from one scheme in another does 
not entail the inability of interpretation. For instance, the famous German expression Schadenfreude cannot be 
expressed in the English language, there is no equivalent word for it, but it is still possible to interpret it in such a way 
that it makes sense for the native English.  
123 Of course, there is always the possibility that I am not creative enough to think of a world-view in which 
something is not itself, where everything is and is not at the same time and nothing must either be or not be.  
124 Strawson (2002) argues that there is, at least, a core of universal concepts shared by every conceptual scheme. 
Possible candidates for such universals are space and time (see also Kant, 1870). 
 125 
 
missing. Similar schemes can be found in which causality is different from 'ours', thus 
changing the causal analysis altogether. There is evidence of schemes with a different 
concept of time expressed in the grammatical structure of the related languages (Bittner, 
2005; Smith, 2008; Tonhauser, 2011) and different concepts of causality across 
different cultures (Norenzayan and Nisbett, 2000; Subbotsky and Quinteros, 2002), 
offering the eclectic alternative conceptual schemes and, consequently, different 
universal methodological norms and cognitive aims which cannot be expressed in 
another scheme. Yet, given the inability to translate while being able to interpret (Case, 
1997; Rescher, 2008), interpreting different conceptual schemes is among the basic 
methodological strengths of ethnographic studies (Gabriel, 2008), the question must be 
asked whether it is feasible to change between different conceptual schemes in the same 
way one could change between schools of thought, especially when different conceptual 
schemes are incommensurate. Looking back at Laudan's (1987) example of Newton's 
cognitive aims for science, i.e. to discover God's hand in the creation, it will be difficult, 
if not impossible, for a contemporary scientist to adopt such an aim if she is not 
Christian, or at least monotheistic, herself. The first question is then whether one is able 
to migrate, quickly, completely and indefinitely from one to another scheme or if only 
temporal excursions and singular adoptions are possible. The latter means that, for 
instance, one can adopt a different concept of causality, thus changing the nature of 
casual analysis and, consequently, impacting every other methodological norm and 
cognitive aim that relies on the concept of causality. This move is not only possible but 
also justifiable, as such a change in concepts might hold new insights for the eclectic 
and ultimately causes an epistemological (micro)crisis. Movement is then not arbitrary 
but aimed. The issue with moving into a different set of universals are psychological 
limitations, for such quick migration would change one's world view and personality 
intensively125, which seems infeasible. Instead, migration can only be subtle due to long 
exposure to new schemes and might never be fully complete. For both options, one's 
own socialisation might hinder either choice or a complete migration at all. While 
interpretation of different conceptual schemes is possible (Case, 1997; Rescher, 2008), 
adoption seems less likely the more alien schemes become to one's own.  
An extreme example would be the culture of the Pirahã people in the Amazon jungle, 
who have no concept of history beyond personal experience and who make no 
__________________________ 
125 I am aware that this presupposes that some conceptual schemes have identity creating power. I believe that this 
presupposition can be adequately justified by drawing on the work by, for instance, Lemke (2000, 2002a; b; c, 2008). 
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metaphysical distinctions of experience itself, i.e. experiences from being awake and 
dreaming are considered equally real (Everett, 2010). Although we are able to interpret 
and understand their culture, more or less, it seems impossible to adopt it. We will, 
socialised and habituated by our own schemes, never be able to overcome them and 
'forget' the concept of history missing in Pirahã's scheme. This also indicates a situation 
where movement is not desirable because it may happen that conceptual schemes are 
not inherently able to lead to rational inquiry; in a similar fashion MacIntyre (1988) 
argues with regards to his tradition-constituted enquiry that some traditions cannot 
constitute rational inquiry at all. According to him, only “an apparent set of unresolved 
issues and difficulties [provide] a measure against which a tradition can evaluate its 
relative progress” (Flett, 1999, p.9), but if such a concept like history is missing in a 
scheme, then there cannot be an awareness of historically unresolved problems nor a 
strategy to resolve them. Yet again, choice becomes meaningless when it will not lead 
to any rational inquiry at all.  
While migration is difficult, and sometimes impossible, adoption of some new concepts 
can be, ceteris paribus, beneficial in accordance to the eclectic rational justification. 
Someone's predominant concept of causality itself causes epistemological restrictions to 
the methodological norms and cognitive aims of underlying layers and, therefore, the 
acceptance of a different concept is justifiable as far as this does not frustrate the ability 
of rational inquiry per se126. Secondly, the adoption of new concepts may also lead to an 
increase in situations of incommensurability, i.e. these concepts cause a decrease in 
cases or the ability of theory comparison while comparison is desired at the same time, 
then we are justified in not choosing them. However, other than the condition of rational 
inquiry this particular cognitive aim is, to my knowledge, not predominant across 
paradigm-like groups or schools of thought.  
So far, the middle layer has been described as paradigm-like methodological norms and 
cognitive aims, simply because both Kuhnian paradigms and Lakatosian research 
programmes have good but still limited explanatory power127. What we describe here 
__________________________ 
126 I am aware that the proposition for the ability to engage in rational inquiry as described by MacIntyre (1988) 
could be seen and criticised as meta-criteria, but again it is not my intention to argue that this criteria is independent 
of any paradigm, research programme or tradition, whatever one wishes to call them, but that it is ultimately shared 
across 'paradigms' and therefore enjoys legitimacy.  
127 For criticism of Lakatosian research programmes see above, for Kuhnian paradigms see specifically Kuhn (2012) 
himself, who acknowledges in the preface that in the absence of theoretical consensus there are no paradigms in 
social science. Critical reflections on paradigms are also found in Dogan (1996) and, focusing on economics, Blaug 
(1976). 
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are those sets of methodological norms and cognitive aims which are not as universal as 
the ones in the outer layer but still are widely shared in one discipline. Possible 
candidates for such groups are materialism and idealism in social sciences, whereas the 
former “identifies a set of circumstances of the human organism (needs), the natural and 
built environment, and the forms of social activity that transform the environment as 
fundamental to social analysis” while the latter “takes states of consciousness -- ideas, 
ideologies, moralities, wants, preferences, modes of reasoning -- as fundamental to 
social analysis and undertakes to characterize social facts in these terms” (Little, 2010, 
p.no pagination). It should not take much to reformulate this definition into Laudan's 
(1987) form of methodological norms and cognitive aims, which tell the researcher 
what aims are desirable and what must be done to achieve such aims. However, at this 
point the reformulation shall not be pursued further, as there is a more relevant issue. 
The more interesting question for this research is the identification of such paradigm-
like groups in economics and their relevant methodological norms and cognitive aims. 
One of the first possible area of delineation are ontological cognitive aims whereas 
orthodox economics, according to Dow (1997, 2004) and Lawson (1997, 2003b, 2004, 
2006), has a closed-system ontology, while heterodox economics has an open-system 
ontology. As such, orthodox economics must promote methodological norms that 
promote the ontological cognitive aims of closed-system analysis and heterodox 
economics must do the opposite. Furthermore, according to Lawson (2006, pp.490–491) 
the fundamental methodological norms, and related cognitive aims, for orthodox 
economics are the use of “formalistic-deductive” frameworks, which are so imprinted 
and accepted that “the mathematical framework (…) is considered so essential that 
worries about its usefulness, or dispensability, if they are raised at all, tend to be 
summarily dismissed rather than seriously addressed” and that “it is because 
mathematisation is understood as being so obviously desirable, indeed, that the project 
is rarely defined in such terms”128. Lawson (2006) finds support for this conclusion in 
Kirman (1989, p.137), who insists that “it is difficult to believe that had a well-
formulated new approach been suggested then we would not have adopted the 
appropriate mathematical tools”, and Leamer (1978), to whom “the idea that there may 
__________________________ 
128 In this regard, Weintraub's (2002) book How Economics Became a Mathematical Science shows, in a new 
interpretation, how mainstream economics heavily borrowed from the cognitive aims and methodological norms from 
mathematics and its evolution between the 1930's and 1950's.  
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be relevant non-mathematical theories of inference” (Lawson, 2006, p.491) never comes 
to his mind.  
Further, contemporary orthodox methodological norms and cognitive aims are 
identified by Blaug (1976). Besides the “'hard core' or metaphysical part” of the 
orthodoxy, which consists of well-known assumptions such as “rational economic 
behaviour, constant tastes, independence of decision making, perfect knowledge, perfect 
certainty, perfect mobility of factors, et cetera”, or Alberts et al.'s (1994b; 2012) 
nomological hypotheses, Blaug (1976, p.161) identifies “'positive heuristics'” that give 
“practical advice” to the economists. According to him these heuristics, or as I wish to 
call them methodological norms, tell us to 
(i) divide markets into buyers and sellers, or producers and consumers; (ii) 
specify the market structure; (iii) create 'ideal type' definitions of the 
behavioural assumptions so as to get sharp results; (iv) set out the relevant 
ceteris paribus conditions; (v) translate the situation into an extreme 
problem and examine first- and second-order conditions; et cetera. (Blaug, 
1976, p.161) 
First, it is noticeable from this formulation that these methodological norms are less 
hypothetical imperative (Laudan, 1987) but more straight-forward (Kaiser, 1991). 
Secondly, in combination with the mathematical deductive frameworks mentioned by 
Lawson (2006), we can formulate the umbrella set of methodological norms and related 
cognitive aims for orthodox economics, from which further norms and aims of related 
schools of thought (labour economics, development economics) can be deduced. This is 
yet the first and easy step. 
The more difficult task is to find the methodological norms and cognitive aims provided 
by heterodox economics. The first example has been mentioned previously as the open-
system ontology of the heterodox community (Dow, 1997, 2004, Lawson, 1997, 2003b, 
2004, 2006). However, chapter 1 also mentions the criticism about the assumed consent 
in ontological questions (Vromen, 2004; Guala, 2008), so the open-system ontology 
might fail as adequate candidate. Another option is the heterodox rejection of the 
orthodox methodology. As Lawson (2006, p.493) suggests “heterodox economics, in 
the first instance, is a rejection of a very specific form of methodological reductionism” 
and he finds, at least with regards to deliberate rejection, support in Backhouse (2000). 
Hence, the core methodological norm in heterodox economics could be formulated as 
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whatever cognitive aim one has, one should not solely rely on a single, mathematical 
deductive methodology that is present in mainstream economics. This does not imply 
that these methodologies should not be used altogether; in fact some heterodox schools 
such as the Post-Keynesians make use of such mathematical methodologies, but the 
norm implies openness to other methodologies.  
Despite having a first candidate for a cognitive aim, it has been said before that this 
'agreement to disagree' is not sufficient for the establishing of a proper criterion of 
demarcation for heterodox economics (Negru and Bigo, 2008). Hence, we need to find 
further general cognitive aims and methodological norms to form a somewhat coherent 
paradigm-like grouping. A second candidate could be derived from the ethical principle 
of tolerance discussed in chapter 1. Here, different methodologies must be tolerated in 
the light of “the absence of a single conclusive final methodological or epistemological 
principle” (Samuels, 1997a, p.67) and because it is necessary for the critical exchange 
of intellectual ideas (Garnett, 2006). However, these are merely pluralists' cognitive 
aims and not generally heterodox ones.  
Just like the differentiation between eclectics and pluralists, not every heterodox 
economist is necessarily a pluralist. It remains possible that a heterodox economist, 
someone who is not submitting herself to the cognitive aims and methodological norms 
of the mainstream, fails to appreciate the diversity of methodologies, theories and ideas 
found in other schools of thought. Hence, it might not be possible to use the second 
candidate for general demarcation of heterodox economics. With the current debates 
and lack of agreement in the literature we might have to resort to the 'agreement to 
disagree' as the general aim, despite Negru and Bigo's (2008) objections. This is, 
however, not necessarily a negative situation but could rather be understood as 
appreciating the diversity of opinions and views within the heterodox community. What 
can be added is also another criterion for distinguishing between the orthodoxy and the 
heterodoxy. Here, the mainstream's general cognitive aims and methodological norms 
that form the paradigm-like grouping appears to be more substantial, more elaborate but 
also more narrow than its opposition.  
Finally, we are facing the non-universal cognitive aims and methodological norms 
within the heterodox schools of thought that promote specific means-end relationships 
that are considered desired or adequate. Yet again specific cognitive aims or 
methodological norms can be shared across different schools of thought, explaining the 
difficulty of precise demarcation, while there are some core assumptions that remain 
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fundamental for the school's members. One might think, for instance, of the uncertainty 
principle in Keynesian economics and its offspring, or the causal efficacy of institutions 
in institutional economics and how they are translated into aims and norms. Hence, as 
suggested above, a school of thought is best defined as a discursive group of economists 
sharing, and in most cases agreeing upon, a set of coherent cognitive aims and 
methodological norms with strong guarded cores. 
When it comes to migration between cognitive aims and methodological norms on the 
level of paradigm-like groupings and schools of thought, eclectics, and evidently others 
too, face less difficulties to do so. With regards to the former, for whatever reason one 
might disagree with the orthodoxy in economics it remains relatively easy to, at least 
temporally adopt those cognitive aims and methodological norms in order to take part in 
the mainstream discourse. In his empirical study on heterodox economists publishing in 
mainstream journals, Reardon (2008, p.189) finds that “[a] total of 95 percent of the 
mainstream papers [by heterodox economists] sent to mainstream journals were 
accepted”, which supports the claim of, at least temporal, migration into the mainstream 
cognitive aims and methodological norms, especially against the background where 
respondents to his questionnaire remarked that “heterodox economists and orthodox 
economists speak different languages, have different priors, have a different knowledge 
base, often work with different methodologies”. On the other hand, Reardon (2008, 
p.189) also notices that “no heterodox papers submitted to mainstream journals were 
accepted”, an indication of the partly incommensurable nature of cognitive aims and 
methodological norms of different paradigm-like groupings129130.  
Yet, we shall not enter into the debate on how heterodox topics are discriminated by 
mainstream journals. The important point is to argue that migration in the middle layer 
of paradigm-like groupings is less difficult than in the outer layer, but reasons for 
migration remain the same. Changing between orthodox and heterodox economics 
allows the eclectic economists to gain access to both discursive fields and to benefit 
from what they have to offer epistemologically. Although it seems that heterodox 
economists prefer to remain in the heterodox discursive fields131, engaging in active and 
__________________________ 
129 Reardon (2008) and his participants speak here of ideological barriers but I think it is reasonable to say that 
cognitive aims and methodological norms can form ideological biases if we accept that they are, sometimes, less 
hypothetical, as Laudan (1987), but more straight-forward (Kaiser, 1991).  
130 It shall be noted that eclectics must not necessarily all come from a heterodox background, although the 
pluralistic attitude seems mostly to occur within heterodox economics. Nonetheless, eclectic economist can also come 
from an orthodox background, trying to migrate into the heterodoxy. 
131 Reardon (2008, p.189) summarises that his participants have a 
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critical discourses across groupings is beneficial and desirable for reasons outlined by, 
for instance, Garnett (2006)132. Secondly, a rather pragmatic and political reason for a 
temporal migration, i.e. a heterodox economist works on orthodox research for a period 
of time, lies in the fact that mainstream journals are highest ranked internationally, 
which might attract, especially young, economists to submit publications for the 
purpose of career development.  
However, the eclecticism presented here shall not be concerned with such 
pragmatism133. The general idea is to benefit from different cognitive aims and 
methodological norms to enrich one's own research epistemologically. One might 
sarcastically but substantially supported the argument that134, of course, mainstream 
economics has nothing to offer epistemologically but I beg to differ here. Consider, for 
instance, the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model that has received substantive criticism 
even within the mainstream135. Although this model does not serve well as an 
explanatory device to explain real world business cycles, it holds at least three epistemic 
benefits for the economists. Firstly, it incorporates many features of modern, advanced 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models used in macroeconomics. As 
such, the RBC model serves as a good training heuristic. Secondly, it is essential in 
understanding its own flaws, i.e. one cannot understand the limitations of the RBC 
model if one does not know the model itself and one must know these limitations to 
promote alternatives136. Gregory Mankiw (1989) demands substantive knowledge of the 
matter in order to criticise it. Thirdly, even if the RBC model fails to explain the 
changes in productivity of modern economies, it might actually work for historical, 
primitive economies where the underlying model assumptions are better met (House, 
2014). Hence, the model might remain useful, because it is applicable for such primitive 
economies and it has the advantage of simplicity over other, more advanced DSGE 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
[p]reference to communicate directly with heterodox economists, rather than mainstream economists. 
Respondent R.10 wrote, ‘‘I want to communicate [in] heterodox journals – I publish in journals that 
heterodox economists read and [these] economists read heterodox journals.’’ And respondent R.26, 
‘‘I didn’t think it would be worth my time, while it would be communicating with the wrong 
people.’’. 
132 See chapter 1 for a summary of his arguments for a liberal conversation in economics. 
133 Yet, it seems possible to formulate career advising hypothetical imperatives in the form suggested by Laudan 
(1987), where the cognitive aim e is once career development and the action m is publishing in high rated mainstream 
journals, then one 'ought to do m to achieve e', while m', i.e. publishing in middle or low rated but heterodox journals, 
might not lead to e in the same successful way than m.  
134 For such support see, for instance, Leamer (1983), McCloskey (1985) or Summers (1991). 
135 See, for instance, Mankiw (1989) or Summers (1986). 
136 This argument can be linked to Feyerabend's (1981, 1999) pluralistic test-model, which states that theories are 
tested against one another.  
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models137. From these three points we are able to formulate, at least, hypothetical 
imperatives for the RBC model in the form Laudan (1987)138 advocates. Hence, we 
might find other orthodox, more sophisticated theories and methods that allow a 
formulation of similar pedagogical and historical or otherwise empirical and 
epistemological beneficial imperatives.  
That being said, we can now concentrate again on the heterodox schools of thought. 
Since we are, as said above, in the situation where higher level cognitive aims and 
methodological norms are partially shared across schools of thought, migration between 
them seems less problematic. There remain only a certain number of non-universal 
cognitive aims and methodological norms that one needs to accept and adopt, which is, 
for reasons outlined above, beneficial. Issues with theory and method choice on the 
school of thought level comes down to different, underlying lower and level cognitive 
aims and methodological norms. This means that lower and higher level sets of aims 
and norms prohibit choice of theories and methods due to their embeddedness in 
different sets of aims and norms, which makes theories and methods appear to be 
incommensurable. This problem can only be solved by looking at higher level aims and 
norms and applying D'Agostino's (2014) syllogism as outlined in chapter 2. Two 
questions emerge from this conclusion: first one needs to know these norms and aims 
and; second what this application of different schools of thought looks like. With 
regards to the former it seems unavoidable to study the relevant heterodox literature to 
familiarise oneself with the existing cognitive aims and methodological norms of the 
existing schools of thought in economics. This is, without saying, a considerable task 
for the eclectic economist as there is a multiplicity of heterodox schools. As said, Chang 
(2014) lists nine major schools with the possibility of multiple sub-schools139. It seems 
there is no way around this task at this moment. 
With regards to the second question, we have already seen an example of eclectic 
research by Stinson (2004, 2009) in the previous chapter. This can be used as guidance 
__________________________ 
137 Here we can see how higher level cognitive aims and methodological norms, in this case simplicity, can make the 
choice of one method over another justified.  
138 For instance: If the cognitive aim e1 is formulated as the attempt to introduce students to the econometric basics 
of DSGE models and aim e2 is to criticise these basics, action m, i.e. teaching the RBC model, has been consistently 
been better in achieving e1 an e2 in comparison to m', i.e. an alternative more complex and thus more complicated 
model for beginners, then one 'ought to do m to achieve e1 and e2'. Hence, at least in pedagogy, the eclectic has no 
reason to discriminate certain methods or theories a priori as they serve as good heuristic devices. This is essentially 
the argument Hegel (Reinicke, 1979) used to explain and defend Potamo of Alexandria's eclecticism, as shown in 
chapter 2.  
139 These are Austrian, Behaviourist, Classical, Developmentalist, Institutionalist, Keynesian, Marxist, Neoclassical 
and Schumpeterian (Chang, 2014). 
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for the development of an eclectic research approach in economics. Let us look at two 
prominent heterodox schools of thought; Marxist economics and Feminist economics140. 
Marxist economics' fundamental tenet is the concept of class, from which all social and 
economic analysis starts, and its methodology is dialectics, or as Wolff and Resnick 
(1987, p.241) call it, “overdetermination”141. As such, Marxist economics offers a non-
reductionist class knowledge of society and its cognitive aims and methodological 
norms can be formulated accordingly, for instance: 'if you aim is to study the capitalist 
society you ought to do a class analysis based on overdetermination'142. This analysis 
then produces specific and insightful class related narratives about the capitalist society, 
which cannot be produced by, for instance, orthodox economics with its underlying 
methodological individualism. One might contend that Marxian insights are without 
epistemological value compared what the orthodoxy produces, but that would require 
that one has the relevant criteria to discriminate the produced knowledge, something 
that, for instance, Dow (2007) and McCloskey (1994), among others, say is impossible.  
With class as central concept in Marxist economics, and consequently the basis for the 
formulation of its non-universal cognitive aims and methodological norms, it does 
however ignore gender roles. On the other hand, the identification of androcentric or 
masculinist biases in economics theories (England, 1993; Nelson, 2002) is one of the 
major cognitive aims of feminist economists with methodological norms supporting a 
plurality of gender-aware qualitative and quantitative research methods. Thus, feminist 
economics can serve two purposes for the eclectic economist. First, it holds different 
cognitive aims and methodological norms than Marxist economics and can therefore 
enrich one's research. It not only provides a new perspective on a given topic, it 
provides even a new set of research questions and answers to which Marxist economics 
is inherently blind to. Secondly, with its central cognitive aim, Feminist economics also 
offers a critique of Marxist economics and its androcentric and/or masculinist biases.  
As a result of this eclectic choice, the economist is now able to develop two narratives, 
one of classes and the other of gender, concerning a general, aspired social analysis143 in 
__________________________ 
140 The latter is not part of Chang's (2014) list, yet feminist economists produced substantial literature on the topic of 
gender roles and the relevancy for economics.  
141 Wolff and Resnick (1987, p.241) explain that  
[i]n this approach, each concept of the theory is complexly linked, as both cause and effect, to all the 
other concepts of the theory. Thus, no concept of the theory can be reduced from or reduced to any 
other; no concept functions as an essence.  
142 I am aware that this formulation is oversimplified but for the purpose of illustration it suffices.  
143 The underlying, shared cognitive aim of both schools of thought is the aim to make such social analysis. 
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the same way Stinson (2004, 2009) was able to develop narratives on his subject with 
the use of post-structural theory, critical race theory and critical theory, which should 
be, as he suggests, understood as “complementary – that is, concerned with different 
aspects of the same phenomena” (Sfard, 2003, p.355; see also Stinson, 2009, p.501)144. 
The eclectic choice on the level of schools of thought, where non-universal cognitive 
aims and methodological norms are the distinguishing factor, allows the economist to 
benefit from the specific epistemological advantages these schools offer due to the 
complementary nature of their application. In addition, the eclectic economist can 
migrate between different discourse groups, in this case Marxist and Feminist 
economics, to frustrate cognitive aims and methodological norms on different layers, as 
well as theories and methods themselves, against each other. Theory and method choice 
then becomes synonymous with migrating between different schools of thought. 
Eventually, this frustration will help the eclectic economist, the schools of thought and 
the discipline to develop by triggering small epistemological crises (MacIntyre, 1977) 
all the time145. As discussed above, these crises can be used as benchmark for any 
school of thought, or in MacIntyre's (1977) wider traditions, to test their own 
resourcefulness to deal with such kind of problems.  
The final thought on making choices by migrating between different sets of cognitive 
aims and methodological norms relates to the question of ontological and 
epistemological pluralism. Choice, here, is not only made on the level of method or 
theory, but involves ontology and epistemology as well. Cognitive aims in all layers 
have a, rather hidden, connection with ontological and epistemological pluralism 
outlined in chapter 1. If ontological pluralism is true, the eclectic must be aware that the 
cognitive aim and its methodological norm are uttered under specific restricted, 
existential quantifier. Referring back to Chalmers (2009), any cognitive aims and 
methodological norms with regards to numbers may be completely different when 
applying a nominalist ontology in comparison to a Platonist one. Moreover, if the 
cognitive aim focuses on an entities that enjoys two modes of being simultaneously, 
such as being possible and actual, then the methodological norm can be dependent on 
the relevant mode of being enjoyed. Likewise, the epistemological set of criteria for the 
determination of knowledge will influence both what set should be used and what aims 
__________________________ 
144 It has been mentioned before in chapter 2 that this complementarity is a reoccurring beneficial key aspect of 
eclecticism in the literature. 
145 Eclecticism itself is not excluded from the need of epistemological crises, hence the eclectic does not only 
develop schools of thought or paradigm-like groupings but also her own leitmotif.  
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and norms will make sense. That means that cognitive aims will not be accepted if they 
are formulated in a way that is diametrically opposed to one or more of the 
epistemological criteria used, e.g. the intersubjective objectivity.  
 
3.3. SYNOPSIS 
Firstly, this chapter has argued that eclecticism and pluralism are closely related due to 
their shared arguments. It begins with the acknowledgement of a plurality of 
philosophies, theories, methods and schools of thought, which is supported by post-
positivistic positions about the uncertainty of knowledge and the inherent limitations of 
theories, i.e. there is no one best method or theory for everything. Yet, eclecticism has a 
particular focus on the individual and her research, while pluralists can acknowledge the 
benefits of a pluralistic discipline yet remain monist in their own research. As a result, it 
is argued that eclecticism should be understood as a special form of pluralism, or a 
pluralism within the individual that allows the economist to be more inclusive in her 
own research.  
This raises the questions of how the eclectic economist can justify this personal 
pluralism where one makes choices from a variety of different approaches etc., or 
whether they are simply relativistic and ultimately unscientific in their work. To answer 
this question the literature of rational theory choice is examined and despite the existing 
objections, i.e. where “[t]here is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic 
decision procedure” (Kuhn, 2012, p.200) or where there is no value-free and thus 
unbiased rational methodology for theory choice (Putnam, 2002), it is argued that there 
is a basis for some kind of rational choice based on the work of MacIntyre (1977, 1984, 
1988) and Laudan (1978, 1987, 1996).  
Drawing from their work, with additional suggestions from Lakatos (1978), Shweder 
(1986) and Kaiser (1991), three arguments are proposed: First, even if there is no 
objective rationality and thus no objective rationale for choice but only some kind of 
bounded rationality, problems or epistemological crises that frustrate specific schools of 
thought's or paradigm-like grouping's narratives can still help to acknowledge the need 
for change and migration from within the rational framework (MacIntyre, 1977, 1984, 
1988). Secondly, the bounded, rational frameworks shall be understood in the light of a 
means-end relation of cognitive aims and methodological norms (Laudan, 1978, 1987, 
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1996). These means-end relations can form hypothetical or straight-forward imperatives 
(Laudan, 1978, 1987, p.25, 1996; Kaiser, 1991) in the form of “if your [cognitive] aim 
is e, you ought to do m” under the assumption that m promotes e better than existing 
alternatives. Thirdly, there are different layers of cognitive aims and methodological 
norms, ranging from universal over paradigm-like to non-universal ones (Shweder, 
1986). The universals are allocated within conceptual schemes and world views, 
paradigm-like cognitive aims and methodological norms are more specific in 
determining the rationality for scientific endeavour and non-universal aims and norms 
are found at the level of schools of thought, contributing to their defining, discursive 
nature. While migration between the universals seems the most difficult one to achieve, 
following the way down to the schools of thought, eclectic choice, or migration, seems 
more feasible and, based on the arguments from the eclectic literature, is 
epistemologically beneficial due to their ability to cause epistemological crises. Theory 
and method choice on the lowest level is becoming synonymous with migration 
between schools of thought, which helps the researcher to frustrate these theories and 
methods, and the consequent findings, with such crises as well. Hence, eclecticism tells 
the researcher why choosing from different schools of thought or paradigm-like 
groupings is justified and not, as some might suggests, totally arbitrary. 
Finally, the use of epistemological crises, formulated as hypothetical imperative of the 
form 'if your aim is to progress your school of thought, you ought to cause an 
epistemological crisis' does not imply them to be the objective guiding principles whose 
existence is denied in the first place. Instead, it is dependent on the acceptance of these 
communities of researchers who themselves formulate the cognitive aims and 
methodological norms that define their very own school of thought. Acceptance, even 
across different communities, does not imply neutral objectivity (Miner, 2011). 
Likewise, the underlying philosophical arguments that support the justification of 
eclecticism, and which are also found in the literature review, make it possible to 
formulate specific eclectic cognitive aims and methodological norms to which the 
eclectic might need to commit herself. This seems to make eclecticism evidently not an 
objective rational choice principle, as it itself becomes highly irrational by implying 
commitment to non-commitment. Despite being true, it only shows that there are 
framework specific arguments used to explore eclecticism in this dissertation, while the 
possibility remains to have different philosophical frameworks justifying eclecticism, as 
indicated earlier with regards to pedagogical eclecticism which has a different rationale 
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behind it. Also, as said above, migration between such philosophical foundations on the 
paradigm-like or even conceptual level are more difficult and may not always be 
achieved. Pluralism provides imperatives for eclectics, i.e. uncertainty of knowledge, no 
best method, tolerance etc., which are considered to be the best reasons to make 
eclecticism reasonable, but the eclectic may replace them when needed. If this specific 
imperative is, however, incommensurate to existing ones in a specific research 
community, then a strategy of changing the imperative in the way presumptions are 
changed when facing incommensurability, as suggested by D'Agostino (2014), can be 
applied.  
 
  
 138 
 
CHAPTER 4: ECLECTICISM: SHORT POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
There is no philosophy without the art of ignoring 
objections. - Joseph de Maistre 
 
After we have conceptualised the eclectic choice and its justification with the help of the 
pro-rational theory choice literature, and specifically with Larry Laudan's (1987) 
concept of hypothetical imperatives built around cognitive aims and methodological 
norms, there are several possible objections that may arise and will be addressed in this 
chapter. The following list is, of course, not exhaustive but it serves as a first answer to 
critical thoughts about this topic that were brought forward by the existing literature, but 
also by friends, colleagues and peers. We begin with Dow's (2007) charge against 
eclecticism (see chapter 2 for more details) followed by the question of whether eclectic 
research is feasible at all. A possible contention that states that this thesis is merely 
promoting mixed-method research is considered third. Fourth, a possible charge of 
relativism is discussed and finally, the relationship and more importantly the differences 
between eclecticism and pragmatism are elaborated.  
 
4.1. DOW'S UNSTRUCTURED PLURALISM 
In her piece on the variety of methodological approaches in economics, Sheila Dow 
(2007, p.3) refers to eclecticism in a very critical way. As already remarked in chapter 
2, she considers eclecticism to be “unstructured pluralism” with “an absence of 
selection criteria”, which must then be wholly rejected. Instead, she calls for structured 
pluralism, which “is the advocacy of a range of methodological approaches to 
economics which, like the range of social structures, is not infinite” (Dow, 2004, 
pp.287–288). This idea of structured pluralism is based on her appraisal of Kuhnian 
incommensurability and understanding of science. In chapter 3, however, it is shown 
that Kuhn (2012) himself has difficulties with applying paradigms to social sciences 
and, as mentioned in chapter 2, Marques and Weisman (2009) criticise Dow's use of 
Kuhnian thought to promote pluralism in economics. Additionally, D'Agostino's (2014) 
discussion of incommensurability itself, see chapter 3, shows that it possesses less of a 
problem for pluralists and eclectics than one might suggest.  
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Moreover, the conceptualisation and justification for the eclectic choice, as outlined in 
chapter 3, should be convincing enough to counter the argument for the “absence of 
selection criteria” (Dow, 2007, p.3). To the contrary, the eclectic position has a set of 
abstract selection criteria at its disposal, which allow the eclectic economist to justify 
her choice of school of thought or theory or method without someone being able to 
accuse her of arbitrariness. Specifically, the argument regarding epistemic uncertainty, 
i.e. the in-existence of one best answer to the question of what knowledge is or how it 
can be formed, something Dow (2007) herself puts forward, does not support but 
eventually frustrates any arbitrariness charge, unless relativism is meant which will be 
discussed further below. Since there might be more than one way to create scientific 
knowledge, migration between sets is not arbitrary but aimed at utilising these sets to 
create and/or overcome epistemological crises. These epistemological crises are the 
second argument against arbitrariness, as they can be used as benchmarks for change 
from within a rational framework (MacIntyre, 1977). They provide an aim or basis on 
which choices can be made.  
At the end, eclecticism does not tell the economist what to choose from the wide range 
of schools of thought etc., but that would be against its own point. Instead, it provides a 
rationale for a structured pluralism on the individual level of research, helping the 
economist to aim at more inclusive and diverse research. It is argued that this individual 
pluralism is as beneficial as the disciplinary pluralism found in the literature (see 
chapters 1 and 2) for the arguments again. Thus, Dow's (2007) criticism seems 
unsubstantiated.  
 
4.2. ECLECTIC RESEARCH IS NOT FEASIBLE 
The argument against feasibility of eclecticism arises from the question of practicability. 
Facing occupational pressures from project deadlines, publication output, teaching load, 
supervision requirements, need for applicability of research and so on, it is questionable 
whether the economist has any time to pursue any eclectic research, which would not 
only require extensive knowledge of a wide range of literature from different schools of 
thought for the familiarisation of the existing cognitive aims and methodological norms, 
but also time to apply these aims and norms in depth in one's own research. In order to 
become literate on, for instance, Post-Keynesian economics, i.e. to have an 
understanding of the literature, might take the economist months or years, time she 
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might be unable spend on a single research project. In order to familiarise oneself with 
the existing cognitive aims and methodological norms of Post-Keynesian economics, 
the eclectic would be required to engage with a wide range of literature from scholars 
considered to be Post-Keynesian, or part of one of the sub-groups within this school. 
Looking at Marc Lavoie's (2014b, p.43) extensive list of members of the Post-
Keynesian school of thought in figure 2, and their subsequent strands, the sheer size of 
it and, under the assumption of a considerable publication history of each member, the 
quantity of literature available should illustrate what it means to become proficiently 
familiar with Post-Keynesian economics. Figure 2 does not, of course, provide a reading 
list of the works which are essential for the understanding of Post-Keynesian 
Economics and according to the Post-Keynesian Economic Study Group there is no 
such list yet. However the group published two lists with major works which give 
insights into the previous and current debates and topics discussed in the school of 
thought (Hayes, 2014; Lavoie, 2014a). To become proficient enough to actually do 
Post-Keynesian research, not only to know broadly what the school is all about, requires 
extensive study.  
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The issue here is clear: if the economist is already fully occupied with the production of 
qualitatively excellent research in a single school of thought, the suggested migration 
between different sets of cognitive aims and methodological norms might simply be 
impossible due to practical time constraints. Secondly, to become an eclectic economist 
might take several years until one has familiarised herself with the extensive range of 
literature that is available in the existing schools of thought. At the end, the day only has 
24 hours the argument goes. 
For the eclectic to be able to utilise the Post-Keynesian cognitive aims and 
methodological norms she must, of course, know more than the general tenets of Post-
Figure 2: Strands, themes and authors of Post-Keynesian economics (Lavoie, 2014b, p.43) 
 142 
 
Keynesian economics. Likewise, substantial knowledge of other schools of thought is 
required for migration. To become an eclectic is certainly not an easy task but not 
impossible. Mixed method research already shows how researchers can become 
proficient enough to use the strengths, and be aware of the weaknesses, of both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. When migration on methodological 
grounds is not only possible but increasingly desirable (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009), 
then there is no reason to believe that migration between schools of thought or 
paradigm-like groupings is generally futile.  
Secondly, eclectic research does not prohibit the publication of preliminary findings. If 
a researcher decides to pursue eclectic research, i.e. migrating between different schools 
of thought or paradigm-like groupings to take advantage the benefits described above, 
she can still publish, i.e. enter into a specific discourse of one or two schools, with 
research outcomes gained from the application of the related set of cognitive aims and 
methodological norms. Publishing preliminary findings is a common practise in many 
disciplines, as they communicate to the relevant discursive group the current research in 
its preliminary stage. How such preliminary findings from eclectic research could be 
communicated shall be shortly illustrated with the help of a research paper by Brown, 
Charlwood, Forde and Spencer (2007) in which they assess pre-crisis job quality 
surveys in the light of New Labour policies in the UK from a political economy 
perspective.  
The main focus of their paper is “to provide a theoretical as well as empirical 
assessment of the job quality debate in the context of the record in ofﬁce of the New 
Labour government” (Brown et al., 2007, p.942). While the theoretical contribution 
aims to “critique [...] the ‘economics of happiness’ approach to job quality”, the 
empirical investigation uses 
primarily subjective measures of job quality taken from the 1998 and 2004 
Work and Employment Relations Surveys (WERS), supplemented by 
analysis of changing job satisfaction from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) and changing occupational structure from the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS). (Brown et al., 2007, p.942) 
The theoretical discussion draws on the limitations of mainstream economics' analysis 
of job quality and the subsequent rise of economics of happiness and its approach to 
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quantify happiness as a property of individuals via the use of sophisticated surveys. 
Hence, Brown et al. (2007, p.945) conclude that 
[t]he belief in the existence and direct importance of cardinal utility, as a 
quantitative entity capable of being summed over different individuals, is, in 
our view, the key general characteristic of the new economics of happiness. 
While the latter differs from economic orthodoxy in its embrace of a 
cardinal concept of utility, it continues to employ, in common with orthodox 
economics, a formal and individualistic method. 
This position that the human well-being is to such extent quantitatively fixed is now 
criticised and replaced by a perspective, coming from the political economy literature, 
of human well-being as qualitative and quantitative determined by a multiplicity of 
cultural and social impact factors, which are in flux. Hence, job quality is, understood as 
“well-being at work”, very much context dependent, yet it can still be formulated 
objectively (Brown et al., 2007, p.946). By introducing the political economics' concept 
of job quality that includes norms and expectations, Brown et al. (2007, p.948) frustrate 
the economics of happiness' proposal “that subjective survey data may reveal the 
direction of changes in facets of job quality over a medium-term period” to a point 
where it can be said that a small epistemological crisis for the economics of happiness is 
triggered.  
The central findings by Brown et al. (2007) are threefold. First, between 1998 and 2004 
the results from the WERS survey suggests, with the exception of one measure, that job 
satisfaction increased in the UK. Secondly, WERS data, in combination with BHPS 
data, shows a u-shape relationship between job satisfaction and income quantiles, 
meaning that workers at the lower end of the income and at the higher end are more 
satisfied than workers from the middle income range. Thirdly, looking at qualitative 
research about job satisfaction, Brown et al.'s (2007, p.959) premise that different 
expectations and norms play the important role for the explanation of the u-shaped 
relationship between income and satisfaction is supported, while the premise of 
economics of happiness, i.e. the “subjective measures of job satisfaction directly reﬂect 
the subjectively deﬁned well-being (‘cardinal utility’) of workers”, is rather 
unsupported146.  
__________________________ 
146 They further argue with regards to the economics of happiness premise that  
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Under eclecticism Brown et al.'s (2007) use of a qualitative research findings regarding 
job satisfaction to frustrate the underlying methodological norm of the cardinal utility 
assumption of economics of happiness is a first, good and preliminary result, but the 
issue itself can and should be investigated further. For instance, they already look into 
job satisfaction and gender differences, concluding “that the overall u-shape is partly, 
but in no case entirely, gender related” (Brown et al., 2007), but this excursion into 
gender differences remains a short, statistical analysis over a paragraph only. In the 
future, they could make use of more Feminist economic research to explore the gender 
aspects of these surveys further. In addition, a Marxian perspective could also be used 
to develop a class narrative that sheds a different light on members of different income 
groups, a narrative that neither Feminist economics nor political economics or 
economics of happiness can develop. This example portrays how eclectic research can 
be conducted even within the constraints of daily academic life and consequent 
pressures and duties.  
 
4.3. ECLECTICISM IS JUST MIXED-METHOD RESEARCH 
The eclectic notion of combining, or making use of, different cognitive aims and 
methodological norms from schools of thought and paradigm-like groupings may lead 
to the belief that this is basically mixed method research. That eclecticism is found in 
the mixed method research literature, as shown in chapter 2, stresses this conclusion 
even further. Is eclecticism therefore just mixed method research or are there 
distinguishing characteristics for both?  
The first problem we encounter when trying to discuss commonalities of and 
differences between eclecticism and mixed method research is, that there is no clear 
definition for mixed method research. Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner (2007, p.123) 
analyse 19 definitions gathered from leading scholars in the field for commonalities, 
which leads them to generally defining mixed method research as 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
for those who believe that purely subjective ‘cardinal utility’ exists, and that it can be simply read off 
from reported job satisfaction, then the observed u-shape means that the lowest earners have, together 
with the highest earners, gained the greatest utility from work. It seems, from this point of view, that 
the easiest route to ‘happiness’ at work is merely to ﬁnd the lowest paid job available. (Brown, 
Charlwood, Forde and Spencer, 2007, p.959) 
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the type of research in which a researcher or a team of researchers combines 
elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of 
qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference 
techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding 
and corroboration. (…) A mixed methods study would involve mixing 
within a single study; a mixed method program would involve mixing 
within a program of research and the mixing might occur across a closely 
related set of studies.  
This definition reflects the main justifications for mixed method research, which focus 
on the provision of understanding and depth and the advantages of triangulation of 
findings147. With such definition, they divide mixed method research into three major 
paradigms, as shown in figure 3, where one is qualitative dominant, one is pure and the 
third one is quantitative dominant.  
 
Figure 3: Johnson et. al.'s (2007, p.124) illustration of mixed method research types/paradigms. 
From this perspective it seems evident that mixed method research and eclecticism 
share, at least, some similarities. Arguments for the need for depth and breath, as well as 
triangulation, can be found in the eclectic literature, even if these concepts are not 
precisely labelled like this. However, Johnson et al. (2007, p.128), in agreement with 
Greene (2006), see mixed method research as a “methodological or research paradigm” 
with the following four areas: 
__________________________ 
147 Denzin (2009b, p.300) defines “triangulation (…) [as] a plan of action that will raise sociologists above the 
personalistic biases that stem from single methodologies. By combining methods and investigators in the same study, 
observers can partially overcome the deficiencies that flow from one investigator and/or one method”.  
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(a) philosophical assumptions and stances (i.e., what are the fundamental 
philosophical or epistemological assumptions of the methodology?), (b) 
inquiry logics (i.e., what traditionally is called “methodology” and refers to 
broad inquiry purposes and questions, logic, quality standards, writing 
forms that guide the researcher’s “gaze”), (c) guidelines for practice (i.e., 
specific procedures and tools used to conduct research; the “how to” part of 
research methodology), and (d) sociopolitical commitments (i.e., interests, 
commitments, and power relations surrounding the location in society in 
which an inquiry is situated). 
As such, mixed method research must be allocated at the level of paradigm-like 
groupings as it defines a specific, albeit generous, set of cognitive aims and 
methodological norms for the researcher148. Eclecticism, on the other hand, tries to 
transcend from this move and demands/justifies migration between sets where it is 
possible. Mixed method research cannot justify migration to such an extent as it would 
mean to contradict its own cognitive aims and methodological norms. 
Secondly, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) argue that the underlying philosophy of 
science for mixed method research must be pragmatism. In reference to Murphy and 
Rorty (1990), they state that “the pragmatic rule or maxim or method states that the 
current meaning or instrumental or provisional truth value (…) of an expression (…) is 
to be determined by the experiences or practical consequences of belief in or use of the 
expression on the world” (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, pp.16–17), to clarify, 
partially with regards to social sciences, that  
if two ontological positions about the mind/body problem (e.g., monism 
versus dualism), for example, do not make a difference in how we conduct 
our research, then the distinction is, for practical purposes, not very 
meaningful (…) [However] in some situations the qualitative approach will 
be more appropriate; in other situations the quantitative approach will be 
more appropriate. In many situations, researchers can put together insights 
and procedures from both approaches to produce a superior product (i.e., 
__________________________ 
148 Further reasons to think of mixed method research being somewhere in the mid-level is that there are still shared, 
universal cognitive aims and methodological norms, as described by Sechrest and Sidani (1995, p.78). They allocate 
the similarities of quantitative and qualitative researchers in the way they “describe their data, construct explanatory 
arguments from their data, and speculate about why the outcomes they observed happened as they did”. 
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often mixed method research provides a more workable solution and 
produces a superior product).  
Pragmatism thus offers the best philosophical ground for mixed methods researchers to 
defend and justify their approach. The justification in the quote given shows similarities 
with the justification for eclecticism that has been developed above, yet there are some 
differences apparent.  
The main difference here is that eclecticism does not argue that some situations prefer 
qualitative and others quantitative approaches. Instead, as indicated above, 
appropriateness is itself context-dependent and -determined. It results from the 
relationship of cognitive aims and methodological norms and therefore it arises from 
within these traditionally established sets on all three levels. The appropriateness of 
qualitative research is defined by the success of the approaches in the context they are 
applied, whereas success again is mostly measured by criteria within the sets of 
cognitive aims and methodological norms on all three levels. These criteria range from 
the specific use of data and its source to generally shared criteria of empirical 
soundness, validity and, in particular in the case of mainstream economics so it seems, 
elegance of models.  
It is unclear to what extent Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) are aware of and how they 
implement this into their understanding of mixed method research. They appreciate the 
pragmatic tendency to acknowledge different, culturally determined values and ends but 
their working definition does not indicate to what extent mixed method research is self-
aware of the context-depended appropriateness. This is the second example where 
eclecticism and mixed method research diverge. Below, I will differentiate pragmatism 
and eclecticism, thus giving more reasons to distinguish mixed method research and 
eclecticism under the assumption that pragmatism should be the philosophical basis for 
mixed method research, as Johnson and Onquegbuzie (2004) suggest. 
 
4.4. ECLECTICISM IS JUST PRAGMATISM IN DISGUISE 
The fourth critical point I encountered was the question whether eclecticism, as 
described, is not simply pragmatic or, more precisely, the same as American 
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pragmatism149. Just as in the previous chapter on mixed method research, it is argued 
that eclecticism is not the same as pragmatism and that the impression they are alike 
comes from the general influence pragmatism had on the philosophy of science and 
methodologies of different disciplines. Additionally, the somewhat unique aims and 
works of different, prominent pragmatists make a clear delimitation more difficult.  
“Pragmatism is a philosophy of action” according to Hans Joas (1993, p.18), at whose 
core lies the pragmatist maxim. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) summarise, as shown 
above, that this maxim, 
states that the current meaning or instrumental or provisional truth value (...) 
of an expression (...) is to be determined by the experiences or practical 
consequences of belief in or use of the expression in the world.  
In summary, the mixed methodist would look at the quantitative and qualitative 
practices available and determine in which situation they are most appropriate; the 
reason why Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) consider pragmatism to be the best 
philosophical basis for mixed method research. Additionally, they argue, taking an 
ontological positions has no meaning if they do not impact how researchers do their 
research. 
Nonetheless, they admit, there are metaphysical issues that can still be meaningful 
and/or be resolved by pragmatism. The early example of how pragmatism can solve 
metaphysical disputes is given by William James (1907), who describes a thought 
experiment in which a human tries to view a squirrel sitting on a tree-trunk. Despite the 
person's best effort to run around the tree to get a glimpse of the animal, it keeps 
moving around the tree itself so that it is always out of sight. The metaphysical question 
asks “does the man go round the squirrel or not” to which James' (1907, pp.43–44) 
pragmatic solution is to clarify “what you practically mean by 'going around' the 
squirrel”. If you understand 'going round' to mean that the person changes position from 
North to East to South to West back to North again, then James (1907) says the question 
must be answered with yes, while if you mean to go to the front, to the right side, the 
back, the left side, and back to the front again, then answer is no and the metaphysical 
dispute is settled. For James (1907, p.44) “you are both right and both wrong according 
as you conceive the verb 'to go round' in one practical fashion or the other”.  
__________________________ 
149 I must thank my third supervisor Dr. Alison Hirst and Dr. Sandra Selmanovic for raising this question 
independently.  
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The simplicity of James' (1907) application of the pragmatic maxim to a metaphysical 
problem makes it very intuitive and therefore it is safe to assume it is widely acceptable 
by eclectics, pluralists, and others. This bears, however, the impression that everybody 
is, in principle, a pragmatist, which then becomes a rather diluted stance similar to 
Solow's (1988) understanding of eclecticism. Secondly, the modern eclectic literature 
does rarely deal with such metaphysical problems; ontologically, eclectics take the 
world as “as complex and disjointed” (Sanderson, 1987, p.325). Hence, the literature 
focuses more on the 'practical consequences' for active research Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) refer to too. The justification of eclecticism proposed here, on the 
other hand, would include metaphysical problems and it, in principle, the same solution 
that recognises the context dependency of James' (1907) application of the pragmatic 
maxim, but that does not make eclecticism and pragmatism equal.  
From the eclectic appreciation of context dependency does not follow James' (1907, 
p.45) aim “of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable”. 
Instead, the mere acknowledgement of the context of traditional ontological disputes 
solves these issues just superficially. For instance, the classical ontological dispute over 
the existence of numbers, where to the questions “do numbers exist … [t]he Platonist 
says yes, and the nominalist says no” (Chalmers, 2009, p.77), is not solve by pointing 
out that 'if you are Platonist the answer is yes but if you are a nominalist the answer is 
no'. One could, of course, argue that this kind of ontological issue is trivial as it has no 
effect on the way we conduct our research in, for instance, mathematics (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
This argument might be challenged by showing the effects of ontological disputes on 
specific epistemology and methodology. Platonists, by granting the existence of 
numbers as abstract objects, face the epistemological problem of how knowledge can be 
gained about them. While knowledge about material objects can be gained through 
experiencing them through the senses, abstract objects like numbers cannot perceived in 
that way. On the other hand, the nominalist faces the indispensability argument, i.e. the 
existence of numbers and other abstract objects cannot be rejected if they are used in 
science. Hilary Putnam (2014, p.57) summarises this argument as follows: 
Quantification over mathematical entities is indispensable for science, both 
formal and physical; therefore we should accept such quantification; but this 
commits us to accepting the existence of the mathematical entities. This 
type of argument stems, of course, from Quine, who has for years stressed 
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both the indispensability of quantification over mathematical entities and the 
intellectual dishonesty of denying the existence of what one daily 
presupposes. 
In summary, neither is this particular metaphysical dispute solved by referring to the 
context, like in the case with the squirrel nor is it trivial. It has been implied by the 
previous chapter that scientific practise always has underlying metaphysical 
assumptions; whether the scientist is aware of them or not. If we make fundamental 
claims about the existence of mathematical objects, we simultaneously make statements 
about the very nature of mathematics and its practice itself150. Furthermore, if we are to 
accept the Platonist claim that mathematical objects exist as abstract ones, but reject its 
relevance for the mathematical practice, then we are applying an anti-realist position 
(Carnap, 1950; Chalmers, 2009).  
The next question is, whether it is possible to induce this idea that metaphysical 
considerations are indeed impacting mathematical practice and are therefore non-trivial 
to other, more general or specifically economic, abstract objects? Tony Lawson (see for 
instance 1997, 2003b, 2004), a self-identified critical realist, makes clear that the social 
ontology is fundamentally important for the practice of economics. Others, who held 
similar views, have been discussed in the previous chapters too. Hence, abstract objects 
in economics, i.e. value, money, institutions, etc., and their related ontological disputes 
appear not only to be not solved by reference to context-dependency but also to be non-
trivial for research. In addition, Lowe (2001, p.26) presents a general argument for the 
close relationship between metaphysics and empiricism, which “presents us with an 
opportunity to combine metaphysical argument with empirical scientific theory in order 
to reach a judgement as to whether or not a certain metaphysical view is plausibly true 
in actuality”. If the pursuit is, as he says, to “form rational judgement as to which of the 
various metaphysically possible alternatives”, i.e. metaphysics establishes the 
possibility of states of affairs, “do actually obtain” (Lowe, 2001, pp.22–23), is it not the 
case that every dispute must be non-trivial? 
__________________________ 
150 Here, Brouwer's (1913) Intuitionism is an example of how ontological statements about mathematical objects can 
have a significant impact on its practise. Intuitionism in mathematics is a form of constructivist philosophy, in which 
“[t]he question where mathematical exactness does exist, is answered differently by the two sides; the intuitionist 
says: in the human intellect, the formalist says: on paper” (Brouwer, 1913, p.82). Moreover, intuitionism also rejects 
the principle of excluded third from classic logic, which “leads to a revision of mathematical knowledge” (Horten, 
2012, p.no pagination).  
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While James (1907) still grants metaphysics some importance, Richard Rorty (1979, 
1998) more radically abandons metaphysics and replaces classic epistemology with 
what he calls epistemological behaviourism. Rorty (1979, p.170) uses the criticism of 
classic epistemology's aim for representations, mostly referring to Quine (1951), but 
also partly to Carnap (1950), to point out that “the crucial premise of this argument is 
that we understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of belief, and 
thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representation”. He goes on to argue that 
consequently the idea of the mind as “Mirror of Nature” must be given up and that “the 
notion of philosophy as the discipline which looks for privileged representations among 
those constituting the Mirror becomes unintelligible” (Rorty, 1979, p.170). That means 
that epistemology cannot transcend the practices of social interaction and conversation 
in determining what knowledge is; what has to be done is “to move everything over 
from epistemology and metaphysics into cultural politics” (Rorty, 1998, p.57). 
Like Carnap (1950), Quine (1951) and others, Rorty (1979, 1998) employs the linguistic 
turn in philosophy151 to formulate his criticism. A first argument by Lowe (2001) 
against the idea that metaphysics is meaningless has been discussed above. 
Additionally, at least Carnap's (1950) critique of metaphysics can be dismissed by three 
points. First, Carnap's (1950) claim about the meaninglessness of metaphysical 
statements is built upon a verificationist theory for meaning, yet the inability to verify a 
metaphysical statement does not imply its meaninglessness. Secondly, Carnap (1950, 
p.26) argues that “an alleged statement of the reality of the system of entities is a 
pseudo-statement without cognitive content”, but in combination with his 
verficationism, i.e. that the meaning of statements lie in the way they are verified, it 
seems questionable that he can verify his own statements on the meaninglessness of 
metaphysics either analytically or synthetically. Thirdly, Quine (1951) shows 
successfully that two of Carnap's (1950) major assumptions used to criticise the 
meaningfulness of metaphysics fail, i.e. the distinction between analytical and synthetic 
statements and that all “meaningful claims can ultimately be reduced to claims about 
perpetual experience” (Ney, 2014, p.129).  
In the case of Rorty (1979, 1998) these points are less applicable, especially as he 
employs Quine's (1951) Two Dogmas of Empiricism for his critique, thus escaping, at 
least, the dichotomy of analytical vs. synthetic statements. However, that does not mean 
__________________________ 
151 The linguistic turn is the name for the shift to language and its importance for philosophy, beginning in the 20th 
century.  
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it is impossible to formulate criticism of Rorty's (1979, 1998) strategy to abandon 
metaphysics and to redefine epistemology. On his radical claim that only that is true 
what is socially justified to be true, Susan Haack (2000, p.64) replies 
[t]o be sure, if we agree that p, we agree that p is true. But we may agree 
that p when p is not true (and we may not agree that p when p is true). So 
“true” is not a word that truly applies to all or only statements about which 
we agree; and calling a statement “true” certainly doesn't mean that we 
agree about it.  
Additionally, she accuses Rorty to generally conflate truth with justified belief, which is 
“a nasty muddle” (Haack, 2000, p.20) and to confuse two concepts of epistemic 
justification; contextualism and tribalism152, which is problematic because the former is 
relativistic and the latter isn't. At the end, Haack (2000, p.65) accuses Rorty of being 
intellectually irresponsible in his treatment of science, calling his philosophy of 
focusing on conversation “Rortyesque dilettantism”153.  
Independent of whether we believe ontological or metaphysical disputes to be relevant 
for our daily research practise, the main point is that neither the eclectic literature nor 
the eclectic justification propose to take an a priori stance in such a dispute. The 
justification merely says that using various positions, in the case of mathematics 
Platonism, nominalism or intuitionism, is possible, and possibly desirable, for the 
eclectic, whether she uses all, prefers one over the other or ignores them is totally up to 
her. Eclecticism does not ask James' (1907) metaphysical pragmatic question 'what we 
practically mean by numbers exist'. The eclectic may use this question in the same way 
she uses other methodological norms to analyse this problem, turning James' (1907) 
metaphysical pragmatic question into a methodological norm on the paradigm-like 
grouping level, but the eclectic may approach this question with a different perspective. 
Other than pragmatism, eclecticism does not try to solve metaphysical disputes in the 
same way but makes use, if possible, of the tensions they generate.  
Leaving the ontological and metaphysical discussion aside, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 
(2004) emphasis the methodological implications of pragmatism, something that is 
__________________________ 
152 Contextualism: “A is justified in believing that p if and only if, with respect to his belief that p, A satisfies the 
epistemic criteria of his community”. Tribalism: “A is justified in believing that p if and only if, with respect to his 
belief that p, A satisfies the epistemic criteria of our community” (Haack, 2000, p.151).  
153 Haack (2000) is not alone in her criticism though, as Ramberg (2007) notices; Richard Rorty has received 
substantial criticism for his conversationalist pragmatism.  
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apparent in Joas' (1993) and, ultimately, Peirce's (1931, 1934, 1974) writings too. Peirce 
(1931, 1934, 1974) sees the pragmatist maxim as important part of the scientific 
method, as it allows to clarify the meaning of scientific hypotheses before they are 
subjected to experimental verification. Consequently, if the metaphysical hypothesis 
does not bear any practical consequences of this kind, i.e. it cannot be tested 
experimentally, then it has no meaning. With probability as example, Peirce (1974, 
p.169) explains how the pragmatic interpretation of the meaning of a concept makes 
probability practically useful; “we begin by asking, what is the use of calculations of 
probabilities; and the answer is that the great business of insurance rests upon such 
calculations”. Hence, “[a] probability, therefore, is the known ratio of frequency of a 
specific future event to a generic future event which includes it”. No other meaning can 
generate the practical consequences and importance of probability for the businesses. 
This does not mean that the exploration of different consequences is, per se, forbidden. 
Peirce (1934, p.6) generally defines his pragmatic maxim as follows: 
In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should 
consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity 
from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will 
constitute the entire meaning of the conception.  
Here Peirce's (1931, 1934, 1974) pragmatic maxim comes closest to how eclecticism 
has been described so far. While eclecticism does not focus on the practical 
consequences as Peirce (1931, 1934, 1974) does, the underlying, one could say, 
'epistemological consequences', i.e. what can a specific theory or school of thought 
explain, reveals the closest connection between eclecticism and pragmatism. However, 
it is hard to argue that this particular interpretation of the pragmatic maxim, especially 
when considering concepts such as probability or others, is unique to pragmatism. 
Conceptual clarity seems generally desirable in any discipline, and, therefore, also in 
economics. The eclectic economist can use the cognitive aim and methodological norms 
of Peirce's (1931, 1934, 1974) pragmatism in order to conduct her research and clarify 
the meaning of concepts in economics in a way described above, something that 
McCloskey (1983) seems to imply too, in order to conduct experimental tests. In 
economics, concepts like 'selfishness' or 'utility maximisation' certainly require the 
application of the pragmatic maxim, as these concepts have been diluted beyond 
meaninglessness, i.e. they are no longer subject to experimental verification or 
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falsification and are rather considered a priori true154. Hence, pragmatism can be useful 
for the eclectic economist, but eclecticism, again, transcends Peirce's (1931, 1934, 
1974) maxim by allowing the eclectic to make a choice. No matter how intuitively 
appealing the maxim is, it remains a mere option to clarify concepts in such a way that 
their practical consequences are tested.  
Finally, when it comes to pragmatism and the question what is meant with the practical 
consequences of hypothesis or metaphysical statements it is unavoidable to discuss the 
underlying truth theories. So far, the concept of truth has not been addressed in this 
thesis, as a development of a comprehensive eclectic truth theory is a PhD topic on its 
own, if not generally impossible to formulate. Nonetheless, a short examination is 
necessary to compare eclecticism with pragmatism with regards to truth.  
From the literature review it becomes evident that the early eclectics had a realist 
correspondence conception of truth, one that acknowledges the existence of an 
objective, mind-independent reality in which the eclectic is capable of identifying those 
teachings of philosophical sects which are corresponding best with the facts of nature 
(Mulsow, 1997; Kelley, 2001). This position is, nowadays, of course difficult because it 
presupposes that the eclectic has an ability that allows her to, objectively, decide what 
teachings or statements are corresponding to the nature and what not. Claiming to have 
such an ability is to say that one has a specific access to the world, something others 
might not have. Such a claim can be criticised in various ways, but the central idea is, 
nowadays, that we might not have any access to a capital T truth in the same way we 
have no access to capital K knowledge (McCloskey, 1994), if it actually exists. 
The modern eclectic literature is less focused on truth but acknowledges the 
developments of philosophy of science in the recent centuries. As said before, eclectics, 
like pluralists, frequently cite the 'there is no one best way' principle, which finds its 
translation into the existence of truth. Hence, they imply that truth, in a Kuhnian (2012) 
or Feyerabendian (1993) sense, as system-dependent, or as multiplicity (Lodge, 1944; 
Slife, 1987; Slife and Reber, 2001; Stinson, 2004; Køppe, 2012), to a point where 
Lazarus, Beutler and Norcross (1992, p.11) say with regards to psychoanalysis that 
these eclectics “promote flexibility and a relativistic approach to truth”. It is, of course, 
debatable whether the eclectic concept of truth must be relativistic, in the absolute sense 
__________________________ 
154 Sen (1977, p.322) points this out, by arguing that “it is possible to define a person's interests in such a way that 
no matter what he does he can be seen to be furthering his own interests in every isolated act of choice”.  
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that “all beliefs, regardless of their subject matter, are true only relative to a framework 
or parameter” (Baghramian and Carter, 2015, p.no pagination), or if eclecticism might 
be based on different truth theory or if eclecticism is rather uncommitted to any truth 
theory. This, however, is not the focus here, but rather the comparison with truth in 
pragmatism155.  
On the topic of truth, James (1907) and Peirce (1878, 1931, 1934, 1974) diverge from 
each other the most. Early on, Peirce (1878) shows a similar realist, correspondence 
theory of truth as the early eclectics had, yet it is only superficially the same. For him, 
the central concept for the scientific inquiry, and thus to the application of his 
pragmatist maxim, is reality. Peirce (1878, p.299) begins with observing that “we may 
define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think 
them to be”, the realist stance, but noticing that “it would be a great mistake to suppose 
that it makes the idea of reality perfectly clear”. Truth now enters the discussion when 
he applies his pragmatist maxim to the concept of truth by asking for the practical 
consequences, which in this case are the formation of beliefs about what is real 
(Hookway, 2013). The subsequent question to Peirce (1878) is how it is possible to 
differentiate between true and false beliefs, and for him only the scientific inquiry can 
answer it156. At the end, Peirce (1878, p.300) concludes that  
different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the 
progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to 
one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are 
carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the operation 
of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other 
facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the 
predestinate opinion. This great hope is embodied in the conception of truth 
and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who 
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this 
opinion is the real.  
__________________________ 
155 If there is to be an eclectic commitment to a truth theory then a good candidate could be a pluralist theory of 
truth, which holds “that there is more than one way of being true” (Pedersen and Wright, 2013, p.no pagination). This 
is not to be confused with relativism, as the latter position could consistently hold that there is only one way of being 
true in every possible context. Compatibilism, for instance, is also a pluralist theory of truth, which says that there are 
absolute and relative truths. In this sense, the eclectic could be a pluralist with regards to truth analogous to 
ontological pluralism by to McDaniel (2009, 2010a; b, 2013b; a, 2014), see chapter 2, where there are different kinds 
of being.  
156 He argues that “the ideas of truth and falsehood, in their full development, appertain exclusively to the 
experiential method of settling opinion” (Peirce, 1878, p.299).  
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The early eclectics themselves never apply anything like a pragmatic maxim as defined 
by Peirce (1878, 1931, 1934, 1974) or others, they never seem to question the clearness 
of truth or reality as concepts. This is the fundamental difference between them and 
pragmatists ala Peirce (1878, 1931, 1934, 1974). With regards to the modern eclectics, 
the contrast is even bigger as they seemingly do not subscribe to a correspondence 
theory of truth (Lazarus, Beutler and Norcross, 1992). Moreover, modern eclectics have 
a different concept of reality from Peirce (1878, 1931, 1934, 1974). Social reality is 
both constructed and complex and thus theories only give a limited access to this reality 
(Sil and Katzenstein, 2010a). Hence, Peircian (1878, 1931, 1934, 1974) agreement 
cannot be achieved all the time, due to the fact that inquiry does not cover the same 
aspects of the social reality.  
William James (1907), on the other hand, makes different claims about truth, going 
even so far as arguing that pragmatism itself is a theory of truth. The pragmatic answer 
to the question of truth is that  
true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. 
False ideas are those we can not. (…) The truth of an idea is not a stagnant 
property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made 
true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of 
its verifying itself. (James, 1907, p.201) 
James' (1907) pragmatic approach to truth asks for the practical value or relevance of 
ideas for human beings. Hence, sometimes ideas have no practical value as the objects 
they refer to are irrelevant to us. James (1907) explains this by referring to a person lost 
in the woods who happens to find a path. She now acts upon the idea that this path leads 
to a human settlement, which means rescue, hence “[t]he true thought is useful here 
because the house which is its object is useful” (James, 1907, p.203). James' (1907) 
pragmatic theory of truth is action related, as pragmatism is in general according to Joas 
(1993), where true beliefs lead to desirable, positive behaviours, while false beliefs can 
be harmful. That being said, it seems obvious that early eclectics, for reasons described 
above, are not in agreement with James (1907). The question now is whether the 
modern eclectics' 'truth relativism', as far as it exists, is the same as James' (1907) 
pragmatic theory of truth.  
The similarities between the eclectic treatment of truth and that of James (1907) are 
striking, to say the least. With the eclectic acknowledgement of truth as being dependent 
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on the context, i.e. theories about the complex social reality are true due to conditions 
set out by the schools of thought, or paradigm-like groupings, or, if one wants to use a 
Habermasian (1987, 1990) term 'discourse groups', they give, knowingly or not, credit 
to James' (1907) idea that truth is not an inherent property of ideas but is given to them. 
However, that does not necessarily mean the eclectics are Jamesian (1907) pragmatists, 
but rather that they are following either aspects of the linguistic turn, a or even the 
significant move undertaken in the 20st century analytical philosophy, or, possibly more 
precisely, what Williamson (2006, p.108) calls “the representational turn”, the 
contemporary philosophical focus which resulted from the earlier linguistic turn.  
The linguistic turn, the shift of focus in philosophy away from naturalism, i.e. the 
analysis of physical properties of things, towards language, has experienced widespread 
support from philosophers of different couleur. For Ayer (2012), for instance, “the 
propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character—that is, they do 
not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, 
or the formal consequences of definitions”, thus concluding that philosophical analysis 
is, other than scientific analysis, fundamentally independent of empirical assumptions. 
Michael Dummett (1978, 2014) lists the works by Gottlob Frege, G.E. Moore, Bertrand 
Russell, Rudolf Carnap and ultimately Ludwig Wittgenstein157 as central contributors to 
the linguistic turn and thus the birth of analytical philosophy158. Pragmatist Richard 
Rorty can be added to the list here too, since he not only edited the book The Linguistic 
Turn (Rorty, 1992)159, but he wrote extensively on the topic of language.  
In his book Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty (1989, pp.4–5) early clarifies that 
“we need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the 
claim that truth is out there”, and emphasises that only “descriptions of the world” can 
__________________________ 
157 Russell Goodman (2002) writes an extensive documentary of Wittgenstein's own, somewhat ambiguous 
relationship with pragmatism, and specifically his agreement and criticism with the work of William James, while 
Rorty (1989) points out the, for him at least, pragmatic nature of Wittgenstein's thought on vocabularies as tools.  
158 For Dummett (1978, p.485) the central tenets of analytical philosophy are  
first, that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought; secondly, that the study of 
thought is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological process of thinking; and, 
finally, that the only proper method for analysing thought consists in the analysis of language. 
Yet, Williamson (2006) argues that neither all analytical philosophers would subscribe to all three points while non-
analytical philosophers, i.e. continental philosophers such as post-modernists, would agree with them. 
159 In it, he writes that 
the purpose of the present volume is to provide materials for reflection on the most recent 
philosophical revolution, that of linguistic philosophy. I shall mean by “linguistic philosophy” the 
view that philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by 
reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use. (Rorty, 1992, 
p.2) 
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be true” whereas “the world on its own – unaided by the describing activities of human 
beings – cannot”. The distinction here is between the existence of a mind-independent 
world, which he does not necessarily deny, and the existence of mind-independent truth, 
which he denies. Earlier, he explains that pragmatism, for him, is anti-essentialism, 
which is specifically applied to the philosophical concept of truth, but also to morality 
or knowledge. Ultimately, as he argues, “there is no epistemological difference between 
truth about what ought to be and truth about what is, nor any metaphysical difference 
between facts and values” (Rorty, 1980, p.723), denying truth to be corresponding with 
reality or being a term for the accurate, linguistic representation for the world.  
It is without saying that there are similarities between pragmatism and eclecticism, but 
the notion that eclecticism is simply pragmatism in disguise is, to say the least, a 
superficial observation. Rather, we find common grounds due to 'trends' in 
contemporary philosophy, in which pragmatism took an active as well as adoptive role. 
Where pragmatism had is influence is, as said, observable in the writings of 
Wittgenstein (Goodman, 2002) or Hillary Putnam, who has been introduced and 
discussed in the first chapter. Putnam (1995a) has written somewhat favourably about 
pragmatism, and also shows that Wittgenstein and pragmatists share some practices160. 
Elsewhere, he explains, and clarifies about himself, that with regards to  
James and the Pragmatists, I like their holistic view of inquiry, and their 
rejection of the fact/value dichotomy, but I have never subscribed to their 
theory (or theories) of truth. Still, one can learn much from James and 
Dewey. (Putnam and Peruzzo, 1992, p.215) 
With these two final examples, it should be clear that similarities with pragmatic 
thought does not make one a pragmatist. Likewise, I have shown above where the 
thoughts of eclectics coincide with that of pragmatists and that this is not due to the 
former being the latter in disguise but general trends in philosophy.  
  
__________________________ 
160 He concludes that “Wittgenstein was not in the strict sense either a ‘pragmatist’ nor a neo-Kantian he shares with 
pragmatism a certain Kantian heritage (which William James, too, was extremely loathe to acknowledge)” (Putnam, 
1995a, p.52). Additionally, Judy Hensley (2012) further discusses the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy 
and that of several pragmatists and indicates similarities and differences, concluding, here in agreement with Putnam 
(1995a), that the question of Wittgenstein's pragmatism cannot easily answered with yes or no.  
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4.5. ECLECTICISM LEADS TO RELATIVISM 
The final question raised by my peers is whether eclecticism ultimately leads to some 
kind of relativism. Here again, just like in the previous sub-chapter on the relationship 
between eclecticism and pragmatism, a comparison between eclecticism and the 
literature on relativism is required to find an answer. Above, we also have dismissed the 
charge of relativistic arbitrariness, i.e. the “absence of selection criteria”, against 
eclecticism raised by Dow (2007, p.3). It goes without saying that the lack of a coherent 
definition for relativism makes answering the question rather difficult. However, there 
are features of eclecticism, but also of its justification and more generally pluralism, that 
are relativistic in their nature.  
Generally speaking we can say that “relativism claims that truth, goodness, or beauty is 
relative to a reference frame161, and no absolute overarching standards to adjudicate 
between competing reference frames exist” (Krausz, 2010, p.13). However, there are 
several variances in the strength of such claim. Krausz (2010), for instance, 
distinguishes between global and local relativists, where the former denies the existence 
of adjudicating standards for all reference frames altogether while the latter allow the 
existence for some frames. Given the eclectic justification developed in the previous 
chapter, it is apparent that the argument is, at least, locally relativistic following these 
two definitions. The idea of non-universal methodological norms and cognitive aims in 
inner and middle layers, as well as the existence of different conceptual schemes in the 
outer layer, is relativistic according to Krausz's (2010) first definition, but it shows also 
that it is not globally relativistic, as it is argued that migration is still possible and 
relatively easy between frameworks in the inner and middle layer, while more difficult 
in the outer layer. 
Moreover, we can acknowledge that Krausz's (2010) definition, if applied to 
knowledge, agrees with Dow's (2007) and McCloskey (1994) assessment that there are 
no overarching standards which allows us to decide what knowledge is and is not. 
According to Krausz (2010, p.17) “relativism requires that, with the respect to the same 
__________________________ 
161 Krausz (2010, p.18) summarises that  
[r]eference frames come in many varieties (…) [t]hey may include conceptual schemes, conceptual 
frameworks, paradigms, symbolic systems, systems of thought, systems of beliefs, practices, world-
visions, languages, discourses, linguistic frameworks, point of views, perspectives, standpoints, 
worldviews, horizons, forms of life, codes, or norms (…) cultures, tribes, communities, countries, 
civilisations, societies, traditions, historical periods, religions, races, or genders (…) [and that] some 
of these varieties of reference frames may overlap; others do not. 
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subject matter, competing reference frames exist”. Hence, the pluralist arguments with 
regards to knowledge creation seem to be relativistic in this sense. Likewise, eclectics 
such as Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin (2011), who use the Piagetian and the Vygotskian 
explanations of proportional reasoning to justify their eclecticism, must be seen as 
being relativistic too.  
Finally, Krausz (2010) clarifies that relativism is not synonymous with subjectivism, or 
the view that every single individual has its own reference frame. Although the latter is 
classified as relativistic, it remains only one of many kinds of relativistic positions. 
Others, that resemble arguments presented above to justify eclectic choices, allow that 
such reference frames can be shared among several individuals and groups. Hence, 
migration between different schools of thought, paradigm like groups and, where 
possible, conceptual schemes, does not mean that eclecticism leads to such 
subjectivism, in which every individual researcher 'lives in her own world', so to say, 
but that the eclectic migrates between different reference frames of groups, in this case 
the schools of thought or paradigm-like groupings.  
In her Brief History of Relativism Maria Baghramian (2010) outlines the historical roots 
of relativism and how it influenced contemporary philosophical traditions, similar to the 
pragmatists' impact described in the previous section. Hence, it is less surprising to find 
the pragmatist influence on relativism too. Here, Baghramian (2010) makes reference to 
pragmatist's scheme-content dualism, and especially William James' (1979) take on the 
Kantian notion of conceptual organisation of raw experience, which, as she argues, 
leads him to foreshadow Quine's ontological relativism162. Eventually, Quine's 
ontological relativism lead to the formulation of the Duhem-Quine thesis of 
underdetermination of scientific theories (see, for instance, Quine, 1951; Duhem, 1991), 
which states that a set of empirical data can give support to different, plausible theories 
and justifiable hypotheses. The thesis itself not only represents one of the strongest 
arguments against scientific realism, but also influenced later contemporary 
philosophers of science such as Paul Feyerabend (1993), Thomas Kuhn (2012), Imre 
__________________________ 
162 Baghramian (2010) draws the connection between James (1979) and Quine (1970) with the following citations of 
their work: James (1979, p.66) writes 
[t]here is nothing improbable in the supposition that analysis of the world may yield a number of 
formulae, all consistent with the facts. In physical science different formulae may explain the 
phenomena equally well-the one-flued and the two-fluid theories of electricity, for example, 
while Quine (1970, p.179) similarly argues that “[p]hysical theories can be at odds with each other and yet 
compatible with all the possible data even in the broadest sense. In a word, they can be logically incompatible and 
empirically equivalent”.  
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Lakatos (1970a; b, 1976, 1978) or Hilary Putnam (1981b, 1982, 1987a, 2002). That 
being said, it is reasonable to assume, just like in the case of pragmatism, that the 
similarities between relativism and eclecticism arise from the historical impact 
relativism had on contemporary philosophy of science.  
It is thus no coincidence that one of the central arguments for eclecticism is 
underdetermination in disguise. As seen in the example of the  Piagetian and the 
Vygotskian explanations for proportional reasoning in the psychological literature 
(Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin, 2011), the argument for the heuristic value of both 
approaches is essentially an argument from underdetermination, in which both theories 
offer insightful conclusions from the same data, while being otherwise different. 
Likewise we find the same argumentation elsewhere, for instance sociology (Sil, 2000, 
2004, Sil and Katzenstein, 2010a; b) where different theories play an important role in 
explaining given circumstances. Therefore, when it comes to the Duhem-Quinian 
underdetermination of scientific theories, eclecticism is very well relativistic. On the 
other hand, other relativistic interpretations are less like to be found in the eclectic 
literature. One of them is the impossibility of translation, something Donald Davidson 
(2001) criticises in conceptual relativism, and that has been argued against in the 
previous chapter too. In fact, as Davidson (2001) argues, conceptual schemes and 
languages are not identical. Instead, schemes can be shared across languages and 
translatability is possible, at least in some cases. Moreover, it has been argued that 
translatability and/or migration is even more likely when it comes to paradigm-like 
groupings and schools of thought. Moreover, there is no instance in the eclectic 
literature where translatability is questioned. Although Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin 
(2011) describe the differences between Piagetian and Vygotskian theories, it is not 
implied that these theories are generally incommensurable. As shown in chapter 2, 
mixed method research eclectics even opposed the idea of incommensurability 
altogether (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2007), indicating that conceptual 
relativism that denies translatability and proposes incommensuralbility are not among 
the eclectic positions.  
Kant's (1870, p.90) claim that “what objects may be in themselves, and apart from all 
this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us”163 did not only 
__________________________ 
163 Translated into English by Kemp Smith (1929, p.82; see also Baghramian, 2010, p.44), in the original: “Was es 
für eine Bewandtniss mit den Gegenständen an sich und abgesondert von aller dieser Receptivität unserer 
Sinnlichkeit haben möge, bleibt uns gänzlich unbekannt” (Kant, 1870, p.90). 
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lead to a pragmatist and neo-pragmatist reinterpretation by James or Quine, but is the 
basis for other forms of relativism (Baghramian, 2010). The above mentioned 
conceptual relativism finds its extreme form in the already referenced  Goodman (1984) 
who developed a radical constructivism, which “suggests that our categories and 
conceptual schemes not only carve up the world, but also, in an important sense, create 
or construct the world” (Baghramian, 2010, p.47). Moreover, in Latour and Woolgar's 
(2013) interpretation reality in science is “constructed via interactive norm-governed 
processes and practices such as negotiations, interpretations and manipulations of data” 
(Baghramian, 2010, p.48), rather than being out there to be discovered. Furthermore, 
Baghramian (2010) concludes that relativism found its way through Nietzsche into 
postmodernism and through Hegel and Marx into modern social constructivism, cultural 
and historical relativism. In conclusion, relativism found its way into branches of 
contemporary philosophical thought, just as pragmatism did, despite its controversial 
nature.  
Stinson (2004, 2009) is, at least, one eclectic who used post-modernist theory in his 
work, eventually implementing some of the inherent relativistic positions Baghramian 
(2010) allocates within postmodernism. Likewise, we have Robert Solow (1988) 
agreeing to some extent with Goodman's (1984) arguments about the construction of the 
world, and although Solow's (1988) interpretation of eclecticism has been dismissed for 
the purpose of this dissertation, it shows that some relativistic thoughts seem reasonable 
even for orthodox economists. Moreover, with Baghramian's (2010) identification of 
Marxist relativism, although mostly related to truth and falsity, ethics and history, 
modern Marxist economists may also embrace relativistic positions. Consequently, 
eclectics would pick these positions up when they use Marxist theories to conduct 
economic analyses.  
To answer the question of my peers: Yes, eclecticism can lead to relativistic positions, 
but not necessarily in the sense implied. Relativism is not the logical consequence of 
eclecticism, but rather eclecticism can use relativistic positions already apparent in some 
contemporary philosophical and economic schools of thought. Relativistic positions are 
still controversial, but some arguments are worth considering. One might, for instance, 
not agree with Quine's ontological relativism or the underdetermination of scientific 
theories, but the relevance of his work for contemporary philosophy can hardly be 
denied. Lawson (2004), yet again the representative example of a heterodox economist 
being aware of the importance, critically discusses Quine's ontological positions, does 
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not agree with all of them but at least accepts the relevance of Quine's contributions. 
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that underdetermination plays a role in 
economics too (Sawyer, Beed and Sankey, 1997; McMaster and Watkins, 2006), and 
must therefore be taken seriously. At the end, to fully embrace eclecticism the eclectic 
must not be afraid to explore the relativistic positions that are still existent in the 
literature.  
 
4.6. SYNOPSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss, and to argue with, five criticisms which were 
presented, mostly, by peers and colleagues in various discussions and/or presentations 
held about this research project. This first debate of these objections is not only a 
necessary, but also a welcome opportunity to further clarify eclecticism and help to 
establish and strengthen its position within the pluralist movement and philosophy of 
economics.  
To begin with, Sheila Dow's (2007) argument that eclecticism is simply incoherent 
pluralism without structure or criteria for the selection of theories, hypotheses etc. is 
discussed. It is argued that the justification for eclecticism developed in chapter 3 shows 
that these charges are untenable. Instead, selection criteria are available, although 
abstract, and the need for and the benefits of epistemological crises are a central point 
for eclectic choices in the justification developed in this dissertation. However, since 
selection criteria are said to not be objective, i.e. independent of a reference framework 
provided by the school of thought, the paradigm-like groupings or conceptual schemes, 
this might support Dow (2007), but her work on epistemology, and other discussions on 
pluralism, suggests that she does not argue for such objective criteria anyway.  
Secondly, the argument against the feasibility of eclectic research is discussed. The idea 
that a research project or a research question is addressed by different approaches 
stemming from different schools of thought, or even paradigm-level groupings, means 
that the researcher must devote time and resources to learn and use these different 
approaches for her research. In practice, however, these resources might not be 
available for the researcher, so pursuing an eclectic research might simply be impossible 
for anyone in a modern research environment, with administrative and teaching duties 
and tight deadlines. However, it is argued that despite these realities of everyday 
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academic life, eclectic research is still possible in the long run. Since it is possible for 
the researcher to publish preliminary findings, which is already a common practice, 
without cessation of the research project, eclecticism would likewise allow the 
publication of provisional results from a single-approach applications and the 
continuation of such project with other approaches later. This, of course, means that not 
every research project can be conducted eclectically, but the impossibility of universal 
eclectic research does not imply the universal impossibility of eclectic research.  
Thirdly, the question has been raised whether eclecticism is just another argument for 
mixed-method research. Indeed, there are several overlapping themes between 
eclecticism and mixed-method research and the fact that there is mixed-method research 
literature arguing for eclecticism makes the assumption even more plausible. However, 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie's (2004), themselves favouring eclecticism, in-depth analysis 
of mixed method research shows the differences with eclecticism on the level of 
paradigm-like groupings and universal methodological norms and cognitive aims. Here, 
it seems as mixed method research uses fixed frameworks of higher concepts without 
the need or willingness to change these. Apparently, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) 
argue for pragmatism to be the underlying philosophical stance for mixed-method 
research, while the eclectic justification outlined in chapter 3 demands the transcending 
movement away from such a singular, philosophical framework and the inclusion of 
other reference frames, such as post-structuralism, critical realism or others. While 
eclecticism and mixed-method research seem to agree on the level of method choice, 
choices of philosophical frameworks are points of departure between both concepts.  
Fourthly, the eclectic justification raised doubts whether eclecticism is not simply a new 
form, or a new argument for, pragmatism. This objection arose with regards to several 
arguments made not only for eclecticism, but also when pluralists' positions were 
outlined. The issue is that if eclecticism is basically pragmatism in disguise, the novelty 
of this position would be diminished or even disappear. The analysis of pragmatism 
revealed, however, that it not only spans over heterogeneous philosophical positions, 
but that the similarities between pragmatism and eclecticism, and likewise pluralism, 
rather arises from the influences of pragmatist philosophers on contemporary 
philosophical thought. Hence, pragmatic concepts, ideas, hypotheses etc. can not only 
be found in the justification for eclecticism or pluralism, but also in several other 
philosophical and non-philosophical disciplines. The overlap between eclectic and 
pragmatist thoughts, ideas and concepts does not, as argued above, mean they are 
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identical, as this is also true for every other intersection of pragmatism and other 
schools of thought or paradigm-like groupings.  
Finally, concerns were raised that eclecticism ultimately would lead to an 'everything 
goes' kind of relativism, where there are neither selection criteria (Dow, 2007), truth 
criteria or any other certainties. After an analysis of relativism, its history and its place 
in philosophy, the, somewhat surprising answer to the question is in some way positive. 
However, the analysis reveals the diverse nature of relativistic positions, just like in the 
case of pragmatism, and how some of these positions are found across different 
philosophical, and ultimately also economic schools of thought164. We have found 
ontological relativism in Quine (see, for instance, 1951) and James (1979), also 
indicating the relationship between pragmatism and relativism. Quine's (1951), and 
Duhem's (1991), underdetermination of theories has become a relevant topic in 
contemporary philosophy of science and became known as the Duhem-Quine thesis. 
Paul Feyerabend (1993), Thomas Kuhn (2012), Imre Lakatos (1970a; b, 1976, 1978) 
and Hilary Putnam (1981b, 1982, 1987a, 2002) have likewise supported relativistic 
positions, and following the explanation of Krausz (2010) pluralist and eclectic 
arguments found in the literature are likewise relativistic to some extent. Hence, when 
eclecticism means to choose from the variety of approaches offered in economics, and 
at least some of them have relativistic tendencies, or philosophical underpinnings, then 
ultimately eclecticism will lead to the choice of relativistic positions. Yet, with regards 
to truth theories, eclecticism can, as mentioned, either be pluralistic or agnostic and does 
not need to be relativistic. Moreover, following Krausz's (2010) analysis of relativism, 
and more important what it is not, relativistic positions are not to be confused with 
extreme versions of subjectivism, in which every person's own, unique perspective of 
the world prevents the establishment of common grounds in any question regarding the 
representation of the world. Instead, relativism can also be used to describe different, 
but shared and comparable reference frameworks, something that is used in this 
dissertation with the distinction between methodological norms and cognitive aims on 
the three levels of schools of thought, paradigm-like groupings and conceptual schemes, 
where migration is possible and, thus, full incommensurability and incompatibility are 
denied. Lastly, Krausz (2010, p.22) also distinguishes between global and local 
relativism, where “a local relativist at the ontic level affirms that only some objects” and 
__________________________ 
164 Here, one could think, at least, of Marxist economics, since Baghramian (2010) identifies relativistic arguments 
in Marxism. 
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“at the epistemic level affirms that our knowledge of only some objects is frame-
dependent”, whereas the global relativist ascribes frame-dependency to all objects. That 
being said, it seems reasonable to assume that eclecticism would maximally lead to 
local relativism, where only some objects, and the knowledge about such objects, are 
dependent on schools of thought and paradigm-like groupings, while others are not. 
This, however, would require further argumentation and research for clarification. 
In conclusion, this chapter established a first defence against objections that were 
brought to my attention by peers and colleagues. As said before, there is plenty of room 
for further criticism, but for now these are the major and most interesting objections 
raised. They also gave the opportunity to further flush out the meaning and applicability 
of eclecticism in economics, and to provide some practical advice or consequences for 
economists and their research. Hence, it is believed that eclecticism can have a future in 
economic research and should be taken seriously by both heterodox and orthodox 
economists.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE ECLECTIC ECONOMIST CONCLUDED 
Life is the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from 
insufficient premises. - Samuel Butler 
 
This PhD research project, which resulted in this monograph, began with the aim of 
understanding eclecticism and asking whether it can be useful for pluralist economists, 
and ultimately, as it is the central aim of the heterodoxy I identify myself with, help in 
the advancement of the economic discipline. Over the past three years, the aim changed 
only slightly as to what the understanding of eclecticism, but also pluralism in 
economics, actually implies. The biggest change came with a shift from a mere 
understanding and application of eclecticism to a coherent justification for it, which was 
not only considered necessary but proved to be a gap in the eclectic literature that 
needed to be explored.  
 
5.1. A SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES 
In chapter 1, the pluralist literature in economics is briefly introduced in order to 
support the understanding of eclecticism, its possible role in economics, and its 
relationship with the heterodoxy and, in particular, pluralism. Hence, the first chapter 
lays the groundwork for the argument put forward in chapter 3 that eclecticism stands in 
close, sub-categorical relationship with pluralism. The support for this argument comes 
from the identification of key themes and positions held within the pluralist literature, 
which is shown to be similar with the eclectic arguments in chapter 2.  
The key themes identified are ontological, epistemological, methodological and virtue 
pluralists' arguments. Beginning with the ontological discussion, it is shown that, 
although there is generally a significant discussion of ontology in economics, the 
question of ontological pluralism remains untouched. For this reason, literature 
conceptualising ontological pluralism from outside economics is consulted for 
clarification (Eklund, 2008, 2009, McDaniel, 2009, 2010a; b, 2013a; b, 2014). This 
conceptualisation suggests that there are different ways of being, expressed by different, 
restricted existential quantifiers in any given language (McDaniel, 2009, 2010a; b, 
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2013a; b, 2014). The underlying focus on the philosophy of language for the definition 
of ontological pluralism is important for reasons outlined in chapter 3, where the 
justification of eclecticism, and eclectic choice, builds, among other elements, on 
different ontological utterances.  
While ontologically in some way vague, although, at the same time, sophisticated 
enough for argumenta ad complexity, the pluralist central conclusion in epistemology 
claims uncertainty of knowledge, i.e. the absence of decisive factors determining what 
counts as (scientific) knowledge and what does not (Gettier, 1963; McCloskey, 1994; 
Dow, 2007). Instead of one best way to create or define knowledge, certain sets of 
criteria can be formulated to establish what we would call scientific knowledge, 
whereas Schurz (2011) names minimal realism, minimal empiricism, fallibilism and 
intersubjective objectivity as a good set of candidates. Despite the argument that this is 
a very good set for defining scientific knowledge, Schurz (2011) remains open to 
different or further criteria. Finally, these sets are used to define epistemological 
pluralism in this dissertation, which is used again in chapter 3 to conceptualise the 
eclectic choice. 
A similar theme to the epistemological uncertainty can be found in the literature 
regarding methodological pluralism, where there is no best, single method to conduct 
(economic) research (Caldwell, 1982, 1997; Dow, 2014). This insight is in contrast to a 
positivist understanding of science and is closely related to the uncertainty of 
knowledge, which ultimately leads the proponents of such a post-positivistic philosophy 
in economics to argue that as a result of this absence of a single method, a diversity of 
methods and methodologies must not only be tolerated but applied for the improvement 
of the discipline itself (Caldwell, 1982; Dow, 1985, 1997, 2004, 2007; Lawson, 2006; 
Mäki, 1997; Negru and Bigo, 2008; Negru, 2009). Methodological pluralism is also the 
most developed and covered of all three areas of pluralism, ontological, epistemological 
and methodological, in the heterodox literature.  
Lastly, the pluralist literature contains contributions less focused on ontological, 
epistemological or methodological arguments, which make their case for pluralism 
based on the virtue of tolerance. The claims for tolerating other schools of thought in 
economics range from the need for intellectual conversation among different groups to 
make any advancement (Caldwell, 1982; Garnett, 2006, 2011) over the absence of 
isolated methods in science and therefore the need to accept the contextual environment 
they are situated in (Samuels, 1997a; b, 1998) to an apologetic 'live and let live' 
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tolerance, which is based on the idea of isolated and incommensurate schools of thought 
(Lee, 2011a; b). Although this literature is, in its arguments, slightly separated from the 
previously discussed claims for pluralism, it is obvious that the virtue of tolerance is an 
essential characteristic of the pluralist and the eclectic, as it guarantees a mind-set for 
the acceptance of different schools of thought and their potential value for the 
discipline, and prohibits a strong discriminatory tendency otherwise said to be found 
among monists.  
Finally, the chapter concludes with how heterodoxy and orthodoxy have been 
differentiated and what is meant by schools of thought in economics, as these are 
reoccurring themes in the heterodox and pluralist literature, and are also important for 
this dissertation. The dichotomy between heterodoxy and orthodoxy, and their 
respective schools of thought, is difficult to draw. A common way to distinguish them is 
to argue that the orthodoxy is monist in its methodology. However, this argument does 
not hold as even the current mainstream is more open to incorporating different 
methodological approaches (Colander, 2000). Another way is to argue that the ontology 
of the orthodoxy is particularly closed-system, while the heterodoxy has an open-system 
ontology (Dow, 2000; Chick and Dow, 2005; Lawson, 1997, 2003b). As a result of this 
difference, Lawson (2006) argues that the core of the heterodox rejection of the 
orthodoxy is ontological in nature. The problem here is, however, that the heterodox 
economists have no coherent definition for schools of thought and that this rejection 
might be the only commonality heterodox schools of thought have, and therefore there 
is little to no room for intellectual exchange (Negru and Bigo, 2008). These problems 
have led to a new conceptualisation of schools of thought in chapter 3 and, in some 
way, the orthodoxy and heterodoxy in economics. This is loosely inspired by Negru's 
(2007) argument to understand schools of thought as communities of academics with 
shared beliefs, interests and ontological, epistemological and methodological stances.  
 
5.2. A SUMMARY OF ECLECTICISM: PAST AND PRESENT 
After the positions of pluralism are outlined in chapter 1, chapter 2 explores the 
philosophical concept of eclecticism. This investigation is roughly divided into three 
chronologically ordered periods, namely ancient, early enlightenment and modern 
eclecticism, as well as additional thematic concepts of idealistic eclecticism and 
criticism of eclecticism, in order to extrapolate the meanings of and develop a working 
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definition for eclecticism. The latter is required, as argued, because there is no suitable 
definition of eclecticism in the literature that acknowledges the rich history of this 
concept and satisfies the needs of this research. 
Historically, Donini (1988) summarises six understandings of eclecticism in the mostly 
enlightenment literature. Firstly, and still prominent today, is a negative interpretation 
of eclecticism as an uncritical mixture of philosophical elements, thoughts and theories, 
which Donini (1988) sees originating form Zeller (1883) and Hegel (Reinicke, 1979). 
Secondly, there is a rather value-free evaluation of eclecticism defining it as a sect, in 
which philosophers combine elements from different sources. Thirdly, eclecticism as 
defined by Moraux (1984) as an intentional orthodoxy where philosophers commit 
themselves to a specific sect but include elements of others, because they are convinced 
these elements are compatible and helpful for their work. Fourth, pedagogical 
eclecticism that does not discriminate philosophical sects when taught in the classroom. 
Instead, they are presented as equals and the students are given the choice which of 
these sect to prefer. Fifth, eclecticism as treatment of philosophical sects as equal and an 
additional anti-dogmatic and anti-sectarian stance, and finally the specific attempt by 
Antiochus of Ascalon to combine Platonism, Aristotelianism and Stoicism into one sect. 
From these six conceptualisations Donini (1988) dismisses all but two and three for 
reasons outlined in chapter 2, while the proposed definition in this dissertation makes 
reference to the anti-dogmatic attitude that was apparent in the eclectic literature.  
Eclecticism in the latest period, in the modern research literature of psychology, 
pedagogy, mixed method research, sociology and economics and law, distinguishes 
itself from the historical texts by means of developments of 20th century philosophy of 
science, and therefore adopts specific ontological, epistemological and methodological 
arguments which, eventually, makes this eclecticism and pluralism quite similar. 
Ontologically, the notion of a rather complicated, or even complex, object of inquiry 
can be found across the literature (see, for instance, Da Rocha Falcão and Hazin, 2011; 
Køppe, 2012). The nature of the objects of inquiry, for instance the ability of 
proportional reasoning among children, generates the epistemological and 
methodological arguments that state that different strategies and approaches are required 
to investigate, i.e. proportional reasoning can be explained, partially, by the cognitive 
development of the human brain and the social environment the child is situated in (Da 
Rocha Falcão and Hazin, 2011). In conclusion, theories, or single methods, are on their 
own, due to their own limitations (see also, with regards to economics and social 
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sciences, Albert, 1994a; b; Albert, Darell and Maier-Rigaud, 2012), not able to examine 
an object of inquiry thoroughly enough. Moreover, the eclectic literature, especially 
from the mixed method research community, rejects partially, or fully, Kuhn's (2012) 
incommensurability thesis and his paradigmatic view of science.  
From this wide range of historical and modern literature a suitable definition of 
eclecticism is synthesised by taking some of the aspects of previous definitions. One of 
the central aspects of eclecticism seems to be an anti-sectarianism. Despite Donini's 
(1988) rejection of it, and Sanderson's (1987) claim that this anti-dogmatism is itself 
dogmatic, this aspect is included, as it appears to have a pivotal role in the modern 
eclectic literature and will be translated respectively into the context of economics. 
Secondly, in relation to Moraux (1984) the notion of intentionality is likewise 
highlighted as important. The reason for this lies in the dismissal of accidental 
eclecticism, i.e. eclecticism as conceptualised in this dissertation always implies 
intentional behaviour. As a result of the review of the literature, eclecticism shall be 
understood as a philosophical leitmotif for the individual researcher to be unprejudiced, 
to have no commitment to a particular school of thought and to treat them as a priori 
valuable for the pursuit of one's research aspiration by deliberately choosing from the 
available range of historical and modern economic concepts, ideas, theories and 
practices.  
The implications of this definition are important for the understanding of the following 
chapter in which the justification of eclecticism is developed. Most important is the 
exploration of choice in the context of eclecticism. The eclectic intentionally chooses 
from, for instance, different schools of thought without commitment to one of them. 
This leads to the question of how choice can be made, especially in the absence of 
guiding principles, or where some of them are originating from these schools of 
thought. The relationship of guiding principles for choice and schools of thoughts, 
among other group-oriented concepts/discussions, is further explored in chapter 3 with 
the help of contemporary philosophy of social science literature. Secondly, this 
definition also hints at the relationship between pluralism and eclecticism, which is 
likewise finally explained in chapter 3. 
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5.3. A SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC ECLECTICISM 
The main chapter, which develops the justification for the eclectic choice, the principal 
question derived from definitions based on the historical and modern eclectic literature, 
begins with a comparison of elements of pluralism and eclecticism outlined in the 
previous two chapters. Especially modern eclectics and pluralists, due to the influence 
of contemporary philosophy of science literature, make their case for the absence of 
'one size fits all' methods/theories, which also implies somewhat shared ontological 
positions of the nature of the object of inquiry. Both pluralists and eclectics use this 
insight to call for a plurality of methods to investigate such complicated, or even 
complex, objects. Secondly, both pluralists (Dow, 2007) and eclectics (Koro-Ljungberg, 
2004) acknowledge that knowledge can be produced differently and that there is no best 
way to discriminate one way over another. Finally, tolerating different theoretical 
approaches, or schools of thought, is inherent in both the eclectic and the pluralist 
literature, with the latter having it promoted even more strongly by some pluralists as 
shown in chapter 1 (Caldwell, 1982; Samuels, 1997a; b, 1998, Garnett, 2006, 2011, Lee, 
2011a; b). As a result of these similarities, while acknowledging some differences, it is 
argued that eclecticism, with a focus on the individual researcher, is sub-categorical to 
pluralism, understood as a community effort. It is argued that one can be a pluralist 
without being an eclectic, i.e. approving different schools of thoughts etc. but 
committing oneself to one school only, while eclectics must be pluralists; eclecticism is 
pluralism within the individual. 
With the relationship between pluralism and eclecticism clarified, the remainder of the 
chapter shifts its focus to the question of how eclectic choice can be explained, made 
and justified. For this, the 20th century literature from philosophy of science with 
regards to rational theory choices is discussed, divided into pro and contra rational 
choice. Both sides essentially agree with, for instance, Kuhn (2012, p.200), who 
concludes that “[t]here is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic decision 
procedure”. However, following MacIntyre (1977, 1984, 1988), Laudan (1978, 1987, 
1996) as well as Lakatos (1978), Shweder (1986) and Kaiser (1991), choice can be 
justified even if those 'algorithms', or guiding principles, are non-neutral. Hence, the 
following three arguments pro-choice are made: in the absence of an objective 
rationality, i.e. no objective guiding principles, epistemological crises, which frustrate 
specific schools of thought's or paradigm-like grouping's narratives, can assist to 
acknowledge the need for change or migration from within a relative framework 
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(MacIntyre, 1977, 1984, 1988). Secondly, it is suggested to understand these rational 
frameworks as means-end relations of cognitive aims and methodological norms 
(Laudan, 1978, 1987, p.25, 1996; Kaiser, 1991) with them being formulated either in 
hypothetical or straight-forward imperatives of the form “if your [cognitive] aim is e, 
you ought [or have] to do m”. Thirdly, these cognitive aims and methodological norms 
range from universal over paradigm-like groupings to non-universal (Shweder, 1986). 
The universal cognitive aims and methodological norms are allocated within general 
conceptual schemes and world views, defining interpretive behaviour and 
conceptualisations, while paradigm-like aims and norms, as they suggest, determine 
more specific rationalities for scientific endeavour. The way eclecticism in this 
dissertation is rationalised, makes use specific aims and norms from a pluralist 
framework. It is argued that commitment to these is reasonable unless some better 
arguments are found or needed after one migrates. This is to say that even eclecticism 
itself, as rationalised in this dissertation, must be subject to epistemological crises in 
order to develop. Finally, non-universal cognitive aims and methodological norms are 
found at the level of schools of thought, thus defining their discursive, communal nature 
(Negru, 2007).  
With these three arguments in mind, eclectic choice is now understood as migrating 
movements between these different cognitive aims and methodological norms. While 
the migration between the non-universal aims and norms of schools of thought is said, 
and demonstrated, to be feasible, eclectic choice between higher level aims and norms, 
paradigm-like groupings and conceptual schemes, becomes increasingly difficult, with 
the latter assumed to be almost impossible. Moreover, with MacIntyre's (1977, 1984, 
1988) notion of epistemological crises, migration is not only possible but also 
beneficial, as eclecticism thus creates constant tension by frustrating the ideas, practices, 
methods, theories etc. from different schools of thought and paradigm-like groupings. 
This tension created by eclecticism's use of epistemological crises resembles to some 
extend Feyerabend's (1993) epistemological anarchism, which likewise concludes the 
inexistence of invariable methodological rules governing the advancement of science 
and is specifically referred to in the discussion about rational theory choices. 
Nonetheless, other than his methodological anarchism eclecticism does not attest 
schools of thought or paradigm-level groupings to be strongly ideological in their 
nature.  
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This is not to say that epistemological crises are the objective guiding principle whose 
existence is denied in the first place. These crises are themselves embedded in a 
framework and can be formulated in a hypothetical imperative like 'if your aim is to 
progress your school of thought, you ought to cause an epistemological crisis'. 
Moreover, if this imperative is shared across research traditions, it still is not neutral. 
Being shared by several communities does not imply neutral objectivity (Miner, 2011).  
The acceptance of this imperative is dependent on the community of researchers who 
themselves formulate the cognitive aims and methodological norms that define their 
very own school of thought. If it is incommensurate to the cognitive aims and 
methodological norms of the relevant community, then a strategy of changing the 
presumption as shown by D'Agostino (2014) can be applied to solve any issue.  
 
5.4. A SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
The final chapter discusses five criticism, namely Sheila Dow's (2007) argument that 
eclecticism is incoherent pluralism, that eclecticism is not feasible, eclecticism provides 
just another argument for mixed-method research, that eclecticism is pragmatism in 
disguise and that eclecticism leads to relativism. All of these criticisms have been raised 
by peers and colleagues in several discussions and presentations in the past three years, 
with the exception of the first one. With regards to the first, it is argued that Dow's 
(2007) point, that eclecticism is merely unstructured pluralism, is refuted by the 
justification of eclecticism outlined in chapter 3. This chapter shows that eclectics have 
selection criteria and that the epistemological crises used for the justification give 
eclecticism a reasonable structure. What is, however, rejected is the existence of 
objective, i.e. independent of any reference framework, criteria for choice, which 
includes those outlined for eclecticism itself.  
The second criticism about the feasibility of eclectic research stems from the argument 
that the application of various methods, theories, cognitive aims and methodological 
norms or even concepts from different schools of thought, paradigm-like groupings and 
even conceptual schemes requires the researcher to devote quite a lot of time and 
resources to learn and conduct her research. In modern academic life, however, the 
researcher might not have this time and these resources available to her, due to 
limitations by administrative and teaching duties as well as deadlines. These practical 
limitations would make eclectic research extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
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Although it is true that these realities of everyday research limit the possibility of 
eclectic research, it remains, as argued, possible to conduct such research in the long 
run. Then, eclectic research can be conducted over several years with the prospect of 
publishing preliminary findings. This is already a common practise in the sciences, 
where preliminary findings are published in projects with more generous or no 
deadlines to indicate the progress of that project. On the other hand, this means that 
eclectic research is not applicable for short-term research projects with definitive 
deadlines, but this only limits the range of possible eclectic research for the economist. 
At the end, it appears that eclectic research is more suitable for the fundamental, grand 
questions in the discipline.  
The third critical point that is raised is the question of whether eclecticism is just 
another way of promoting mixed method research. It is true that there are several, 
overlapping themes between eclecticism and mixed-method research, and as chapter 2 
shows there are arguments for eclecticism in the mixed-method research literature. It is, 
however, argued that there are differences in the cognitive aims and methodological 
norms of mixed-method research and eclecticism and that mixed-method research is 
situated somewhere between schools of thoughts and paradigm-like groupings with a 
fixed framework of concepts without the need or willingness to migrate. In fact, 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) specifically argue that mixed-method research works 
best under pragmatism as a philosophical framework, while eclecticism, as developed in 
chapter 3, clearly includes migration in higher levels of paradigm-like groupings. 
Hence, while eclecticism and mixed-method research appear to be equal on the level of 
method or even theory choice, they differ when it comes to higher level frameworks 
with different cognitive aims and methodological norms.  
Fourthly, the question was brought to my attention whether the argument developed for 
eclecticism is not simply a new way to promote (American) Pragmatism. This question 
was raised when both arguments for eclecticism and pluralism were presented to peers 
and colleagues and would mean, if true, that the novelty of eclecticism would diminish 
or even disappear. It is argued, however, that the similarities between eclecticism and 
pragmatism do not arise because they are identical, but rather through the influence 
pragmatic thinkers had on contemporary philosophy of science. Therefore, the influx of 
pragmatic ideas and concepts found their way through philosophy of science not only 
into eclectic and pluralist literature, but other modern philosophical schools of thought. 
Moreover, it is also shown that pragmatic thinkers differ from each other in their own 
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conceptualisation of pragmatism and thus, there is no real homogeneous pragmatic 
school itself. The only overarching characteristic of pragmatism is an identity giving 
'us', as found in other schools of thought, that could be used to delimit the members 
from others. One of the important contributions to contemporary philosophy, i.e. the 
shift in focus towards the importance of language, seems to come from pragmatist 
Richard Rorty (1979, 1980, 1989, 1992, 1998), among others. It is thus natural that 
these pragmatic influences occur in this research dissertation, and its justification for 
eclecticism, where the importance of linguistics also plays a certain role. Yet, this does 
not imply that eclecticism is just another form of pragmatism, as this argument could 
then be made for other philosophical positions with pragmatic influences while non-
pragmatic influences must logically lead to the conflation of eclecticism and those non-
pragmatic philosophical positions.  
Finally, the concern that eclecticism leads to a relativistic position was raised, in the 
sense that we will arrive at some kind of 'everything goes' mentality with no theory or 
method selection criteria, truth criteria or any other certainties for the researcher. As a 
result of this critical point, it is shown that relativism has, just like pragmatism, 
influenced contemporary philosophy to some extent, that it is no surprise to find 
arguments resembling relativistic positions that support eclecticism, and pluralism for 
that matter. It is shown that some kinds of relativism are apparent in writings of Quine 
(1951), James (1979), Feyerabend (1993), Kuhn (2012), Lakatos (1970a; b, 1976, 1978) 
and Putnam (1981a, 1982, 1987a, 2002), indicating the range of different philosophers 
who had relativistic ideas. Moreover, it is shown that relativistic positions should not be 
confused with extreme versions of subjectivism, in which individuals' own unique 
perspective or experience of the world prevents the formation of common grounds 
regarding the representation of the world (Krausz, 2010). Additionally, we can 
distinguish between local and global relativism, in which “a local relativist at the ontic 
level affirms that only some objects” and “at the epistemic level that our knowledge of 
some objects [are] frame-dependent” (Krausz, 2010, p.22), i.e. our understanding of 
some objects is independent of our schools of thought, while the global relativism 
ascribe frame-dependency to everything. Although frame-dependency plays an 
important role for the justification of eclecticisms, the rationale in this dissertation itself 
remains agnostic to whether this is locally or globally relativistic and it is argued that 
eclecticism would maximally lead to local relativism. Eclecticism is thus relativistic as 
it uses arguments for the existence of different but comparable reference frameworks.   
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5.5. WHAT THE FUTURE MIGHT BRING 
Like in every PhD research, there are things unmentioned, things undone, things 
underdeveloped. This is likewise true for this dissertation. Therefore I wish to outline 
three aspects or issues with regards to eclecticism in economics, which have, 
purposefully, not been discussed here, mostly due to restrictions in scope and length of 
this dissertation. At the time of writing, four major issues with regards to eclecticism are 
left open for future exploration. Firstly, identifying eclecticism in the historic economic 
literature. Secondly, intentionality and agency of the eclectic economist. Thirdly, 
eclecticism and its pedagogical meaning for curriculum development. Fourth, the 
relationship between eclecticism and truth theories.  
The literature review has shown that the identification of eclecticisms in the writings of 
historical figures is, due to the lack of decisive criteria, rather difficult. This is even 
more amplified with intentionality as the defining characteristic of eclecticism used in 
this dissertation, as an absence of intentionality strictly means an absence of eclecticism. 
However, when it comes to interpretation, rather than application, of eclecticism, 
different criteria might have to be applied and Moraux's (1984) conceptualisation of 
intentional and de facto orthodoxy might be the best candidate for such interpretation. 
With the tool for interpretation set out, the next step is to find sources of interpretation. 
Bronk (2009) and Viner (1927) list Robert Malthus, John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, 
Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes as possible eclectic candidates, whose work 
would have to be analysed and interpreted with Moraux's (1984) conceptualisation of 
intentional and de facto orthodoxy. Although such analysis yields, most likely, very 
interesting insights, the needed scope of such interpretative work requires, as argued, a 
PhD research project in the history of economic thought itself and, therefore, does not 
fit into this dissertation.  
Secondly, the presupposed intentionality in the definition of eclecticism is suffice to 
distinguish eclectic choice from accidental adoption of elements from outside schools of 
thought or paradigm-like groupings in this thesis. However, it might be necessary for 
the future to draw upon works of Anscombe (2000), Searle (1983) and Dennett (1989), 
to name a few, on intentionality to explore its relationship with eclectic choice and the 
cognitive aims and methodological norms on all described levels. Especially 
Anscombe's (2000) analysis of intentionality and human action appears to be promising 
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for the analysis of these aspects of eclecticism and may further help to understand 
overall agency of eclectic economists.  
Thirdly, eclecticism in pedagogy, especially with regards to Hegel's (Reinicke, 1979) 
interpretation of Potamo of Alexandria or in the way Taggert (1955) promotes it, may 
help to justify curriculum change in economics, and a greater inclusion of different 
schools of thoughts, as well as the history of economic thought, and the application of 
different pedagogical tools by the teacher. Although teaching is an aspect of modern 
academic life that is as important as research, I made the decision to develop the 
justification for eclectic choice purely with regards to economic research. The focus on 
research is, I would suggest, much more challenging, while arguments for eclectic 
teaching may not only require a slightly different justification, but may also be more 
straight-forward. Hence, a slightly less lengthy research project may lead to some 
insights or arguments about where eclecticism can be used in the classroom and may 
support the wider push for curricula change.  
Finally, the relationship between eclecticism and truth has remained mostly untouched 
in this dissertation. The reason for this is, again, the scope of this dissertation. Although 
the linguistic aspects discussed in this dissertation, such as framework-dependent 
conceptualisations, imply some kind of relativity with regards to truth, i.e. sentences 
about conceptualisations come out true in the relevant framework but false in others, the 
relationship between truth and eclecticism, and more specific truth theories, is not 
explored in much detail. It is hinted that eclectics could be either truth relativists, 
pluralists or totally agnostic towards truth. However, a detailed examination of truth 
theories for the development of a conceptualisation of eclectic truth would mean 
extensive research that, with the already conducted justification of eclectic choice, 
would certainly go beyond the scope of a PhD dissertation. The potential importance of 
an eclectic theory of truth, on the other hand, justifies and motivates future research that 
will build upon the arguments brought forward in this research.  
 
5.6. FINALLY SOME FINAL WORDS 
In summary, I have achieved my aims to develop an understanding of eclecticism in this 
dissertation and to present a reasonable justification for the use of eclecticism in 
economics, and possibly other social sciences. The central question, which emerged 
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from the reviewed literature on eclecticism, which spans over several centuries in 
human history, about the possibility to justify eclectic choice on the levels of method, 
theory, paradigm-like groups or even conceptual schemes, as defined by cognitive aims 
and methodological norms, can be and has been formulated successfully in this 
dissertation. Eclecticism therefore allows the individual researcher to conduct her 
research in a new way, a way in which migration between cognitive aims and 
methodological norms is possible in these various levels. Migration is not only possible 
and desirable for its own sake, but also helps in producing advancements in, at least, the 
schools of thought in economics, and the discipline itself, by frustrating them with 
induced epistemological crises. Hence, the eclectic economist is free to migrate, 
uncommitted to a single school of thought and refrains from being dismissive a priori 
towards any of them. At the end, to paraphrase Diderot (see Donini, 1988, p.19), the 
eclectic economists may become those economists “who are the kings on the face of the 
earth”, or the eclectic economist may realise what George Shackle (1952, as cited in 
Steele, 2004) had in mind when talking about the 'complete economist'.  
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